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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the connections between ideologies of modernity and social 
power for three interrelated sets of elites in Mozambique. My research is based on 20 
months of ethnographic fieldwork primarily, but not solely, among the now adult 
children of high-ranking members of Frelimo (Mozambican Liberation Front, the 
ruling party since independence) and those closely associated with the party in the 
capital city of Maputo. It examines how elites’ transforming relationship to the project 
of modernity has allowed them to survive periods of dramatic social change while 
maintaining power, although in a modified form. The thesis argues that “local” 
understandings of modernity held by dominant groups in Mozambique have created 
the wider political field that unifies elites and creates the parameters in which they 
operate. It allows them both to control the positions that underwrite their social power 
and to attempt to justify their positions of power. The thesis examines the source of 
elites’ social dominance and how it has been transformed over the generations. I also 
investigate how recent social, political and economic changes have created a growing 
backlash among social groups who were once Frelimo’s strongest supporters. The 
thesis argues that through the acquisition and monopolisation of “modern” skills, such 
as high levels of education, elites can survive contested legitimacy because there are 
few who seem capable of replacing them.  
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
… in relatively backward countries, where the process of modernization 
has yet to come into its own, modernism, where it develops, takes on a 
fantastic character, because it is forced to nourish itself not on social 
reality but on fantasies, mirages, dreams (Berman 1982: 235). 
 
1.1 Uncomfortable Modernity 
 
A Mozambican friend, Lina, once expressed to me deep worry over some of 
the trends she found among the modern Mozambican elite. Lina comes from an elite 
family. She is of mixed descent, primarily Portuguese and Goan. Her grandfather was 
born in Portugal and emigrated to Mozambique during the colonial period, where he 
worked with the Portuguese army. Although he tended towards the right of the 
political spectrum and returned to Portugal after independence, Samito (Lina’s father 
and his son) had been a fervent Frelimista (supporter of Frelimo).
1
 Samito still 
frequently speaks about the socialist leader, Samora Machel, the legendary first 
president of Mozambique. During the socialist period Samito was a high-ranking civil 
servant. Although he has left government service during the capitalist period, he still 
maintains connections with the government and many of Lina’s friends also come 
from families that include current or former high-ranking officials in Frelimo. 
 Lina is concerned about her family’s sources of wealth in the post-socialist 
era, which is a far cry from the socialist austerity the elite had previously championed. 
In the current neo-liberal era, there have been many corruption scandals involving 
elites and Lina is trying to understand exactly where her family’s prosperity comes 
from. Lina is not entirely alone in this anxiety. Other thoughtful young elites are also 
raising uncomfortable questions about their family’s wealth. Another friend once told 
me that she asked her father, who at the time was in charge of a major public works 
project, if he was implicated in the corruption that was rumoured to surround the 
development. He truthfully answered that he had never done anything so bad that he 
                                                 
1
 Frelimo (Mozambican Liberation Front) is the ruling party of Mozambique and has been continually 
in power since they won independence from the Portuguese in 1975. 
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could not sleep at night. Despite examples like this, Lina feels that very few young 
elites ever question their rising prosperity. Many, in her opinion, simply took it as 
their due, just some of the perks that arise from their status. Lina’s assessment broadly 
conforms with many non-elite perceptions found in Maputo. The children of elites are 
often nicknamed the “Do you know who I ams?”. Other young elites, although less 
fond of ostentatious display, still cannot bring themselves to question their families, as 
Lina remarked about a mutual friend: “You have seen… together with her father, they 
are like a king with his princess, you know she never questions where everything 
comes from”.  
 In Mozambique the allegations of corruption among elites goes beyond the 
moral complicity of theft and casts doubts on the underlying ideology that was one of 
the primary internal justifications of their social position.
2
 To understand why this is 
so, it is necessary to know something about the background of the ruling Mozambican 
elites. The majority of the ruling elites belonged to a category known as assimilado 
(the assimilated)
3
 in the colonial era, with a significant minority (like Lina’s family) 
from Indian, mixed-race, or Portuguese backgrounds. This group is a small minority 
of the population that is mainly urban-based, with a cosmopolitan outlook and 
relatively weak ties to “traditional”, or indigenous African power structures. Many of 
the current elites could broadly be characterised as having a petty-bourgeois 
background in the colonial period. The social groups who make up this elite became 
increasing embittered against and alienated from Portuguese colonial rule. It was 
these groups who came to dominate the Frelimo party, which made common cause 
with sections of the peasantry and fought a guerrilla against the Portuguese. The 
eventual outcome was Mozambique’s independence.4   
Upon the assumption of power Frelimo promised a new, socialist/egalitarian 
and radically modernist social order. In the early days of independence Frelimo 
enjoyed strong popular support, although some argue the party’s popularity came 
                                                 
2
 By Ideology I am referring to a “master narrative” in which elites support basic beliefs and 
assumptions, legitimise the existing social structure and show an image of the elite to the world, the 
way in which they would like to be seen (Getty and Naumov 1999: 18). 
3
 Assimilados were a colonial category for non-whites in the colonial era. To be an assimilado one had 
to demonstrate certain criteria and have one’s application approved by the state. Theoretically 
assimilados had equal rights with Portuguese colonisers, although that was not the case in practise. The 
status did confer significant advantages as compared to the majority of the population. Assimilação is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapters Two, Three and Four.   
4
 There is a common pattern in modern revolutions where an embittered urban intelligentsia allies itself 
with sections of the peasantry to overthrow the social order (see Wolf 1973 for further details). 
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primarily from it having freed the population from Portuguese rule and that only a 
small minority of the population actually understood the party’s ideology or political 
programme (Hall and Young 1997). While this may be the case, the Frelimo 
leadership’s vision of creating a radically new world was intoxicating to some, 
especially young urbanites. A middle-class woman in her 40s, who lives in Maputo 
and comes from a similar social background to many members of Frelimo leaders 
once told me about how excited she was during the initial days of independence.  She 
is now a strong critic of Frelimo and she feels the party is corrupt and self-serving, but 
her frequent criticisms are occasionally interrupted by nostalgia when she recalls how 
she felt when she was a teenager. According to her the atmosphere of the early days 
seemed electric and she was convinced that anything was possible. 
 
I was about 15 years old when we became independent and I was tremendously excited. 
Things had been bad under the transitional government,
5
 but I was very hopeful for the 
future. Frelimo had set up neighbourhood parties throughout the city for the 
independence ceremonies. My mother had attended one of these parties in our 
neighbourhood. Others of my family, those who had done well under the old regime, 
stayed home. They were frightened about what would happen to them now and they did 
not want to be publicly humiliated. As for me, I wanted to go to Machava Stadium, where 
they were going to have the ceremony. I went with my sister and my aunt and uncle. 
When we arrived the Stadium was completely packed with people. My aunt and uncle 
decided to stay in the car and listen to the ceremony on the radio, but my sister and I 
squeezed our way in. It was amazing. At midnight, when Samora Machel gave his speech 
declaring independence and they raised our new flag, everyone went crazy with joy. 
People were completely overcome with emotion, they were crying and cheering, they 
could not contain themselves. They had a fireworks display and Frelimo soldiers fired 
their guns into the air to celebrate. My sister and I became worried, the crowd was 
ecstatic, and we did not want to get accidentally crushed. Some Frelimo guards saw us 
and helped us out, we were very small and luckily the celebrations were very well-
organised. We made our way back to our aunt and uncle’s car and they gave us some tea. 
It was an incredible night (Field notes 7 July and 8 November 20 2003). 
 
 Throughout my fieldwork I heard many similar descriptions of the early days 
of independence from middle class urbanites, even from those who are now alienated 
from, or critical of, Frelimo. For many members of this group at least there was a 
genuine enthusiasm for Frelimo and the new society they promised to create. Yet 
despite initial public support for the party’s goals, be it animated as from middle class 
urbanites I interviewed, or more passive as Hall and Young (1997) suggested was the 
case for large sections of the peasantry, Frelimo’s plans for transformative 
modernisation were essentially a “top-down” project. The original egalitarian rhetoric 
                                                 
5
 The Transitional Government was a year-long interim government in Mozambique during the final 
negotiations for independence. During this period there were many outbreaks of violence in the capital. 
See Chapter Four for more detail. 
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of the party aside, the Frelimo leadership together with many of their followers 
remained a distinctive elite with a particular worldview. This sense of distinction has 
historical roots that go back to the colonial period. The social groups that were 
strongly represented in the leadership had seen themselves as the more “developed” 
sections of Mozambique’s population and their assumption of power was predicated 
on the promise to transform Mozambique from a colonial backwater ruled by brutal 
and arbitrary authority to a strong, modern and “rational” state. As the Frelimo 
leadership tried to create a completely new Mozambique they encountered significant 
difficulties. Their plans were extremely ambitious.  They laid out a social programme 
which would have been difficult to achieve even under the best circumstances, but 
which was well nigh impossible under those obtained after independence. Frelimo 
inherited a state verging on bankruptcy with few qualified personnel to carry out the 
centre’s directives. The meagre resources that were available were often wasted on 
grandiose and badly thought out projects. In addition the leadership’s version of 
modernity alienated sections of the population, which then provided support for or at 
least acquiesced in foreign funded aggression. By the mid-1980s much of the nation 
was devastated by a brutal civil war. When Mozambique was mentioned in the 
world’s media, it was synonymous with poverty, war, shocking brutality and 
starvation. This was not the version of modernity that the elite had desired to build. 
 By the late 1980s the war had reached a stalemate and the country was in 
ruins. The ruling elite, desperate to stave off complete collapse and almost entirely 
dependent on foreign aid, were pressured by international institutions and the 
country’s major donors to introduce radical changes. Socialism was abandoned, as 
was the single-party state, a large-scale privatisation programme was introduced and 
multiparty elections were held (Pitcher 1996, 2002). Since the end of the war 
Mozambique has enjoyed one of the higher economic growth rates in Africa. The new 
Frelimo president, Armando Guebuza, once known as a hard-line leftist, has appeared 
at a photo shoot with George Bush, who hailed him as one of the “New Kind of 
Leaders in Africa”, a leader who embraces “free markets” and democracy (The 
Independent 6 July 2005). A recent article that appeared in a British newspaper cited 
Mozambique as a case to prove that development aid can be effective.  Instead of 
being a “typical African basket-case” (ibid), Mozambique is now seen as a success 
story.  
 13 
 Yet the triumphalism of these accounts obscures some of the continuities that 
have accompanied political change in Mozambique. Most important among these is 
the identity of the ruling class. The present incarnation of Frelimo has replaced the 
rhetoric of socialist egalitarianism with the more “current” discourse of human rights, 
multiparty democracy, civil society and foreign investment. Yet the government 
officials who speak of the need to create an entrepreneurial “culture” in Mozambique 
are often the same people who spoke of the need to build socialism in earlier years. 
Since independence the ruling elite has remained remarkably cohesive, despite the 
changing political situation. Even the more hard-line socialist ministers who have 
been replaced in the transition to capitalism continue to belong to the party, often as 
members of the central committee, near the summit of the party hierarchy and 
Frelimo’s policy making body. In contrast to other African countries, members of the 
leadership have had relatively few public disagreements or formed splinter parties. 
Despite the failure of socialism, many members of the ruling elite still see themselves 
as the “engine” of modernisation in Mozambique, even if modernity will take a very 
different form. This is central to the self-image of several Mozambican elites and an 
attempt to legitimise their social power. Elements of this can be seen from grand 
policy statements to more mundane manifestations such as Frelimo t-shirts and 
election slogans that consistently promise “progress’ in exchange for votes. 
 By pointing to some of the continuities in Mozambican politics since 
independence, I do not mean to deny that dramatic changes have taken place. Ideas 
concerning modernity have been, and continue to be, an underlying thread of both 
elite political discourse and the way the privileged see themselves. These ideas are 
not static though and they have transformed considerably since independence. 
 The vision of modernity originally conceived by the Frelimo leadership was a 
vast unifying project that would be dependent on mass mobilisation. Following the 
chaos and destruction of the civil war period, intense internal disputes and ultimately 
the fall of socialism, these kinds of grand visions of mass modernity appear to be 
receding from political discourse. Modernity, in the current era, is no longer 
characterised as a goal that can be achieved through simultaneously mobilising and 
transforming the population. Instead, many elites increasingly think it is a feature 
distinctive to themselves. This can be seen both by the new “technocratic” political 
discourses and by spending time with young elites whose formative period occurred 
after independence. Young elites are less self-conscious about modernity; for the 
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most part they always thought that they were. Modernity is something that makes 
them unique in a country that fundamentally is not. My thesis explores the formation 
of a Frelimo-based elite and the way they have harnessed changing conceptions of 
modernity in Mozambique and how they have been linked in various ways to social 
power.    
  
1.2 Elites 
 
 It has long been commented on in elite studies that the term elite is amorphous 
and that they are difficult to accurately define and delineate (Hansen and Parrish 
1983; Marcus 1983a; Shore 2002). As I once heard in a conference, “an elite is a like 
a giraffe, it is difficult to describe but you know one when you see one”. Part of this 
problem stems from the fact that in most societies there are multiple “elites”. Thus 
various groups may dominate the realms of business, cultural activity, religion and 
politics on a local and national scale. There may be a significant overlap between 
these groups, with a member of a given elite holding multiple offices in different 
sectors of society throughout their career but this varies from place to place and in 
different historical contexts. In addition, although elites can exercise significant 
power and control resources through their connections to institutional structures, in 
today’s “mass societies”, unlike those with more feudal forms of government, it can 
be difficult to demarcate them from the social groups where they have their origins 
(Marcus 1983a).  
 This confusion exists in Mozambique where there are also multiple elites. The 
term could conceivably be applied to local regulos (chiefs), regional party cadres, 
high-ranking members of the major opposition party, religious leaders of influence, 
foreigners connected with powerful international aid agencies and the top members of 
the Indian merchant class whose wealth grows from international economic 
connections. This thesis concentrates on an interlinked group of people who currently 
appear to be the socially dominant, if not uncontested, group in Mozambique. This 
group coalesces around the Frelimo party, including many current or former high-
ranking members, their families and close associates. The dominant place of high-
ranking Frelimo members is widely recognised in Mozambique and Frelimo is often 
used as a generic term for elite in Maputo, Mozambique’s capital. 
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 My thesis focuses primarily on the now adult children of this dominant group 
and traces the genesis of this group from the colonial period to the present day. 
Through the thesis I divide these elites into three interrelated generational groups. 
The first I call the colonial elite; they are the forbearers of the current elites. The 
second I call the revolutionary elite, who are, frequently, the descendents of members 
of the colonial elite. Many members of this group are still in power in today’s 
capitalist democracy and may no longer hold views normally deemed as 
“revolutionary” but most owe their prominent status to the successful conclusion of 
the liberation struggle against Portuguese colonialism and the fact that they (or a 
close kinsmen or associate) were a member of Frelimo during the struggle and/or the 
socialist period. The final group I have labelled the independence elite and they are, 
in many cases, the children of the revolutionary elite. They were usually born toward 
the close of or after the liberation struggle and have no personal experience with 
colonialism and, in most cases, only childhood memories of socialism. The 
independence elite normally began to secure their positions during the capitalist era. 
 Numerous members of the revolutionary and independence elite have their 
origins in southern Mozambique, particularly the capital and the Gaza province at the 
beginning of the 20
th
 Century. The southern colonial elite was primarily a petty 
bourgeoisie and they were among the most privileged sector of the non-white 
population. This group was racially mixed and consisted of Mulattos, some Indians, 
particularly Goans, and the most important for the purposes of this thesis, assimilados 
from the major southern ethnic groups, primarily the Shangaan, Ronga and Chope.
6
 
The colonial elite differed in several respects from other elite groups in Mozambique 
due, in part, to the way in which southern Mozambique was incorporated into the 
colonial and wider regional economies. Since the beginning of the 20
th
 Century the 
colonial elite had been gradually squeezed out of mercantile professions due to 
discrimination and competition from white colonialists and the Indian merchant 
class.
7
 The prevalence of migrant labour, the patterns of landholding and the nearness 
                                                 
6
 The predominance of southern ethnic groups in the colonial elite and later the revolutionary elite have 
led critics to level charges of ethnic favouritism and domination in Mozambique. While there may be 
elements of truth to this accusation, it is more complicated than it first appears. Many members of the 
revolutionary elite from the south married women from prominent northern families during the 
liberation struggle. As the south is patrilineal and the north is matrilineal their children do not have an 
“official” ethnicity, nor do they usually speak an African language. Thus many ethnically mixed 
members of the independence elite simply describe themselves as Mozambican. 
7
 The Indian members of the colonial elite were often Goan and had a different social background than 
the Indian merchant class. Goans had a far stronger social base in the colonial bureaucracy.  
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of the capital with its associated economic and educational opportunities also aided in 
the formation of the colonial elite as an urban based petty bourgeoisie. Many of the 
African members of the colonial elite came from chiefly lineages that often 
contributed to their educational opportunities. This background and the particular 
historical events that took place in the south contributed to the formation of a very 
specific social group. This group tended to be based in urban professions and the 
lower levels of the civil service and drew their positions and prestige more as 
members of the “modern” economy than as being part of “traditional” power 
structures.  
 There was often a direct relationship between members of a state-based 
colonial elite and the revolutionary elite that would eventually seize control of the 
state. Examples abound: Raúl Honwana was a colonial civil servant and father of Luis 
Bernardo Honwana (Minister of Culture under Frelimo), João Honwana (Commander 
of the Air Force under Frelimo), Fernando Honwana (aid to the first President, 
Samora Machel) and Gita Honwana (appointed by Frelimo to be one of 
Mozambique’s first female judges). Joaquim Chissano’s (former Foreign Minister 
and later President of Mozambique) father was translator for the colonial civil 
service. Marcelino Dos Santos’ (former vice-President of Frelimo) father worked for 
the national railways under the colonial state. Despite this strong relationship, there 
were numerous exceptions. Samora Machel’s father was a prosperous peasant and 
most of his family were involved in migrant labour to South Africa. His father’s land 
was confiscated by the state though and during the colonial period Samora Machel 
worked in the capital as a nurse. Magid Osman, the former Minister of Finance, came 
from an Indian merchant family also based in the capital. In general though, the 
colonial elite of the south was strongly tied to the bureaucracy of the colonial state. 
 The revolutionary elite grew from a section of the colonial elite, normally 
those who were the most disaffected and alienated from the colonial state, especially 
Protestant assimilados.
8
 Once again there were exceptions though. For instance, 
Jacinto Veloso (Minister of the Interior and head of the secret police under Frelimo) 
came from a well-established and wealthy white colonial family. The revolutionary 
elite were also joined by small numbers of radical Portuguese who wanted to help 
                                                 
8
 The connections between Protestantism and the revolutionary elite will be examined in greater detail 
in Chapter Three. 
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build socialism.
9
 Many, but not all, came from Segundo (lit. second, but in this case 
second-generation) backgrounds. Segundos were white Portuguese who were born in 
Mozambique and had families that had been in the country for generations. They 
faced discriminated by the ruling faction of the colonial state, who were more recent 
arrivals. In addition, during the liberation struggle many northerners joined the ranks 
of the revolutionary elite. The northerners were often mission-educated and came 
from similar social backgrounds as the southerners, although some rose through the 
ranks during the struggle.
10
 The revolutionary elite was separated from other 
descendents of the colonial elite who came from extremely similar social 
backgrounds by their (or a close relative’s or associate’s) participation in the 
liberation struggle.  This process of social formation resulted in a small, tightly 
interlinked ruling group, where many members had known each other personally, 
often since they were children, and were bound even more closely together by shared 
goals and experiences. 
 After the successful conclusion of the liberation struggle the revolutionary 
elite became politically dominant, and following the post-independence exodus of the 
Portuguese and a series of nationalisations, the state they controlled was dominant in 
the formal economy as well.
11
 The role of the revolutionary elite as a strictly 
politically based elite began to change after the fall of socialism. In the capitalist era 
many members of the revolutionary elite used their political power base to secure 
positions with powerful international aid agencies that provided around 60% of the 
government’s budget during fieldwork, and to penetrate more deeply into the opening 
economy. As with many formerly socialist countries, when large-scale privatisations 
were implemented in Mozambique, current and former state officials were often 
among the chief beneficiaries as they were some of the few who had the skills, 
experience, resources and political connections necessary to operate these industries 
(cf Pitcher 1996, 2002; Verdery 1996).  
                                                 
9
 Out of a white population of about 250,000, only a small fraction stayed after the first few years of 
independence.  
10
 After the death of Samora Machel and the fall of socialism, some northerners, especially those who 
rose through the ranks, apparently became increasingly marginalized as socialist ideology faded in 
importance compared to technocratic ability. 
11
 Some major companies from the colonial period decided to continue their operations in Mozambique 
after liberation and they were not nationalised, although they were subject to government intervention 
(Pitcher, 1996, 2002). 
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 The expansion of the revolutionary elite into the market economy has been 
accompanied by a great deal of corruption, which is strictly at odds with the 
revolutionary elite’s puritan roots. This has included, but is not limited to, extensive 
asset stripping of former state industries, the use of political connections to facilitate 
money laundering and drug smuggling and land appropriation. The expressed goal of 
privatisation and the transition to capitalism was to release economic concerns from 
the direction and control of the state and allow them to operate in the open 
competitive system of the market. While Mozambique is held out as an example of a 
successful structural adjustment programme, this goal has failed in many of its 
original intentions. The government remains a key player in the economy, retaining 
part ownership in many large economic concerns; and many new “private” economic 
players are members of the Frelimo party who retain strong links with the 
government (Pitcher 1996, 2002). In reality privatisation primarily allowed those with 
political power to amass economic wealth. The revolutionary elite has managed, often 
through a blend of both legal and illegal methods, to maintain its position as a “ruling 
class”, but not entirely through the ownership of the means of production as the 
traditional Marxist understanding would have it. Instead their social position and 
ability to access wealth in the capitalist period is based on being dominant politically 
with the ability to access important networks of power. After my fieldwork concluded 
the recently elected administration of president Armando Guebuza filled some 
ministerial positions with regional party members, with weaker connections to the 
traditional revolutionary elite. It remains to be seen if this will have an overall effect 
on elite power structures. 
 The third group this thesis investigates is the independence elite. The life 
experiences and social strategies of this group differ from their parents in the 
revolutionary elite in several important respects. They often have no direct experience 
with colonialism and have always belonged to Mozambique’s dominant group. Few, 
at least at this stage of their lives, demonstrate much of an interest in taking part in the 
formal political process. Up to the present date one of the few members of the 
independence elite to seek political office was the son of Samora Machel who ran for 
a position on the Maputo city council. Instead, through their educational background 
and through their political and social connections the independence elite has found 
positions in various government ministries, and more importantly, as members of 
powerful international aid agencies or working with growing family run economic 
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enterprises. Positions outside the government were often seen as “safe” and beyond 
politics during my fieldwork as there was growing doubt concerning Frelimo’s ability 
to win the upcoming election in Maputo.
12
 Members of the independence elite, unlike 
their parents, are becoming an international elite with the ability to access high-level 
positions outside Mozambique (although Mozambique remains a power-base). In this 
way they are attempting to use political connections to be able to transcend the 
dependence on politics that is still so essential for their parents in the revolutionary 
elite.   
  
1.3 The Question of Elites 
 
Now that I have identified the particular set of elites that this thesis will be 
investigating, the following sections will provide an overview of the dominant trends 
in elite studies and explain how I draw on the insights of previous theorists and where 
I seek to expand on existing debates. Broadly speaking, elite studies fall under three 
main headings, pluralism, the power elite and the anthropology of elites.
13
 I shall 
explore these three themes and then discuss how they relate to conceptualisations of 
African elites in the following section. I will then discuss the Mozambican case and 
demonstrate how the role of “modernisers” has been central in legitimising and 
maintaining social power for the dominant Mozambican elites. 
 
Theme One: Pluralism 
 
 Elite studies arose from the changing social and political landscape that 
followed the French Revolution and the introduction of “mass societies” in Europe 
(Marcus 1983a). The word elite originally meant the elect of god, and its meaning was 
overshadowed by numerous terms of rank in feudal societies (ibid). The term began to 
take its modern from through efforts to explain the persistence of deep inequalities of 
wealth and power that continued in the class stratified societies dominated by the 
bourgeoisie that started to supplant feudal ones. As western societies became more 
institutionalised, with power residing in broad categories, such as classes, 
                                                 
12
 Actually Frelimo won a landslide victory, although this was marred by low voter turnout and 
allegations of fraud. 
13
 An exhaustive review of literature related to elite studies is beyond the scope of this chapter; instead 
I will offer a few concrete examples of those I take to be exemplars of their particular trends.  
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governments, and bureaucracies, the term elites was used to describe the causal force 
of particular agents behind these impersonal institutions. 
 
What distinguishes elite from such alternative concepts such as class and the state is that 
it focuses one’s imagery at a much lower level of abstraction than do the later terms. It 
evokes the image of specific groups of persons rather than impersonal entities such as 
formal organizations and mass collectivities. Furthermore, the concept of elite carries 
with it the notion that such groups are the major source of change within relevant levels 
of social organization – local, regional, societal and international; they are the force 
behind institutional processes in which others – the masses, nonelites – participate with 
them (Marcus 1983a: 8-9). 
 
The study of elites therefore gives a human face to what otherwise seems to be the 
vast and impersonal mechanisms of power that control people’s daily lives. Thus 
early works dealing with elites served, in some ways, as a rebuke against generalising 
theories and instead focused on causal agents and a more individual sense of agency.  
 Fittingly the first studies that brought elites, in their modern sense, to 
academic prominence were those concerned with preserving a sense of “continuity” 
with older, more aristocratic forms of social power and were rabidly opposed to the 
advent of “mass societies” (Hansen and Parrish 1983). Early authors, Pareto and 
Mosca, were deeply influenced by the more agrarian based power-structures found in 
their native Italy in the late 19
th
 and in the opening decades of the 20
th
 Centuries. 
They were at odds with the understandings of emergent capitalism formulated by 
Marx and Weber, and they defined an elite by reference to its older, more feudal class 
standing and its associated type of morality. They felt that it was the duty of this elite 
not to merge with or become hegemonic within the state, but to protect society from it 
(Hansen and Parrish 1983: 260). Pareto and Mosca argued that a state dominated by 
the bourgeoisie, or even worse, the masses, would lead to corruption and attempts to 
redistribute property the masses had no “legitimate” claim to, therefore the older elite 
was needed to dominate the parliament and executive branch of the government and 
keep the people at bay (Hansen and Parrish 1983). After the rise of Fascism in Italy, 
the political ideal of this type of elite became largely irrelevant, but Pareto and 
Mosca’s influence lived on, albeit in a very different manner, in the conservative 
leanings of the pluralist view of elites that grew from their insights and gained 
prominence in the American academy after World War Two. 
 As with Pareto and Mosca, the pluralist view of elites was used to argue 
against Marxist theories of capitalism and class-based power. Loosely stated, Marx 
 21 
believed that there is a “ruling class” at the summit of society, one that controls the 
means of production and through this dominates the state. This ruling class is bound 
together by the fact that its members have shared interests, which are opposed to those 
of the other classes in society (Marx 1976). The pluralists took exception to the idea 
of a ruling class; they argued that even some of Marx’s own examples show the 
essential fallacy of this idea, pointing especially to the diverse coalition of supporters 
which underwrote Louis Bonaparte’s assumption of power in France (Marcus 1983a; 
R. Cohen 1983). While Marx explained the diverse interests of these coalitions as 
“class fractions”, pluralists argued that Marx’s ruling class was an abstraction that did 
not explain the actual behaviour of elites (Kamenka 1983; Marcus 1983a). The 
pluralists’ case stated that there is no centralised ruling class, but rather a collection of 
various elites that represent differing interest groups. To understand elites, they said, 
one must map out the various interests they represent. 
 
Theme Two: The Power Elite 
 
 The pluralists generally held sway among non-Marxist analysts, especially in 
the United States, where their work often dovetailed with the state’s ideological 
portrayal of itself as a decentralised “open society”. However this was to be 
powerfully challenged by a re-conceptualisation of the role of elites in society, 
typified by the work of C. Wright Mills (1956).  Mills also focused on the United 
States after the Second World War, and in arguing against the pluralists, he drew 
more strongly on ideas associated with the works of Weber and Marx (A. Cohen 
1981: 11). His seminal work, “The Power Elite” (1956) argued that American society 
had been dramatically reconfigured through the New Deal and especially the Second 
World War. He described a change from a society that had previously had a relatively 
weak executive centre and where power was often exercised by local governmental 
representatives, “grand families” and regional corporations, to one in which power 
was being centralised at the national level. Mills argued that after World War Two the 
three foundations of power in America were the government, the military and major 
national and multinational corporations. Besides accompanying the centralisation of 
power there was an ongoing centralisation of elites. He pointed to the fact that the 
high-ranking members of the three major bastions of American power tended to rotate 
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between these organisations, lessening the effect of more localised interest groups and 
bringing greater overall unity and social control.  
 In addition, Mills contended that the structure of the American elite was 
changing. Elite status was not determined so much by family wealth as it was by top 
positions in the great bureaucratic institutions that ruled the country, which were 
themselves becoming the chief sources of wealth and power. Paradoxically the move 
from “grand families” to “great institutions” did not imply social levelling or more 
open access for people of modest backgrounds, but in Mills view, signified a general 
hardening of American class structure. Thus formerly dispersed regional elites began 
to share a similar “elite culture”: they went to the same schools, belonged to the same 
clubs, inhabited similar social circles, espoused similar ideological views and 
practised marital endogamy. It was the members of this progressively centralising 
“elite culture” who were likely to work in at least one, and often multiple, foundations 
of national power. This gradual universalising of American elite experiences created, 
in Mills’ words: “social and psychological unity” (1956: 11). In addition these 
processes were not a historical accident that grew out of the exigencies of the 
depression and war, but in fact had been carefully planned to ensure the ruling 
group’s national dominance and growing international influence. Mills felt that the 
work of the pluralists had completely misread what was actually happening among the 
ruling elites, and that their continuing denial of an overall ruling class was either 
ideologically driven or based on a mistaken set of assumptions and focused 
inappropriately on levels of power that were not the most important ones in society. 
 
The top of the American system is much more unified and much more powerful, the 
bottom much more fragmented, and in truth, impotent, than is generally supposed by 
those who are distracted by the middling units of power which neither express such will 
that exists on the bottom nor determine the decisions on the top (Mills 1956: 29).   
 
 Mills’ challenge to the pluralists contributed to increasing academic attention 
to the possibility of a more unified ruling clique. Analysts began to counter pluralist 
critiques of ruling elites by pointing out that pluralists’ models could not explain how 
elites, as individuals, were linked to large-scale corporate bodies, the great 
institutional bureaucracies that Mills focused on (Marcus 1983a). While Mills’ overall 
stance was closer to Weber, his style of research also proved attractive to new 
generations of more Marxist-inspired researchers in the 1960s and 1970s, who wanted 
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to focus on the structures that underlay social power. The power elite and pluralist 
trends became opposing camps within elite research, giving rise to a long-running 
debate about the nature of elites. 
 
Theme Three: The Anthropology of Elites 
 
 Eventually the power elite versus pluralist debate stalled. The power elite 
camp had difficulties explaining the diversity of elites and certain types of intra-elite 
competition. Their explanations for the roles of elites in society became increasingly 
conspiratorial. The pluralists, although gaining some advantage from these 
weaknesses, still could not adequately explain the linkages between grand institutions 
and elites, nor many forms of unity that do exist among the top-ranking members of 
society. Both camps became increasingly involved in arcane discussions of what an 
elite is exactly and tied up in over-detailed attempts to map the role of elites in given 
societies (Hansen and Parrish 1983; Marcus 1983a; R. Cohen 1983). The debate had 
also become increasingly normative, with much of the argument focusing on the 
desired rather than the actual role of elites. Although the insights that arose from this 
debate have expanded our knowledge on the roles of elites in society, many analysts 
found that a new approach was necessary, an approach that could make use of insights 
from both camps (Hansen and Parrish 1983; R. Cohen 1983). 
 The emergence of a third trend was aided by the growing role of anthropology 
in elite studies. Although anthropologists had long been interested in the political 
structures and systems of far-flung places, their attention during the early years of the 
sub-discipline’s existence tended to focus on small-scale political structures in 
isolation from their connections to the wider world (Marcus 1983a; Shore 2002).
14
 In 
1983, George Marcus, inspired in part by the work of Abner Cohen proposed using 
ethnographic methods to move forward from the pluralist/power elite debate.
15
 
Marcus argued that the debate had focused overly on the role of elites in institutions. 
To move forward one should examine them from their own point of view, in order to 
understand their worldview and their social relationships and structures from the 
“inside”. Marcus and his supporters felt that ethnographically-based fieldwork would 
                                                 
14
 There are notable exceptions to this tendency, for example Gluckman’s “Analysis of Social Situation 
in Modern Zululand” (1958). 
15
 I will discuss the role of Abner Cohen’s work in the following section. 
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help to determine the specific and variable nature of elites throughout the world 
instead of arguing increasingly entrenched and mainly normative positions. 
 
The role of elites cannot be inferred from merely positional criteria – who holds what 
position, who is married to whom, who belongs to what club and so on. Their behaviour 
must be observed directly over the course of time. This is precisely the proper domain of 
ethnography, a key reason why we believe that anthropology has a critical mission to 
fulfil in resolving this debate, and that systematic ethnographic inquiry into the nature of 
elite families and networks would go a long way towards resolving a stalemated issue 
(Hansen and Parrish 1983: 261). 
 
Marcus’s own fieldwork dealt with “old money” families (Marcus 1983b; Marcus and 
Hall 1992). Marcus focused on how long-established elites managed to interact with 
large-scale institutions, protect their wealth and ensure their social reproduction by the 
use of charitable trusts. In addition, unlike many previous analysts who tended to 
explain the role of elites in society by using externally derived definitions of power, 
Marcus used detailed ethnography to demonstrate the ways in which elites themselves 
understood their power and social positions.  
The new direction suggested by Marcus has been expanded by the work of John 
Gledhill on political processes in Mexico (1994, 1998, 2002). Gledhill’s work is 
innovative as it examines not only local political concepts and how they interact with 
wider, transnational, power networks, but also less visible and more informal power 
structures. 
 
The problem with the kind of debate in which most political scientists were engaged was 
not simply that it did not look hard enough at what was happening within Mexican 
society at large, nor at the complexity and variability of particular regional situations: it 
seldom raised any deep questions about the nature of Mexican elites, and about the way 
the structures of informal social power behind the formal institutions of political life 
shape the way in which elites respond to the growing range of problems afflicting the 
country (Gledhill 1998: 11). 
 
Gledhill’s work explodes the simplicity of the pluralist/power elite debate by 
demonstrating how various elites (regional, nation, political, social, and economic) are 
united by a common political culture and often by personal ties as well. Despite this 
unified culture and these strong ties, fierce competition was in evidence between elite 
cliques as they tried to protect their own interests, especially in the era of neo-
liberalism (1998).  
In Mexico the introduction of neo-liberalism eventually began to fracture the 
established consensus among elites. In a later article, Gledhill (2002) examines the 
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consolidation of the Mexican political elite, based on the PRI (Institutional 
Revolutionary Party) that ruled from 1929 until 2000, showing how the introduction 
of neo-liberalism and growing intra-elite competition led to its eventual demise. 
Gledhill argues that the political elite was formed through various struggles among 
the ruling group that arose from the Mexican revolution. While these various elites 
were not strictly coterminous, the PRI party managed to build coalitions and maintain 
overall dominance by presenting a united front through the use of state power as both 
a threat and a source of patronage. The strength of the political class was based on the 
coherence of the party, with the summit of power being the “revolutionary family” 
based on a small network of leaders, including ex-presidents, who ran the party and 
by extension the country (2002: 50). The system began to unravel with the 
introduction of neo-liberalism and the growth of the narco-shadow state and other 
sources began to able to rival the state as a source of patronage. As other non-state 
actors began to rival the state as a source of patronage the sense of coherence at the 
centre of the political process became harder to maintain, intra-elite competition 
increasingly became public knowledge, most spectacularly with the assassination of 
the PRI presidential candidate in the 1990s, blamed on rival PRI members. The final 
result was PRI’s first ever national electoral loss in 2000. Once again Gledhill goes 
beyond the simplicity of the earlier debate by showing how elites go through periods 
of fusion and fracture which are intimately connected both to local political structures 
and the way in which these structures are affected by wider transnational processes, 
such as international neo-liberal capitalism. 
 The exploration of the role of a unified political culture in its ability (and the 
limits of this ability) to maintain cohesion amongst a ruling group is of vital 
importance to facilitate a wider understanding of the roles of elites in society and is 
crucial for this thesis. In her work on two sets of elites in Yemen, republican and 
monarchist, vom Bruck (2005) observes that contrasting attitudes towards 
consumption and the display of wealth form a “unified field” for their respective 
elites. Thus attitudes towards consumption underlie moral critiques of the social 
systems that the two groups are supposed to embody. For republicans, displays of 
wealth and consumption of high-status, often imported goods symbolise the modern 
“consumer democracy” that their rule has ushered in. This stands in opposition to the 
stultifying puritanism of the monarchists (2005: 261). For the monarchists, avoiding 
these forms of consumption operates as a repudiation of the corrupt social order of 
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republican rule (2005: 266-268). I shall also investigate how changing patterns of 
consumption from socialism to capitalism are intertwined with notions of wider 
legitimacy, yet an important point remains, one must also examine the relationship of 
“non-elite” actors to the unified political cultures of elites. In Spencer’s work on the 
Sinhalese elite of Sri Lanka, he notes that in this case, nationalist discourse is the 
primary source of a unified political culture (2002: 92). However, Spencer also points 
out that many “non-elites” have been able to make use of this discourse to further 
their own ends. In this thesis I shall demonstrate that changing concepts of modernity 
have been instrumental for the creation of an overall framework that unites 
Mozambican elites. The thesis shall also explore if, along the lines of Spencer’s 
argument, the elite discourses that form this framework are inclusionary and offer a 
space for other social groups to pursue their own agendas, or, following the examples 
of Gledhill and Mills, they operate as a mechanism to centralise power and how this 
changes over time.     
 Anthropology, as the examples above show, has much to offer the study of 
elites. This is demonstrated by its ability to go beyond the abstract, universalising 
models offered by other disciplines and offer intimate descriptions from an insider’s 
perspective of the variable social worlds of elites. An anthropological approach allows 
us to develop a deeper understanding elites in specific societies, and also an attempt to 
understand something about the general exercise of power throughout the world. 
Nevertheless, despite calls by Laura Nader (1972) to “study up” and demonstrations 
by Marcus (1983a, 1983b, 1992) on how this might be done, up to the present elites 
have attracted relatively limited anthropological interest (Shore 2002). While many 
anthropologists have contributed valuable and penetrating studies of how unequal 
power relationships affect the disenfranchised, our knowledge of those who exercise 
significant power over them remains relatively limited.  
 In a recent edited volume, “Elite Cultures” the editors and contributors issued 
a fresh call to focus anthropological attention on those who wield power (Shore and 
Nugent 2002). Shore (2002) suggests that, to better understand such questions, 
anthropologists must expand beyond the current “preoccupation with literary 
criticism, textual analysis, deconstruction and symbolism” to wider issues of 
economics, power, politics and social change (2002: 9). This does not mean 
abandoning interests in the cultural or symbolic behaviours of elites, but rather 
acknowledging both the material and social bases of power. According to Shore “… 
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the external conditions that promote and sustain local or national elites must also be 
matched with an analysis of the norms, values and shared interests that characterise 
and unite such elites…” (2002: 13).  
Perhaps due to the comparative dearth of the ethnography of elites recent 
discussions on the structure of power seem to echo the old pluralist/power elite 
debate. While many Marxist inspired studies of the 1970s and 1980s took positions 
similar to those described by studies influenced by the “power elite” concept, the 
more recent collapse of class-based politics and a growing interest in identity politics 
often take positions closer to the pluralist position. These studies raise important 
questions, such as whether the growth of identity politics has destroyed the notion of 
“class for itself”(Comaroff and Comaroff 1999). Yet it is doubtful that the answers 
will be uniform. More research needs to be done on how these trends are understood 
and acted upon locally. This is an issue of great importance for this thesis and in 
Chapter Four I examine how class standing can also become an identity for elites in 
addition to and in some cases beyond other forms of identification such as race.  
 
1.4 African Elites 
 
 Traditionally anthropologists in Africa studied what could be termed “local” 
elites, such as village headmen and chiefs, with far less focus on those involved in 
power structures on a national level. Even studies that moved beyond investigating 
“traditional” forms of power tended to focus on local elites. A prime example is the 
work of Joan Vincent (1971). Her work was pioneering for the time, as she 
understood that African villagers were integrated into wider transnational structures 
such as the emerging global economy. She examined how village elites in Uganda 
operated as a buffer between the forces of the market and the state and the wider 
society that they represented. Yet as researchers became increasingly concerned with 
national level politics during the post-independence period in Africa shades of 
pluralist/power elite debate began to appear (R. Cohen 1983). Although studies of 
national power structures in independent Africa took a variety of theoretical and 
political positions, many leaning towards the pluralist side of the debate, there is one 
influential trend that was closer to the power elite camp that I want to examine 
further. The trend in question tended toward a more critical Marxian/political 
economy standpoint and was primarily concerned with the ways in which the post-
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independence state in Africa had become the central source of accumulation, both 
political and personal, for newly empowered elites. 
 This trend studied the formation of what was termed the “national 
bourgeoisie”. Writers demonstrated how political power, and the opportunities for 
accumulation that came with it, was central for the creation and reinforcement of 
other forms such as economic or social power. Thus, like those in the power elite 
camp, these researchers studied the ways in which power, and the holders of power, 
were fused and held together by the patronage base of the state. The national 
bourgeoisie was initially formed in the colonial period, usually arising out of the 
“petty bourgeoisie” whose members had access to higher education who then formed 
the core of cadres for the ruling party after independence (Allen and Williams 1982). 
Although those who formed the national bourgeoisie were comparatively privileged 
during the colonial period, they had limited ability to access resources independently 
of the state. This contributed to a blurred distinction between state and personal power 
and often gave the national bourgeoisie a comprador nature (Hodgkin 1982; O’Brien 
1982).  
 These characteristics were also the central process in the formation of African 
class structure. Thus, in Africa: “… classes are categories of people sharing common 
political and economic interests arising from their access to public authorities and the 
public resources and opportunities which they control. Other classifications ignore the 
fundamental political origins of social mobility” (M. Cohen 1982: 181). Although 
coming from a broadly Marxist influenced tradition, M. Cohen argued that the 
particular way in which the bourgeoisie was formed in post-colonial Africa meant 
that, unlike the classical Marxist definition of class, control of the means of 
production is almost secondary and political capital is seen as the defining factor. 
According to Leys (1982) this type of class structure had particular political and 
economic effects. With the bourgeoisie and those staffing the bureaucracy often being 
the same people, a situation was created in which little time or effort was available 
for, or given to, the creation of productive capital or the search for profits. The 
mainstay of the national bourgeoisie was rent-seeking. In this conception societies in 
Africa (at least sub-Saharan Africa) are shaped as a unitary pyramid with the political 
elites at the top able to dominate all other sources of power and wealth, but without 
any solid productive basis for this wealth.  
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 A similar situation has been described in post-independence Mozambique. 
Adam and Gibbon argue that although the Frelimo leadership was initially deeply 
opposed to the idea of having a national bourgeoisie, high-ranking members of the 
Frelimo party are increasingly taking on the characteristics associated with it (1991). 
They chart the development of Frelimo: a party that started as a loosely-based front of 
peasants and urban-based nationalists that later became an alliance between high-
ranking party officials and the state bureaucracy after independence. Now, according 
Adam and Gibbon, there is a new social base for Frelimo, an alliance between the 
party and elements of the bureaucracy and foreign capitalists (Adam and Gibbon 
1991: 4). Adam and Gibbon argue that these trends in Mozambique have closely 
paralleled, indeed been typical of, the formation of a national bourgeoisie in other 
countries. Frelimo’s victory opened the way for the consolidation of power for a 
variety of predominantly urban-based class elements, usually drawn from those who 
formed the “petty bourgeoisie” under colonialism.16 Under socialism these groups 
used the state bureaucracy to rise to positions of importance and later, during the 
introduction of neo-liberal capitalism, these groups were ideally placed to amass 
wealth given the changing economic circumstances and to forge connections with 
foreign capitalists. What has not changed dramatically, according to Adam and 
Gibbon, is the position of large numbers of the peasantry, who continue to play a 
similar role to the one they held throughout colonialism, state socialism and neo-
liberalism. They remain the providers of goods and labour. The formation of a 
national bourgeoisie is described here as creating a tightly-linked, state-dependent 
elites who use their position to accumulate wealth through a combination of acting as 
a comprador for foreign interests and the extraction of resources both from 
international networks and the local population. 
 The ethnographic research of Abner Cohen (1974, 1981) among a group that 
could be termed a “national bourgeoisie” greatly increased our knowledge of African 
elite formation by going beyond the examination of the effects of unequal power 
relationships in a generalized African context. He focused on how members of one 
specific regional elite understand their role in society. Abner Cohen’s research 
explored elite formation among the “Creoles” of Sierra Leone, a group descended 
from repatriated slaves from the early colonial period. Creoles were distinctive from 
                                                 
16
 Adam and Gibbon do point to the fact that some of the party’s leaders have rural connections who 
have also benefited from these processes. 
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other groups in Sierra Leone as they had embraced Christianity, spoke English as a 
first language, had relatively high educational qualifications and adopted a self-
consciously European life style. This group also had a strong ideological unity, or 
class-consciousness, based on the premise that they were the “civilised” and Christian 
section of the population. Throughout the colonial period and into independence, 
Creoles formed the majority of the civil service and governmental bureaucracy. When 
Sierra Leone became independent, many Creoles realised that if they were to keep 
their bureaucratic niche it was no longer advisable to publicly demonstrate a strong 
Creole identity as it had associations with colonial rule. Instead, given that they were 
not tied to any of the major ethnic groups, Creoles began to stress that they were 
“authentically” Sierra Leonean. Whereas during the colonial period the practise of 
giving Creole children European names had emphasised the group’s distinctiveness, 
they now began giving their children African names to demonstrate their connection 
with the new country. As Creoles formed only 1.9% of Sierra Leone’s population 
during A. Cohen’s fieldwork, and because an effort to form a Creole political party 
foundered soon after its beginning, they knew that they could not retain their positions 
by engaging in “identity politics”. Instead they kept their social base in the civil 
service and bureaucracy; as with other cases of a national bourgeoisie government, 
positions were often held alongside professional and business occupations. Their 
ability to act as a neutral buffer between the two major ethnic groups of Sierra Leone, 
the Mende and the Temme, allowed them to retain these positions. 
 What makes A. Cohen’s work remarkable is that it focused not only on the 
material bases of elite power, but also on the symbolic patterns and behaviours that 
came to characterise and internally legitimise an elite. His work deals with the ways 
in which elite groups create symbolic boundaries between themselves and “outsiders” 
such as mythologies of descent, ritual beliefs and practises, moral exclusiveness and 
specific ideologies which demonstrate their uniqueness and solidarity (1974). From 
these insights, A. Cohen seems to have anticipated later concerns with performativity 
and how power relationships are acted out in everyday life. This body of work also 
helped to raise questions as to how elite power is demonstrated in more banal, 
seemingly everyday ways. Similar questions have been systematically developed in 
another tradition by Bourdieu (1984) who showed how certain forms of consumption 
and certain styles or tastes demonstrate “symbolic” capital that serve as markers of 
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social position. The symbolic expression of social power is a central concern of this 
thesis and is examined in Chapter Three. 
 While the work of A. Cohen and M. Cohen, Leys and others who developed 
the idea of a national bourgeoisie have done much to clarify our understanding of 
political power by demonstrating how access to the resources of the state is central for 
the creation of African class structures, unanswered questions remain. One of the 
more pressing questions is what constitutes the class basis for non-elite groups and 
what avenues of social mobility exist for them? This is especially important if the 
boundaries between elites and non-elites are often quite ambiguous in practice (A. 
Cohen 1981: 18). One possible answer to this question, for a specific group of non-
elites, is hinted at in the works of Karanja (1987), Mann (1985) and Obbo (1987). 
They point to the importance for members of less powerful groups of having access to 
elites. Their work demonstrates that although elite families in sub-Saharan Africa are 
often officially endogamous, unofficial sexual liaisons and the tendency for elite men 
to take “outside wives” is a crucial avenue for women from non-elites groups to 
acquire access to resources. This raises the wider question of the role of social 
proximity in African class structures. Does a close social relationship create an 
avenue of social mobility for less powerful actors as it enables them access to elites 
and by extension to resources that elites control? My thesis shall endeavour to 
examine if social proximity mitigates lower class standing and how barriers are 
formed between socially close groups and how they are permeated.      
 Although the examples given above investigated groups that, for the most part, 
could be broadly defined as belonging to a national bourgeoisie whose power grew 
from their relationship to the state, they did so in very different ways. These different 
conceptualisations helped to launch the two major trends in conceptualising African 
elites today.
17
 One trend is built around the concern displayed by the national 
bourgeoisie school, if not its broadly Marxist inspiration, on the tendency for elites to 
combine political power and public enrichment while at the same time displaying 
little concern for increasing the productive capacity of their respective countries. This 
trend focuses on the prevalence of behaviours among the elite that are often labelled 
corruption and patrimonialism. Although there are divergent opinions within this 
                                                 
17
 In contrast to the typology I have presented, some political scientists prefer to speak of five basic 
types of state/party systems found in Africa. While this argument is beyond the scope of my chapter, 
for details see Gledhill 1994 for a concise summary. 
 32 
school of thought, overall it shares similar concerns with the ideas discussed in 
Bayart’s work dealing with the “politics of the belly”. The other major trend tends to 
be more interested with many of the questions examined by A. Cohen. Researchers 
using this approach study the ways in which African elites manage to institutionalise 
their power and create durable structures to govern society. Once again there are 
divergent opinions within this group, but I broadly refer to this trend as the 
“institutionalisation”. I will now examine both of these schools before moving on to a 
discussion of the Mozambican case in the next section. 
 
The Politics of the Belly 
 
 The most famous example of this stance, as well as the man who coined the 
phrase the “politics of the belly”, is Jean-Paul Bayart. His work was influenced by 
previous studies of the national bourgeoisie. Bayart also described the state as the 
primary means of accumulation and the bureaucracy as the backbone of elite power, 
but unlike earlier works he was also critical of the tendency to see this bourgeoisie as 
a colonial creation without deeper roots in African political cultures: “The theme of a 
‘national bourgeoisie’ sheds no light at all on the ancient classes to which this 
bourgeoisie is defined in Africa” (Bayart 1993: 103). Throughout Bayart’s work he 
offers a complicated argument; the reason the post-colonial state is both authoritarian 
and weak is a combination of the colonial legacy and African cultural practises, which 
encourage corruption amongst the dominant class as the struggle for power is chiefly 
a struggle for wealth. The dominant classes in Africa are not neo-colonial lackeys, as 
some would have, but skilful agents, who manipulate their contacts with the outside 
world to increase their wealth and, by extension, shore up their power base (1993: 
93). Using contacts with outsiders to extract resources is not a new development, but 
is in fact part of a longstanding cultural practise of “extraversion” which has 
historically enmeshed local African actors in world-wide networks that are 
instrumental in bolstering actors’ local power (1993, 2000). In some ways Bayart 
echoes the concerns expressed by Marcus (1983a, 1983b) when Bayart contends that 
those writing about “national bourgeoisies” have not fully taken African agency or the 
historical roots of the modern system of stratification into account. 
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On the whole, the term “comprador class” would be preferable to that of “national 
bourgeoisie” if it were not tainted with infamy and misconception: the compradors served 
their own rather than foreign interests, and the coloniser, who understood this well, made 
it his priority to break them. The phenomenon we are faced with, and which we cannot 
examine in more depth here, is the crystallisation of social stratification astride the 
international system (1993: 102). 
 
To Bayart, the international connections that have long been one of the key bases of 
African elite power were only altered by colonialism, not destroyed: “These societies 
have never been and, even after their military defeat, could never have been the 
passive objects of dependency. Colonisation did not radically weaken their ability to 
pursue their own strategies or produce their own modernity” (1993: 20). The cause of 
many internal crises in African states has been the elite’s strategy to bolster their 
power by increasing the exploitation of dependents and the mobilisation of resources 
gained from the outside world for personal use. Due to these longstanding cultural 
practises and the nature of the African elite, Bayart is broadly pessimistic about wide-
scale institutional reform. He, instead, sees processes such as democratisation and 
privatisation more as new avenues for the elite to build personal bases than as far-
reaching societal reforms.  
 In another recent well-known book “Africa Works” (1999), the authors, 
Chabal and Daloz came to many similar conclusions as Bayart, although they do not 
believe in the existence of a dominant class in the African context. They too claim 
that Africa has a characteristic social and cultural make-up to which western models 
of economics, politics and development are simply inapplicable. According to Chabal 
and Daloz, the long-running state of political and economic crises that exists in many 
sub-Saharan African countries is actually beneficial to these nation’s rulers as it 
allows them to use their dependence to extort more outside resources. Like the 
national bourgeoisie school they see the state as the primary fulcrum of power, 
political and economic, yet, as with Bayart, they also feel the idea of a national 
bourgeoisie misreads African reality. They contend that one of the central mistakes of 
many earlier analysts was attempting to understand Africa through western analytical 
models, such as social class, which they claim does not exist as such in Africa. For 
them, the state in Africa and its rulers are not differentiated from the wider 
population, but like Bayart’s “rhizome state” deeply intertwined with society. The 
people are connected to the elite through horizontal links, primarily networks of 
patronage that give the leaders legitimacy. These patrimonial obligations are why, 
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after the wave of democratisation that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, many former 
authoritarian leaders were voted back into power or “recycled” in the new 
governments. The authors see recent events in Africa as leading to a process of “re-
traditionalisation” in which leaders base their power on clientelist networks, ethnic 
social bases and the resurgence of occult practices, therefore leading to a new 
“African” form of modernity. 
 The above authors challenge the idea of a unified national bourgeois on a 
number of points, but they do share a common set of concerns with this tradition. 
While they may differ on the reasons why, all have pointed to the fact that dominant 
elites in the post-colonial state are not setting up relatively neutral or viable 
institutional frameworks, but instead are using the benefits of office to create personal 
power bases and to extract wealth. Authors such as Bayart would further contend that 
the stated western political objectives for African states, such as “good governance” 
and the elimination of corruption are based on fundamental misunderstandings of the 
social and political realties found in Africa. Besides the obvious colonial overtones of 
dictating how African governments should work, many of these plans are doomed to 
failure anyway and actually result in the strengthening of the practises they were 
supposed to abolish. Yet not all studies of post-independence African elites have 
focused on how political structures were corrupted to prompt personal gain. Another 
prominent trend came to a very different conclusion and investigated how elites tried 
to use their social power to build durable institutions.   
 
Institutionalisation 
 
 Although focusing on similar social groups as Bayart and Chabal and Daloz, 
researchers interested in institutionalisation have come to very different conclusions.  
The Creoles Abner Cohen (1981) worked with may have had a specific identity, an 
elitist outlook and an ethnic power base in the bureaucracy, but he did not report 
widespread corruption, nor the building of personal power bases per se. Instead he 
described a group with what amounted to a tradition of public service, trying to build 
the institutions of their new nation and to act as neutral mediators between Sierra 
Leone’s two dominant ethnic groups.  In order to do so they made sure that neither 
could staff the ranks of the bureaucracy with personnel overly receptive to one group 
or the other. Werbner (2004) explores these kinds of points even more forcefully. 
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Werbner argues against the prevailing climate of “afro-pessimism”. His research is 
based in Botswana, a country that has managed to avoid the cycles of wars, 
dictatorships, coups and collapsing economies that have characterised other African 
nations after independence. Werbner worked with a Botswanan elite, whom he 
describes as “reasonable radicals”. This elite is drawn from members of an ethnic 
minority, the Kalanga. While this group has some, often unacknowledged, similarities 
with the elites described by Bayart and Chabal and Daloz, such as the reliance on 
personal and ethnic ties and the tendency to use a power base in the national 
bureaucracy as a basis for branching out into personal business enterprises, the 
conclusions drawn by Werbner are completely different from those of these authors.  
 Werbner argues that the Kalanga elite in Botswana is primarily concerned 
with the general good of the nation. According to this argument this elite has been 
instrumental in helping to create neutral and impartial bureaucratic institutions that do 
not serve as the power base of a specific leader or political party or for strictly 
personal or ethnic enrichment, but are responsive to the nation as a whole. These 
bureaucratic structures have been institutionalised by the general political culture, 
buoyed by an independent and functioning media, so they will survive the eventual 
retirement of the current elite from public life. Werbner further states that we must 
focus on a “second post-colonial era”:  
 
Instead of a focus on violence in collapsed states, the ethnography of the second 
postcolonial era has to pay more attention to reasonable deliberation, to the political art of 
negotiated power in good governance, and to the analysis in ethnic relations of the build-up 
of trust and accommodation, rather than merely conflict and competition (Werbner 2004: 
9).  
 
Thus, unlike the work of Bayart, or Chabal and Daloz, Werbner does not see the state 
primarily as a centre of elite accumulation.  On the basis of his observance of these 
Kalanga bureaucrats, he points to Botswana as a thriving example that democracy can 
work in Africa.  
 The arguments put forth by Cohen and even more forcefully by Werbner come 
to a very different conclusion from Bayart and Chabal and Daloz as to the role of the 
elite in post-colonial African states. Much of the divergence may come from the 
specific focus of the analysts. For example, both Bayart and Werbner claim to provide 
models that help explain an African-wide post-colonial condition. Yet much of their 
actual research tends to be drawn from specific areas, Cameroon and Mobuto’s Zaire 
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for Bayart (although he does make efforts to incorporate many more African nations 
as well) and Botswana for Werbner, countries which have had radically different post-
colonial experiences. My investigation of Mozambican elites hints that perhaps the 
views associated with the “politics of the belly” and institutionalisation are not really 
incommensurate with each other. Can elites institutionalise themselves in state and 
economic structures while at the same time enriching themselves? Are both aspects 
present in differing degrees in different historical periods? It now remains to be seen 
how these questions and the insights mentioned throughout this introduction can be 
used for understanding the role of elites in Mozambique.  
 
1.5 The Mozambican Case and Modernity 
 
 As we have seen from the examples provided so far one of the major debates 
in elite studies concerns whether elites form a centralised ruling class or a 
decentralised aggregate of competing interest groups. Following the examples of 
Gledhill (1998, 2002), Spencer (2002) and vom Bruck (2005) I argue that the way 
forward is to examine the unifying political cultures that bind elite together, even if 
allowing space for intra-elite competition. As I have stated earlier, changing 
ideological conceptions of modernity among elites’ have provided this unifying 
political culture in Mozambique. Thus for Mozambican elites modernity was not only 
the social goal to be strived for, but their role as “modernisers” is also an attempt to 
provide a powerful legitimising factor for their assumption of high-status positions in 
society, both internally and to key non-elite constituencies although to differing 
degrees at different historical periods. In addition, the elite’s role as the “modern” 
sector of the population allows them to acquire the practical skills to staff positions 
that allow them to access the resources of the state and increasingly of the 
international community, and the less tangible abilities, such as the ability to “fit in” 
among powerful foreigners who currently play such a key role in Mozambican 
society. To demonstrate this I follow the examples of A. Cohen (1974, 1981), Marcus 
(1983a, 1983b) and others by not attempting to simply “map” elite positions of power, 
but instead to understand how they explain their own “folk” conceptions of both 
power and the discourses that bind them together. 
 The second point of importance raised by the review of elite literature is to 
understand the basis for “local” class structures and for African elites this has 
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primarily been access to the resources controlled by the state. Therefore African elites 
tend to form a national bourgeoisie who channel state resources towards their own 
strategies of personal accumulation. While authors such as Bayart (1993) agree that 
one of the primary bases of African elites is the state, he argues that an excess of 
attention on the role of the state has neglected older forms of power that find their 
continuation in modern African elites. It is important not to neglect the possible 
continuities of pre-colonial forms of power amongst modern elites, but Bayart’s view 
does not seem to hold in the case of Mozambique. For the elites who are the focus of 
this study, their formation in the colonial period was deeply tied to their role as lower-
level state functionaries.
18
 The connection between these elites and the state has 
grown in importance following Mozambique’s liberation and remains a bulwark of 
elite status today. What this thesis will examine is how different generations of elites 
have used their (or in the case of the independence elite their parents’) powerbase 
within the state to expand into different centres of power, such as the “international 
community”. 
 The final point raised by the review of elite literature that will be discussed 
here concerns the relationships between elites and the wider populations of the 
countries they control. Analysts like Chabal and Daloz (1999) state that elites in 
African are not really socially differentiated from the wider population due to the 
horizontal links created by patronage networks. The evidence arising from my 
fieldwork in Mozambique serves to complicate this assertion. While links are created 
between elites and some groups that share a similar social background, other groups 
are more fully excluded. Furthermore social closeness can continue to exist with 
groups that are not strongly integrated into elite patronage networks. My thesis shall 
investigate how social boundaries are continually re-drawn and contested. I argue that 
patronage networks are not the only, or even necessarily the primary factor in linking 
elites to other social groups in Mozambique, but rather the group’s perceived 
relationship to the project of modernity. Modernity is an ambiguous term that often 
holds multiple meanings. The following section will explore how I use modernity for 
this thesis and why it is central to social power.    
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 Other high-status groups such as the top levels of the Indian merchant class follow a very different 
historical trajectory. An in-depth examination of this trajectory is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Modernity 
 
 The ideology of modernity for the Mozambican elite has its roots in the 
colonial period, but came to fruition during the liberation struggle and independence. 
Unlike many popular understandings of the meaning of modernity, for the 
revolutionary elite, the term did not necessarily entail increased individualism as 
social roles become steadily unmoored from societal institutions and its resulting 
uncertainties, as exemplified by Marx’s famous statement: “All that is solid melts into 
air” (Berman 1982). Instead modernity, for the early Frelimo party, gave the 
ideological foundations for a vast, disciplined effort where the needs of the individual 
would be subsumed to the social good and the country would be united in its attempts 
to utterly transform society.  Thus the initial goal of the Frelimo leadership was not to 
create a form of “African Socialism” which enjoyed wide popularity in the 1970s, but 
what Donham calls a “Marxist Modern” (1999). This type of modernity was 
predicated on the example of the Russian and Chinese revolutions, where tiny elite 
groups from “backwards” countries seized power and were able to “catch up” with the 
west by creating strong industrialised societies built, at least theoretically, upon 
secular and rationalist principles (ibid). Socialism was seen to provide a blueprint for 
how exploited and marginalized groups could beat the powerful at their own game. 
Like the “French modern” described by Rabinow (1989), “top-down” technocratic 
efforts of state-lead social engineering were seen by the revolutionary elite as central 
to achieving their form of modernity. The primary focus of the revolutionary elite’s 
project of social engineering was the countryside, which they wanted to transform 
into “cities in the bush”. Scattered hamlets would have to be centralised into large 
communal villages, education would be made widely available, gender relations 
would be equalised, “superstition” and religion would be banished in favour of 
scientific rationalism, and rural inhabitants would be freed from the “feudalism” of 
traditional power structures (Fry 2000; Hall and Young 1997; West 1997). 
 These dramatic transformations also legitimised the need for the revolutionary 
elite to centralise their hold on power. The concentration of power among the Frelimo 
leadership was thought of as necessary as they tended to view the population as a 
passive mass that could be mobilised from above and the nation as a “blank slate” 
which after the removal of “backwards” cultural traits could be created anew. 
(Geffray 1991; Hall and Young 1997). The reality of this ambitious programme fell 
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far short of its lofty goals. Although some parts of Frelimo’s modernisation were 
popular with some segments of the population, others were less so. The party’s heavy-
handed methods of implementation were less popular still. The brave new world the 
party leadership hoped to build had proved to be unrealisable by the late 1980s, 
surrounded by the ruins of economic crisis and civil war. Some commentators feel 
that the Frelimo leadership “learned their lesson” after the tragedy of the civil war: 
they have now revised their former hostility to “tradition” and view their nation with a 
less elitist, more open gaze (Fry 2000). I argue that this is not entirely the case. 
Modernity is in fact a badge of social distinction and elites are still ideologically 
wedded to and legitimised by their relationship to the overall project of modernity, 
even if its forms vary in different historical periods. Thus, unlike the Cameroonian 
elite described by Rowlands, Mozambican elites spend little time trying to rise in 
“traditional” hierarchies or investing wealth in neo-traditional titles (2002). Instead, 
both the revolutionary and independence elites are justifying their positions due to the 
needs of a new project of modernisation that will transform Mozambique from a war-
torn, poverty-stricken socialist state to a vibrant and prosperous capitalist democracy. 
As noted by West, there are many aspects of the current process of capitalist 
democratisation that echo the dogmatism and messianic ambition of socialism, far 
more than appears to be the case at first glance (1997: 676). 
 The central factor of my understanding of the changing ideology of modernity 
in Mozambique is that it needs to be examined as an analytic device and not 
necessarily a social condition. Recently much academic attention has been focused on 
the creation of “alternative” modernities in Africa (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Comaroff 
and Comaroff 1999; Geschiere 1997). While these works have provided valuable 
insights into the way modernity is conceived on a local level, questions have been 
raised as to whether the term “modernity” itself is in fact necessary as a descriptive 
device or if it masks the presumptions of the researcher (Cooper 2005). Cooper asks: 
 
…is modernity a condition – something written into the exercise of power of political and 
economic power at a global level? Or is it a representation, a way of talking about the 
world whose key element is the use of a language of temporal transformation while 
bringing out the simultaneity of global unevenness, in which “tradition” itself is produced 
by telling a story about how some people became “modern”?  If we are talking about a 
condition then the question is whether modernity, as an analytic category, encourages us 
to ask good questions about what that condition is. If we are talking about representations, 
then the question is whose? (2005: 114) 
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 I respond to Cooper’s challenge by following Ferguson’s (2006) advice to use 
modernity as a “native category” and to explain how it has become, for my 
informants, a discourse of identity based on a universal, singular, instead of 
alternative and multiple, conception that places some ahead and others behind on its 
scale of progress. This ideal of universal development still has a powerful hold on the 
imaginations of many people throughout the world, and although it has become 
popular in academia to equate a universal modernity with a hegemonic and imperialist 
European ideology, outside academia it represents a hoped-for alleviation of the plight 
of many. As shown by Nugent (1994, 1998), the initial “modernisation” of a 
peripheral region in Peru by the central state was not locally seen as an imposition or 
colonial venture, but as a way to bring economic and political progress and free the 
population of the often cruel and arbitrary rule of the local aristocracy. Although 
modernisation theory may be dead as an academic analytic device, it seems it is still 
thriving as a popular discourse, and in Mozambique, a discourse that is deeply 
interconnected with social power (Ferguson 1999, 2006).  
 
1.6 Research Setting 
 
 An important aspect of my fieldwork was that it was based in a major city, 
Maputo. The fact that most of my informants are urbanites and often have been for a 
least two generations is an important factor in their self-identity and a component of 
their “modernity”. As one Mozambican friend once remarked to me in a discussion 
about witchcraft: “Well that is what they tell me, I don’t personally know as I am a 
city person. I stay away from that kind of thing”. Although the practise of witchcraft 
is alive and well within the city limits of Maputo many of my informants felt that 
their status as “city people” almost automatically separated them from what they see 
as elements of “tradition” such as sorcery. The connection between urbanity and 
modernity was deeply ingrained in many of informants and being urban was in many 
ways part of being modern. This is not to say that all urbanites are equally modern, as 
shown by Rotenberg: “In cities, people force the spaces around them to take on 
meaning” (1993:xiii). Therefore for most of my informants, members of the 
Mozambican elite or middle class, the epitome of urban modernity was found in the 
city centre, not the outlying suburbs.  
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 Maputo is Mozambique’s largest city with a population of around three 
million people. Among the numerous divisions of Maputo, one of the most basic is 
between the cidade de cimento (cement city), and the cidade de caniço (cane city). 
During the colonial period, the cement city was reserved for the colonial population. 
It has European style apartment blocks, houses (usually made from cement rather than 
brick-built, hence the name) and services. The cane city grew on the outskirts of the 
cement city and consists of shanty dwellings built by the African population. There 
were neighbourhoods that blurred the boundaries between these two sections, such as 
Xipimanine, which was reserved for relatively privileged groups under colonialism, 
such as mulattos and assimilados. These areas were not as deprived as some sections 
of the cane city, although they did not have the same standard of amenities as the 
cement city. After independence and the large-scale exodus of Portuguese settlers, the 
social make-up of the cement city was transformed. It was no longer a white preserve, 
but was settled by multiracial (although predominantly black) urbanites. The cane city 
was also transformed after independence, and grew dramatically, especially after the 
onset of the civil war, which drove large numbers of internal refugees to the capital 
seeking the relative security that could be found there. Although the divisions of the 
city are no longer imposed by a state-held racist ideology, the populations of both 
sections still live, to all intents and purposes, in two separate worlds. The divisions 
within the city are symbolic of many of the issues dealt with in this thesis.  
 Maputo, at least at its centre if not towards its sprawling shantytown margins, 
is a beautiful city. During the colonial period, Maputo, or Lourenço Marques as it was 
then known, was widely considered to be one of the most breathtaking cities in Africa 
and while it suffered from years of neglect and lack of funds during the civil war it is 
beginning to reclaim its title. Many of the streets are pot-holed and several buildings 
are still run down, but the city still exudes a tropical charm. Strolling down the wide 
tree-lined avenues and gazing at the colonial architecture, one appears to be in a 
setting far distant from the squalid realities of the African urban slum. This 
impression of the city centre as a self-contained world is borne out by an examination 
of its inhabitants’ geographical orientation. Almost all of my informants live in the 
city centre, and the majority of them in the three well-off areas of Polana, 
Sommerschield, and Bairro Triunfo (neighbourhood of triumph). The city centre is 
also where most of my informants work and spend their leisure time. Many of my 
younger informants had limited experience of Maputo outside of the city centre and 
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some of the wealthier suburbs. One young woman, who works for an international 
NGO and was sent to the slums just outside of Maputo to collect data, told me of her 
shock at seeing such squalid living conditions just kilometres from her home. The 
experience sent her into a deep depression. Rutheiser observed in his work in Belize 
that social characteristics such as class and occupation are central features for creating 
distinctive social topographies with poorer parts of cities appearing as “empty zones” 
for more privileged urban residents (1993: 108-109). Although the slums in Maputo 
are just a short distance away they do not belong to the world most of my informants 
normally inhabit.  
 The world of the city centre which my informants inhabit reminded me of a 
privileged version of the socially self-contained “urban villages” studied by the 
Chicago school in the 1920s or William Whyte’s Italian slum (Hannerz 1980; Whyte 
1993). Mozambican friends would often complain to me about how Maputo was such 
a small town that everyone knew everyone. Whenever I would mention that Maputo 
is a city of around three million people I would receive a bemused look and the 
response: “You know that is not what I meant, everyone around here (meaning the 
city centre and the well-off neighbourhoods) knows everyone else”. One can easily 
see how the conception comes into being. Whenever I accompanied any Mozambican 
friends to one of Maputo’s beachside cafes, restaurants, bars or night clubs they were 
sure to run into to at least one person they knew well, usually many more. Numerous 
conversations with informants over coffee were interrupted when someone would 
walk in and inquire as to the health and general well-being of the informant’s family. 
Social visits for elites tended to rotate around the same set of well-appointed houses 
whose furnishings usually appeared similar to upper-middle class residences the 
world over. During the hot season people would spend the day relaxing by the pool. 
Even for the houses of the middle classes which were not nearly as grand, family and 
friends would come over and crowd the living room to watch the latest Brazilian 
telenovelas (soap operas) on cable television. For elites, visits outside the city centre 
are usually jaunts to beach towns along the coast or trips abroad to South Africa or 
further a field. If it not for the endless streams of workers pouring into the city centre 
from the suburbs and the presence of empregadas (servants) in the houses of elites, 
the city centre can easily pass for a self-contained bubble floating slightly above 
Mozambique. As with many aspects of the lives of elites and even the urban middle 
class, life in the city is quintessentially of Mozambique. These patterns of behaviour 
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have their roots in the colonial period and assumed their current shape starting with 
the independence of the nation. Yet compared to the experiences of the vast majority 
of the population, it is alien enough to border on fantasy. 
 
1.7 Methodology 
 
 One of the major difficulties encountered by researchers interested in the elite 
is the problem of access (Nader 1972; Shore 2002). Elite social circles are difficult to 
enter for the uninitiated and due to the importance of positions that elites usually 
occupy; they often have good reasons for limiting the access of outsiders to things 
that could be considered sensitive (Shore 2002). I circumvented part of this problem 
through good fortune. I had met some of my initial informants before I undertook this 
study. I obtained my master’s degree at the University of Cape Town, which is a 
popular destination for elite Mozambican students when they study abroad. During 
my fieldwork I was able to become reacquainted with some of the people I had met in 
Cape Town. As with C. W. Watson (1999) in his fieldwork in Indonesia, I met many 
of my other informants through previous personal relationships. Needless to say my 
access was not total. Many of informants and their parents had sensitive jobs, and I 
had limited access to their places of work. In addition, Maputo is also a busy urban 
centre, which limited direct empirical observation of some aspects of both work and 
family life as people had crowded social schedules and were not always available. 
While this is a drawback to some degree, I think the breadth of contacts I was able to 
make in a widely varied environment offsets this. 
 My primary informants were 23 members of the independence elite that I 
knew well. This group was relatively young with ages ranging from the early 20s to 
early 30s. Of these 23 informants, 22 had studied abroad for university (the one who 
did not had to remain in Mozambique for family reasons but he sent his younger 
siblings to study in South Africa). Thirteen of them had also studied abroad for at 
least part of their secondary school education as well. The most popular countries for 
education were South Africa (for both secondary school and university) and the 
United Kingdom (for university). Other countries included Portugal (for both 
secondary school and university), the US (secondary school and university), Brazil 
(university) and Swaziland (secondary school). Of the 22 informants who studied 
abroad, 21 took university degrees in law and the social sciences and one in 
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architecture.  One other informant obtained an MBA after an undergraduate degree in 
the social sciences. Many had started working for various governmental ministries 
after their education and then moved to the more highly remunerated international 
agencies. Government salaries were typically about £160 per month and international 
agencies tended to start at around £385 and the top positions could pay up to £825 per 
month. Of the 23, three were still studying. A further two worked for family 
businesses; the rest worked for the government or international agencies. Many were 
able to supplement their incomes with money from their families, or more 
occasionally through rents earned from properties they or their families owned. 
 Through my connections with my primary informants among the 
independence elite I was able to gain access to members of the revolutionary elite, 
often family members of my initial informants. This was supplemented with contacts 
I made through my affiliation at Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo. All 
together I was able to perform a series of semi-structured interviews with 40 people. 
In addition to my informants among the elite I also had 16 primary informants among 
the urban middle classes and one middle class family that I was especially close to. 
All were studying or had studied within Mozambique and while they held a diverse 
selection of jobs, (although many were also employed by international agencies) 
salaries tended to average around £200 per month, although two with relatively high 
positions at international agencies earned around £650.  
 In addition to more formal interviews one of my major techniques for 
gathering data was through participant observation. As with William Whyte’s (1993) 
“Street Corner Society” I found that pulling out a notepad and a pen in social 
situations outside formal interviews made my informants uncomfortable. Following 
Whyte’s advice I trained myself to remember casual conversations that I could write 
down later. In many cases the information obtained from more casual social settings 
was just as informative, if not more so, than that gleaned from formal interviews. 
More casual information was used to incorporate Gluckman’s famous method of 
situational analysis, typified in his study of the opening of a bridge in Zululand 
(1958). Following Gluckman’s lead I watched the social interactions of elites with 
each other and members of wider social groups to understand how these interactions: 
“create a wider social and historical analysis” (Hannerz 1980: 132-133). Yet 
participant observation alone could be a one-sided and somewhat daunting method in 
a large, busy African city where: “Network chains run on without visible end, new 
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faces keep showing up while others drift out of the picture unpredictably” (Hannerz 
1980: 312 cf Ferguson 1999). I supplemented participant observation with the 
collection of over 30 life histories and case studies. Life histories were crucial for 
understanding a situation, which due to its urban nature and an extended period of 
political and social change, was extremely fluid. Through life histories I could 
gradually see patterns in social relationships emerge and also attempt to trace how 
they had changed over time (Bernard 1988; Bertaux 1981; de Camargo 1981). In 
addition I found it useful to combine observations from life histories and case studies 
with that of participant observation to attempt to build on Turner’s extended case 
study (1957). Thus through observation I could watch how the repercussions of an 
interaction, or series of interactions, often ones that I had only had described to me 
during life histories, played out over time. This was a key factor in understanding both 
the formation of social roles and how they had changed through recent history.  
 Following the lead of Gupta (1995) I was also interested in forms of popular 
media such as television, radio, and the newspaper. I used these to understand how 
representations of class were formed on the national and global level. Practically, this 
was done by discussing news and media stories with my informants, especially those 
concerning the government and corruption. Two pivotal stories were of particular 
importance. One suggested the possible involvement of members of the current 
government in the South African plot to assassinate Mozambique’s first president, 
Samora Machel. The other was the second nationally televised trial in Mozambique, 
concerning the assassination of a prominent journalist, Carlos Cardoso. Cardoso had 
been investigating a serious embezzlement scandal that occurred in some of 
Mozambique’s banks, during and immediately after privatisation. A powerful family 
was implicated and allegations were made against the President’s eldest son. This trial 
captured the attention of the city and was a constant topic of conversation. I spent 
many hours discussing the trial and watching it on television with various families, 
exploring the gulf between the elite and popular opinions concerning the facts of the 
trial and looking at how they exposed the nature and morality of the current regime 
and its primary beneficiaries.  
 The high social profile of many of my informants and the relative smallness of 
their community raises several ethical issues. While the discipline of anthropology has 
established relatively strict (although frequently debated and often challenged) ethical 
guidelines, there tends to be an underlying assumption that most anthropological 
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informants belong to groups that are poor and oppressed (cf. Gledhill 1994). The 
types of protection advocated for these groups are not necessarily the same for groups 
of higher social status. In this respect I found myself in slightly less well-charted 
waters. While I always made sure to stress to my informants my role as an 
anthropologist, it can be difficult for people to keep this in their mind for 24 hours a 
day over the course of 20 months. I was occasionally told things that could be quite 
damaging; both for the informant and for other people and my analysis did not always 
coincide with peoples’ self-representations. I have tried to the best of my ability not to 
include anything in this thesis that I feel could overtly compromise any of my 
informants. In addition I did not pose questions of a financial nature. These could be 
very delicate, especially when standards of living appeared to be in excess of stated 
resources. Due to the small size of the study group and their widespread fluency in 
English I have also made an extra effort to protect the identities of my informants. 
Names have been changed, unless requested otherwise, and actual positions (i.e. 
Minister of Information) have been purposely left vague unless it is a matter of public 
record or if I was interviewing someone in their political capacity. In addition this 
thesis contains no photographs as people and often even their houses are easily 
recognised.  
 
1.8 Thesis Chapter Outline 
 
 The following chapter provides a historical outline, giving a brief general 
overview of Mozambican history and then focuses on the late colonial period and the 
post-independence period in the south of the country where my research was based. In 
this chapter I argue that the particular structure of the colonial elite distanced them 
from “traditional” power structures and helped make ideas of “modernisation” 
attractive to their descendents the revolutionary elite. Chapter Three examines what it 
means to be modern for the Mozambican elites in different periods of history and how 
this conception of modernity confers both social power and a sense of uniqueness in a 
country that the elite have seen and continue to see as still fundamentally “backward”. 
I examine the elites’ changing conceptions of modernity from the liberation struggle 
to the present and the types of social power that were exemplified by different forms 
of modernity. The chapter argues that, despite the fact the Mozambican elite has held 
differing ideological conceptions of the overall project of modernity, throughout 
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various stages in history elites connections to the ideology of modernity both 
legitimises the ruling group and entitles them to their social status. The chapter 
specifically investigates the role of education abroad, showing how it inculcates a 
sense of cosmopolitan modernity. It also discusses elite patterns of consumption that 
demonstrate this modernity on an everyday basis. 
 In Chapter Four I discuss the local connotations of racialised discourse in 
Mozambique from the colonial period to the present. The chapter explains why young 
elites in the current period often use a derogatory racialised vocabulary to speak about 
people even when they belong to the same racial group. It argues that the concept of 
race for my informants is drawn from a larger idiom that originated in the colonial 
period and was used to express social difference, not just in relation to Europeans or 
the Portuguese, but also to the larger population. I further argue that although this 
discourse has colonial roots, it was grounded in the liberation struggle and early 
independence period, including an attempted coup by extreme Portuguese settlers and 
an outbreak of racial violence that formed the “transitional moment” for the modern 
elite’s understanding of race. I contend that although independence was won through 
a long peasant-based struggle, the Frelimo leadership shared a predominantly urban 
background and a commitment to modernity that caused deep distrust, which 
sometimes verged on contempt, for much of the peasant population and for what the 
leadership saw as “traditional” ways of life. I then investigate how political and social 
changes that have followed the fall of socialism have been accompanied by a different 
kind of racial discourse, which is used against other high-status groups as former 
bonds of solidarity begin to fray. I argue that in Mozambique racial discourse does not 
speak of biological differences per se, but of social position and behaviours that are 
thought to accompany certain groups. 
 In Chapter Five I examine the complicated relationship of elites to the urban 
middle classes in Maputo. Although the Frelimo leadership was initially suspicious of 
the urban middle classes shortly after independence, the similar social background of 
the latter helped make them the most receptive to the party’s message of modernity.  
They also had the skills to staff the growing state apparatus. The middle class soon 
became one of the bastions of party support and the boundaries between them and 
elites began to blur. The chapter argues, however, that the intertwined processes of 
democratisation and neo-liberalism, which were theoretically supposed to enfranchise 
the population, have in fact created a growing social gap between the two and Frelimo 
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is losing its legitimacy among its former staunch supporters. The chapter further 
demonstrates, by using a famous scandal as an example, how the elite’s utilisation of 
social networks has created a growing sense of conspiracy among the middle classes. 
 In Chapter Six, the final ethnographic chapter, I examine the often 
contradictory effects of Frelimo’s plans to introduce “modern” relationships and 
emancipate women. This chapter argues that considerable tensions have arisen from 
the social closeness of elites and the urban middle classes and the imperatives of elite 
consolidation which have stressed endogamy, both during socialism as the need to 
strengthen the “ideological family” and in the present capitalist era to consolidate 
resources often through marriage and minimizing ties with poorer kin. However, 
while there may be an elite ideal of endogamy, it is frequently circumvented on the 
ground. I examine the individual strategies used by my informants to achieve their 
objectives within the existing social constraints. 
 Chapter Seven is the conclusion. In this chapter I outline the major points of 
the thesis which demonstrate how an ideological conception of modernity has been 
central in the formation of the Mozambican elite and ensuring their continued social 
dominance. In addition I describe the strengths and weakness of the study and 
examine the contributions it makes and the further research questions it poses.  
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Chapter Two 
 
The Modernity of Elites: a Historical Background 
 
The Blacks in Africa must be directed and moulded by Europeans but they are 
indispensable as assistants to the latter…. The Africans by themselves did not account for 
a single useful invention nor any usable technical discovery, no conquest that counts in 
the evolution of humanity, nothing that can compare to the accomplishments in the areas 
of culture and technology by Europeans or even by Asians. (Former Portuguese Prime 
Minister Marcello Caetano 1950 quoted in Isaacman and Isaacman 1983: 27). 
 
When the whites came to our country we had the land, and they had the bible; now we 
have the bible and they have the land (Popular saying, quoted in Mondlane 1969: 23). 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 This chapter provides the historical background for the growth of the 
modernist elites in Mozambique.
19
 In this chapter I argue that the elite ideology of 
modernity drew, in part, on the elites’ colonial experiences. The nucleus of the 
revolutionary elite had its origins as an urban-based petty bourgeoisie, and despite the 
fact that many of Frelimo’s leaders came from families that had connections with 
powerful or royal African families, they often became enmeshed in the colonial 
system instead of African “traditional” power structures such as chiefdoms or lineage 
based organisations. This group was mostly of southern origin and was participating 
in an economic system firmly tied to that of the country’s more powerful and 
industrialised neighbour, South Africa. Many members of the embryonic colonial elite 
were concentrated in the more “modern” sectors of the economy, and their economic 
background was primarily based in state employment, migratory labour, the service 
industry, and, more rarely, commercial farming. I argue that the social and economic 
origins during the colonial period of the Mozambican elite were influential in sowing 
the seeds of a modernist ideology with a strong anti-rural and anti-traditional bias. 
This is not to say that the elite ideology of modernity is a mechanical outgrowth of 
Portuguese colonial policy. In some ways it is counter-intuitive to the manner in 
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 The actual growth and formation of the elite’s modernising ideology is examined in the following 
chapter. 
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which Portugal tried to rule Mozambique for much of the colonial period, but the 
nucleus of this ideology was shaped by the relationship and interactions between the 
colonial elite and the colonial state. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the 
historical processes that have contributed to the particular formation of a state-based, 
modernising revolutionary elite. This chapter focuses on the formation of a particular 
colonial elite in the south of Mozambique in general and in the capital in particular.
20
 
I begin my historical examination with Portuguese contact and do not attempt an 
analysis of pre-colonial history; instead my general concentration is on the 100 years 
preceding independence and primarily on the formation and rise of Frelimo.     
 
2.2 Portuguese Contact 
 
 The paradox of Portuguese imperialism was that although they had one of the 
great colonial empires, their internal weakness served to limit the effective penetration 
of Portuguese rule for much of the colonial period. The Portuguese often had to align 
themselves with local leaders and the early years of their rule provided the indigenous 
elites with opportunities to increase their power. Although Portuguese propaganda 
stressed that they were the master of one of the oldest and most durable colonial 
empires in Africa, one lasting close to 500 years, their ability to actually rule the lands 
they claimed was limited throughout much of the colonial period. The formation of 
Portugal’s colonial empire did not stem from the subordination of the colonies to 
supply resources for growing mercantile and later industrial strength, as may be 
argued for Great Britain, but from internal weakness. The ruling elite of a small state 
that had difficulties in supplying enough food to feed its own population, looked to 
foreign shores for the resources necessary to enrich themselves (Alpers and Ehret 
1975; Axelson 1973; Newitt 1981, 1995). Their internal weakness, combined with 
fierce foreign military and economic competition, resulted in the empire being 
constructed on shaky foundations. The continuing weakness at the political centre was 
to have far-reaching consequences for the type of colonialism practised in Portugal’s 
imperial possessions and even for their version of colonialism’s eventual demise.    
 Portugal first made contact with sub-Saharan populations in West Africa in 
1443 (Newitt 1981, 1995). At the time the Portuguese elite was less concerned with 
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 With the exception of the discussion of the liberation struggle (1964-1974) which was concentrated 
in the far north of Mozambique. 
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extending their control to new territories than they were with discovering and securing 
a ready supply of slaves, gold and other commodities that could be marketed in 
Europe (Newitt 1981, 1995). As the Portuguese arrived in Mozambique in 1498 and 
their empire expanded along the west and east African coast in the 16
th
 Century, they 
began to view Africa in a new light, hoping to replicate the recent conquests made by 
Spain in the new world and find their own fabulous sources of wealth (Axelson 1973; 
Isaacman and Isaacman 1983; Newitt 1981, 1995). However the societies that the 
Portuguese initially encountered in what was to become central and northern 
Mozambique were very different from those found in Central and South America. 
There was no unified empire which a small group of Portuguese soldiers could 
neutralise with a decisive blow to the capital, nor was there large-scale infrastructure 
or apparatus for administration and domination that could be co-opted for colonial 
rule. Instead the Portuguese encountered a widely varied social mosaic of coastal 
merchant towns. These towns were deeply involved in long-standing Indian Ocean 
trade networks that were often dominated by Arab, Indian and Swahili traders who 
were connected to the inland, matrilineal polities through a complicated set of 
relationships involving intermarriage, trade and patronage (Alpers and Ehret 1975; 
Newitt 1981, 1995,). The Portuguese King ordered that these networks be reformed 
and brought under imperial control. But for agents on the ground, it was far more 
feasible to focus on creating a niche in the existing system. Many Portuguese agents 
employed the selective use of their limited military forces to bargain for an 
advantageous position within these networks rather than attempting outright 
domination.    
 Until very late in the 19
th
 Century the Portuguese Empire in Mozambique was 
a somewhat ramshackle edifice (Atmore 1985; Smith and Clarence 1985). Imperial 
rule was limited to a few small isolated outposts and much of the actual power and 
commerce was in the hands of foreign capital, sertanejos (Portuguese hunters and 
rural traders), Swahili, Indian and Arab merchants, African chiefs, and prominent 
Afro-Portuguese families (Alpers and Ehret 1975; Axelson, 1973).
21
 Much of the 
territory that makes up the modern nation-state of Mozambique was not brought fully 
under Portuguese government control until after the First World War. For hundreds of 
years the Portuguese colonialists who settled in Mozambique were of limited number. 
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 Even in isolated outposts, Portuguese representatives often concentrated on building up their own 
economic networks at the expense of the state (Newitt 1995), 
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They frequently married into locally prominent families and, unlike some other 
colonial powers such as the British, they tended not to introduce new methods of 
production or new technologies (until very late in the colonial period) but rather to 
adapt themselves and make use of what was already there (Newitt 1995: 29-30, 100). 
Portugal’s style of colonialism, the brutality and lack of overall development that 
accompanied their rule, the apparent permissiveness towards “miscegenation”22 and 
the tendency for local officials to adopt African social patterns, caused wide-spread 
condemnation and contempt among the other colonial powers, particularly Great 
Britain (Chabal 2002; Fry 2000; Newitt 1995; Penvenne 1995).  
 This sense of siege combined with the long-term political weakness in 
Portugal itself, its dependence on outside foreign capital and numerous attempts by 
other colonial powers to seize territory claimed by Portugal, gave rise to a sense of 
national humiliation in the metropole. Many Portuguese felt the other European 
powers viewed them as “little better than the natives” themselves. The combination of 
these factors resulted in an extremely nationalistic colonial policy, which meant that a 
peaceful process of decolonisation was unlikely. These trends were accelerated after 
the advent of a quasi-fascist dictatorship in Portugal in 1928 known as the “New 
State”. The dictatorship’s colonial policy consisted of attempts to draw the colonies 
ever more tightly within the Portuguese grip (they later became known as overseas 
provinces) and to use the colonies’ resources and markets to try to modernise Portugal 
itself. Colonial possessions also became a symbol of Portuguese national pride, proof 
that Portugal was not just a small and poor country.  
Indeed, the cultural and material factors of Portuguese colonialism helped to 
create many of the crucial difficulties of the post-colonial state. Frelimo inherited a 
country characterised by weak internal cohesion, with a few highly developed cities 
and agricultural areas that were connected to neighbouring countries rather than to the 
vast surrounding hinterlands, which had little real infrastructure and overwhelming 
illiteracy. In addition to the physical difficulties of trying to rule the new nation, there 
was a wide divergence between the social outlook of the relatively educated 
revolutionary elite, whose members tended to hail from the urban areas and the most 
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 Portugal’s multiracial rhetoric only became stressed in government propaganda towards the end of 
the colonial period as they attempted to win over critics and deny possible support to Frelimo. Much of 
this rhetoric was marred by utter hypocrisy, as noted by Eduardo Mondlane who commented that 
despite the government’s statement about the Portuguese having a “special and close” affinity with 
their African subjects there are far fewer mulattos in Mozambique than in South Africa, where 
interracial unions were barred by law (Mondlane, 1969). 
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economically developed parts of the country, and that of the mass of the population. 
Considerable tensions resulted, and these have lasted, and even intensified, up to the 
present day.     
 
2.3 The Founding of Delagoa Bay and Colonialism in the South of Mozambique 
 
The south of Mozambique was long considered a backwater by the 
Portuguese, but its eventual pacification resulted in almost contradictory effects. 
Unlike many areas of Mozambique that were formally administered by chartered 
companies, the south was brought under direct control of the Portuguese state. Yet, at 
the same time, due to its geographical position and years of colonial neglect the south 
had already become deeply intertwined in the British dominated regional economy 
and Portuguese firms were often at a disadvantage.  
During the first three centuries of the “empire” Portuguese officials 
concentrated their attention on the central and northern port cities of the area that 
would become Mozambique. As if to demonstrate their commitment to international 
trade and their lack of interest in the land itself, Mozambique was officially ruled 
from Goa until 1752. Then the capital was then moved to the Island of Mozambique, 
off the coast of the present province of Nampula in the north. Although the far south 
of Mozambique had a natural deep water sea port in Delagoa Bay, which later became 
Maputo, contact was limited and most Portuguese in the area were survivors of 
shipwrecks. This gradually began to change with the expansion of the ivory trade. By 
1589 the Portuguese had a limited official presence in the area that eventually became 
the colonial capital of Lourenço Marques and later the independent capital of Maputo. 
In addition to the Portuguese presence, Delagoa Bay was already inhabited by African 
societies drawn to the area because of the abundant opportunities to engage in 
whaling (Newitt 1995: 160-162).  
The Portuguese attempted to draw these societies and the groups inhabiting 
the hinterlands into their already existing trade networks and installed a barter system 
for ivory. While significant profits were made from the ivory trade, the populations 
the Portuguese encountered in the south were structurally very different from those in 
the other areas of Mozambique and were more difficult to incorporate into the 
existing system. Much of the south was semi-arid and lacked the rich agricultural land 
of the centre of the country. The area was populated more sparsely and the 
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populations were patrilineal, with wealth and political power concentrated in the 
ownership of cattle. Young men would work for elders to gain the cattle necessary for 
lobolo (bride-price in many southern languages). While Portuguese trade goods were 
in use, they did not gain the significance that they held in other parts of the country 
and more attention was focused on the internal cattle economy (Feliciano 1998; 
Newitt 1995). Portuguese manpower was limited and most colonial governors found it 
more profitable to focus their attention on the slave trade that was primarily run from 
the port cities in the centre and north of the country. The south was barely 
incorporated into existing imperial political structures and, outside small outposts, 
was left to its own devices until the 1885 “Scramble for Africa”, when it was decreed 
that effective occupation was the primary basis for a colonial power to claim 
hegemony over territory (Axelson 1973; Newitt 1981, 1995).  
Although the south of Mozambique may have initially been a backwater even 
by the standards of a ramshackle empire, it was by no means isolated. By the end of 
the 18
th
 Century the town of Lourenço Marques, which had been founded on Delagoa 
Bay, was becoming an area of commercial importance. English ships from India were 
calling to trade for ivory and an Englishman in the service of Austria had set up a 
permanent trade factory (Atmore 1985; Newitt 1995). The Portuguese presence was 
still relatively weak, especially after the outbreak of the revolutionary wars in Europe. 
French ships often attacked the Portuguese in the area and local chiefs found they 
could get higher prices from English and Dutch merchants. These cosmopolitan 
connections increased in the 19
th
 Century. South African labour recruiters were active 
in bringing southern Mozambican labourers into the Transvaal republic, and British 
Indian merchants dominated the local trade networks, dealing with and competing 
against sertanejos and local African leaders and prominent Afro-Portuguese families 
(Harries 1994; Penvenne 1995). The cosmopolitan make up of Lourenço Marques and 
Britain’s designs on the area worried the Portuguese administration. In addition to 
European threats, strong African polities had also established themselves in southern 
Mozambique.  
The competition amongst colonial powers for African territories threatened to 
become dangerous and destabilising and efforts were made to settle boundary disputes 
between European states in the famous Conference of Berlin in 1884-85. Portugal 
came with the mapa cor de rosa (pink or rose coloured map) that stated their claims 
for a large swathe of central Africa, from the Atlantic coast of Angola to the 
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Mozambican coast on the Indian Ocean. Although Portuguese explorers had followed 
the tried and tested colonial formula of signing treaties with anyone who could pass as 
an African authority figure, many of Portugal’s claims were rejected. At the Berlin 
conference it was decided that effective occupation would be one of the major criteria 
in assigning territories. While Portugal claimed vast amounts of Africa were subject 
to its suzerainty the reality was very different. The south was already being 
economically incorporated into neighbouring South Africa, and the central section of 
Mozambique was divided into prazos. Prazos were theoretically land grants, usually 
to Afro-Portuguese families that ruled in the name of the king and were subject to 
royal renewal. In actuality, prazos tended to resemble personal fiefdoms, in which 
loyalty to the king operated in name only and the actual power was that of the “feudal 
lords” backed by personal slave armies. Other territories in the centre and the north of 
the country were held by chartered companies that effectively wielded the powers of a 
government (Roberts 1986). The companies had their own police forces, they printed 
their own currencies and profited through the extraction of taxes. Many of these 
companies were owned by foreign capital. The Niassa Company for example in the 
far north was around 80% British owned (Newitt 1995). Portugal’s grand claims were 
rejected and envious eyes were cast towards their remaining territory. Britain and 
Germany long considered dividing Mozambique between them. However, Portugal’s 
diplomatic defeat at the Conference of Berlin unleashed a wave of colonial 
nationalism among the metropolitan population and the government tried with 
renewed vigour to extend effective control over its remaining possessions.  
One of the targets for suppression was the Gaza Empire in the south of 
Mozambique. The Gaza Empire had grown out of the series of regional conquests and 
disturbances known as the Mfecane, unleashed by the growth of the Zulu Empire. 
Renegade Zulu generals had fled into Mozambique and used their disciplined armies 
and new tactics to establish their hegemony over local groups (Feliciano 1998; Newitt 
1995; Smith and Clarence 1985). By 1894 the Portuguese had decided that the Gaza 
Empire had to be destroyed. Although the then emperor, Gungunhana, had officially 
aligned himself with the Portuguese, he had allowed Swiss Protestant missionaries 
from across the border with South Africa in his court, and the Portuguese colonial 
establishment suspected him of favouring the British and Kruger’s then Zuid 
Afrikaanse Republiek. With the Portuguese government increasingly aware of the 
fragility of their empire after the Conference of Berlin and with the temptation of 
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securing the valuable commerce flowing through Lourenço Marques for their cash-
strapped operations, the threat of a strong, independent African polity that could 
possibly side with colonial rivals was simply too much. Following the example of the 
recent military victory by Cecil Rhodes in Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese 
government declared war on the Gaza Empire in 1895 and resistance was completely 
crushed by 1897.  
The Gaza Empire had internal weaknesses that could be exploited. Its rulers 
had exploited and dominated other ethnic groups, subjecting them to repeated raids 
and obliging them to pay tribute (Feliciano 1998; Honwana 1988; Newitt 1995). The 
Portuguese sent a relatively strong force of European soldiers to forge military 
alliances with the disaffected groups who had suffered under Gaza rule. When war 
broke out the Gaza Empire had some successes and even managed to infiltrate and 
attack Lourenço Marques, but the superior firepower of the Portuguese and their allies 
soon brought the war to a close. In 1895 Gungunhana was defeated and captured. The 
Portuguese then exiled him to the Azores Islands. One of Gungunhana’s chief 
commanders, Maguinuana, continued the fight against the Portuguese, but he was 
captured in 1897 and beheaded, thus ending not only the Gaza Empire, but any 
significant, independent African polity in the south of Mozambique. 
The Gaza wars were to have great significance for the future forms of 
Portuguese colonialism. The victory restored Portuguese pride in their colonial 
empire, after the humiliation at the Conference of Berlin and military setbacks in 
other parts of Mozambique. The Portuguese commander, António Ennes, became a 
national hero and was made the next colonial governor. During his period of office he 
reinvigorated the administration and began to solidify Portuguese control over 
Mozambique.
23
 The capital was also moved from Mozambique Island in the north to 
Lourenço Marques in 1898 as the area was directly under state control (Newitt 1995; 
Penvenne 1995).  
However, the effects of the Gaza wars went beyond a revitalised colonial 
administration. Although Frelimo was later to portray Gungunhana as a proto-
nationalist hero, at the time his influence was deeply divisive. As previously stated 
other ethnic groups, tired of Gaza depredations, had joined the Portuguese war effort. 
When Gungunhana was captured his own men began to chant: “Away with you, 
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vulture, slaughterer of our chickens” (quoted in Honwana 1988: 43). Despite 
Gungunhana’s ignominious departure from the political scene his resistance later 
became a nationalist myth. Samora Machel stated that he began to develop his 
political consciousness as a young man through hearing the stories of his grandfather 
who was a commander in Gungunhana’s armies (Christie 1989). Machel’s successor, 
Joaquim Chissano, also had ancestors who fought with Gungunhana and in Frelimo 
mythology Gungunhana became one of the first proto-nationalists. Like many 
nationalist myths the reality was in fact far more contradictory. This can be seen in the 
ancestry of other members of the Frelimo leadership. For example, Eduardo 
Mondlane, the founder of Frelimo, came from the Chope, a coastal group living 
further to the north and whose people had been victimised by the Gaza Empire and 
had on occasion sided with the Portuguese. Members of other southern groups, such 
as the Ronga, also aided the Portuguese in the conquest of Gaza. One such example is 
the father of Raúl Honwana, the patriarch of a prominent Frelimo family. He had 
fought with the Portuguese during the Gaza war and later served as a translator.  
The destruction of the Gaza Empire was to have wider implications for the 
future structure of the colonial and eventually the revolutionary elites beyond the 
formation of a nationalist myth. When the Portuguese went to war with the Gaza 
Empire they made no attempt to preserve its structures and utilise them for the 
purposes of indirect rule after the conflict. They simply destroyed them. This act of 
destruction left behind the seeds of what would become a nationalist myth, but it also 
left a significant “traditional” power vacuum, which was filled by the Portuguese 
administration. This situation accelerated the penetration of international capital and 
the importance of migrant labour, a process that had begun under Gungunhana’s rule. 
In Gaza Portuguese allies were being promoted to positions of power and the 
remainder of the population had to find sources of income that could pay the ever-
increasing government taxes. The future for ambitious African youths in the south, 
especially the areas near Maputo, no longer resided so much with rising in the ranks 
of ‘traditional” power structures, as these were being filled by outsiders, but with 
finding employment, in the mines of South Africa or in the growing southern capital. 
These developments helped, in part, to weaken the links between the indigenous 
southern colonial elite and traditional power structures, a development that was to 
have momentous consequences in the post-colonial era. Ironically, the destruction of 
the Gaza Empire and the incorporation of the south into the colonial state set the 
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scene for the formation of an urban-based modernising elite who would eventually 
overthrow Portuguese dominion over Mozambique. 
 
2.4 The Formation of the Colonial elite 
 
After the destruction of the Gaza Empire, the future colonial elite became 
more tightly bound with Mozambique’s new capital, Lourenço Marques. In the last 
years of the Portuguese monarchy, from 1877 to 1910, Lourenço Marques had an 
open economic policy (in contrast to other Mozambican ports) and in combination 
with the growth of the mining industry in the Transvaal, changed Lourenço Marques 
from a half-forgotten backwater fort to a centre of commerce, although the lion’s 
share of trade was controlled by British capital. Yet Lourenço Marques’ growing 
prosperity did not impress visiting Europeans and for many neighbouring colonial 
powers Portuguese imperialism was synonymous with misrule. An early British 
visitor described the city as follows:  
 
The future of Delagoa Bay (the English name for Lourenço Marques) under Portuguese rule 
can be but decay and death… This mass of grass huts, reed fences, decayed forts… and 
stench is enclosed by a wall about six feet high. At one time the slave and ivory trade must 
have made this an important station, but the abolition of the former and the failure of the 
other… have reduced the place to the most miserable condition (quoted in Penvenne 1995: 
32). 
 
Other British observers were even harsher in their judgement, stating that Lourenço 
Marques was a symbol of the racial degeneracy of both Africans and the Portuguese 
and demonstrated that the Portuguese were unfit to rule the territory: “… set in a land 
of loveliness, surrounded by rich luxuriant vegetation (Lourenço Marques) is cursed 
with malaria and given over to lazy people who wallow in their filth…” (Penvenne 
1995: 32).
24
 However by the first decade of the 20
th
 Century the city had a modern 
port with a hydraulic crane, forty or so miles of macadam roadway, hotels and 
handsome villas with mosquito proofed verandas (Penvenne 1995: 33). While the 
colonial capital developed modern amenities for the white population, this was the 
beginning of the steady disenfranchisement of the African population and the colonial 
elite. 
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 One observer described the Portuguese of Lourenço Marques as: “dissolute, immoral and useless” 
(Penvenne 1995: 32). 
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 There is a current debate in African studies concerning whether there were 
substantial differences among the colonial systems implemented by different 
European powers or if, despite rhetoric, they effectively followed the same logic 
differing primarily in extremes (Mamdani 1996). While the finer points of this debate 
are beyond the scope of this chapter, I argue that the Portuguese colonial model did 
have specific characteristics that derived both from the specific ideological 
conceptions of what the empire was to be and from the political and economic 
weakness of the mother country itself. This does not mean Portuguese colonialism 
was static; it took different forms throughout the periods of monarchy, republican rule 
and Salazar’s “New State”.25 In addition much of the practical implementation, until 
the advent of the New State, depended on the personality of the colonial governors, 
who, in practice had considerable autonomy from Lisbon and often implemented their 
own policies.  
Throughout much of the empire’s history the Portuguese presence in 
Mozambique was extremely limited and many of the predominantly male colonialists 
would marry into African families, often recognising and giving their nationality to 
the children of these unions who were then able to find relatively high-ranking 
positions in trade or the colonial administration (Hedges 1999; Mateus 1999; 
Penvenne 1989, 1995). Although the phenomenon of local elites obtaining high 
positions was not unknown in other parts of Africa, it tended to characterise only the 
early periods of colonialism; barriers became tighter during the 19
th
 and 20
th
 Centuries 
with the growth of so-called “scientific racism” (Dubow 1995; Mann 1985; Stoler 
1997).
26
 The fact that the Portuguese men often intermarried or at least kept 
mistresses among the African population, and that they often recognised their 
children, led to charges of miscegenation and degeneracy from other European 
powers. The Portuguese responded by stating that they were bringing European 
civilisation to the “natives” and that this demonstrated the Portuguese’s ability to 
understand and interact with their subject population. They used this supposed 
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 António de Oliveira Salazar was made the minister of finance for the military junta that overthrew 
the Portuguese Republic in 1926. After accomplishing the Herculean task of balancing the budget he 
became the dominant voice in the junta and was appointed Prime Minister in 1932. He held power until 
incapacitated by a stroke in 1968. Salazar established a quasi-fascist authoritarian regime that borrowed 
heavily from Mussolini’s corporativist ideology and local nationalism, it was called o Estado Novo (the 
New State). He kept Portugal neutral in the Second World War and was later able to become a member 
of NATO and benefited from their assistance during the liberation wars in Africa (Newitt 1981).  
26
 This is not to say that forms of “scientific racism” were not influential among the Portuguese during 
the colonial period. They were, there were simply some differences in implementation. 
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enlightened attitude to try and deflect charges of Portuguese complicity in the illegal 
slave trade. During the last stages of the “New State” (1932-1974) it became a full-
blown ideological justification of Portuguese colonial domination. This ideology, 
known as lusotropicalismo, stated that, unlike the racist rule of other colonial powers, 
Portugal was uniquely endowed with the ability to reign over Africans in harmony 
and advance their level of civilisation (Hedges 1999; Newitt 1981; Roberts 1986). 
 Although many of the claims of lusotropicalismo were hypocritical at best and 
outright falsehoods at worst, this form of colonialism did give the Mozambican elite a 
distinctive character. As stated earlier in this chapter, the colonial elite was primarily 
urban-based. Although many members of this group found the grand claims of 
Portuguese colonialism laughable and only participated to gain its benefits for 
themselves and their families, it did begin to create an identification with a form of 
metropolitan culture, if not the specific metropolitan power (Honwana 1988; Sithole 
and Ingwane 1977). It also created an indigenous elite that was complicit, to a degree, 
with the colonial system.  
 While the Portuguese may have made some concessions to colonial elites, 
their rule was characterised by poverty and brutality for the majority of the 
population. In the charter concessions in the centre and north of the country, 
companies were free to make their profits by using the population in whatever way 
they saw fit. The situation was slightly different in the south, which was under direct 
government control. The government soon found that its major resource, outside of a 
deep-water port, was the local population (Hanlon 1990). By 1897 Portugal had 
signed treaties with the Zuid Afrikaanse Republiek over the amount of migrant labour 
that would be exported to South Africa. This treaty survived the Anglo-Boer war and 
it was decided that the South Africans would also send workers’ salaries directly to 
the Portuguese colonial administration, where they would take a portion and then 
deliver the rest to the worker (Harries 1994; Norman 2004). In addition the south saw 
the widespread use of chibalo (forced labour).
27
 It was declared that it was an 
African’s duty to work, and if someone did not have a job they were sent to do 
chibalo, with minimal, if any payment, either for public works or for private 
companies (Hedges 1999; Newitt; 1995; Penvenne 1995). Conditions of chibalo were 
little better than slavery.  Although the workers were often called “volunteers”, the 
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 There are various spellings of the word chibalo; it can also spelled as shibalo or chibaro. I have used 
the most common spelling. 
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name was a fiction. Raúl Honwana recalled a Portuguese official presenting 12 
chibalo labourers to his boss and saying “I hereby present 12 volunteers, all duly 
manacled” (Honwana 1988: 87).  
While many members of the colonial elite were spared this indignity and 
many, especially in the elite associations of Gremio (a Catholic, mulatto dominated 
association of powerful old families) and Instituto Negrofilo (a black and protestant 
dominated elite association with fewer ties to the Portuguese state)
28
 raised their 
voices against colonial abuses, some of these same people also directly profited from 
them (Casimiro 1979; Penvenne 1989, 1996). Despite the fact that many of their 
members spoke passionately against the injustices suffered by the majority of the 
population, these institutions (Which, in many ways they served as early attempts for 
elites to institutionalise themselves) were formed for the protection of elite interests 
and often displayed a sense of superiority which frequently earned them the distrust of 
the common people (Penvenne 1989, 1996).
29
 In addition, although the colonial elite 
also suffered discrimination, some forms of discriminatory measures also served the 
class interests of some members, such as chibalo. Some African elites also made use 
of chibalo and one of the most eloquent voices against colonial abuses, that of João 
Albasini, was directly involved in the chibalo trade (Penvenne 1996). While colonial 
elites criticised government abuses, their attitude towards the majority of the 
population was often characterised by class-based attitudes and patronising 
condescension towards what they viewed as “backwards” or “bush blacks” (Penvenne 
1989).
30
 Due to the ambiguous position of some members of the colonial elite, as both 
champions of the people and government lackeys, the majority of the population 
viewed them with hostility and saw them as a local outgrowth of the Portuguese 
(Penvenne 1989, 1996). They occupied an uneasy place between the Portuguese and 
the majority of the population, and were regarded with suspicion by both. 
   The high point for the colonial elite in southern Mozambique was the period 
between the end of the Monarchy and the beginning of Republican rule (1910-1926).  
The latter was the start of their decline, especially for mulattos, who were formerly 
known as brancas da terra (whites of the land, or local whites). White immigration 
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 Protestant Missions offered superior educational facilities that allowed some of their members to join 
the African elite, but the missions also were the subjects of state hostility. This is explained in more 
detail in Chapter Three. 
29
 This is discussed in more detail in Chapters Three and Four. 
30
 These elite institutions and elite attitudes towards the majority of the population are examined in 
more depth in Chapter Three.  
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increased and the administration no longer needed to rely on Mulattos, instead they 
started to become more of an embarrassment and were marked as a separate and 
inferior racial group (Penvenne 1979: 17-18). As the colonial state consolidated its 
hold on Mozambique, the status of and opportunities for the colonial elite began to 
dwindle. The political and economic weakness of the mother country, which had 
originally empowered them, was now beginning to work against them. The 
Portuguese government wanted to consolidate its hold over its colonial possessions 
and increasingly the state tried to do this by importing administers and settlers it felt it 
could control and whose undivided loyalty it commanded. The state attempted to 
carry out this goal by increasing white immigration and by intensifying older imperial 
strategies. During the Monarchy, the Portuguese had not relied solely on African 
members of the colonial elite to undertake the colony’s administrative burden, but had 
also imported Indians from their possessions in Goa.  Goans were well-established in 
both the lower and middle ranges of the administration and Indians connected with 
British colonies and the long-standing trade diaspora had a filled a mercantile niche in 
Mozambique, who later formed one of the key components of the Indian merchant 
class. The course of the often-troubled relationship between this group and the post-
independence elites was influenced by this early competition.
31
 In addition, white 
immigration that began to increase after the republican revolution became a flood 
during the “New State”, especially after the Second World War. The competition for 
suitable positions became a tripartite racial struggle (Birmingham 1992: 15-16). 
In many British colonies there were whites from relatively poor backgrounds, 
but with perhaps the exception of large segments of the Afrikaans population in South 
Africa, whatever their class standing was at home, white migrants could reasonably 
assume that they were destined for high-ranking positions upon arrival in Africa. 
Portuguese immigration tended to follow a different pattern. Migrants were frequently 
from the mother country’s rural poor and they often had low levels of education and 
literacy. The state systematically starved Africans of resources to build amenities for 
whites and ensure a relatively high standard of living for Portuguese migrants, but 
despite their continuing efforts many whites only had sufficient skills to take on 
menial positions (Hedges 1999; Penvenne 1995). In contrast to their higher status in 
most British colonies, white settlers in Mozambique worked as taxi-drivers, waiters 
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 More detail on the relationship between the Indian merchant elite and elites are provided in Chapter 
Four. 
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and barbers. By the 1950s, “Black cobblers, street vendors, bakers, housemaids, bus-
conductors, bar tenders and prostitutes all found their jobs threatened by poor 
whites…” (Birmingham 1992: 21). Urban African workers were under constant strain 
as they had to compete for positions with immigrant whites who were systematically 
favoured by the state. The path for upward social mobility was increasing blocked. 
The original colonial elite found their economic interests threatened by Indian 
competition while at the same time white immigration was slowly squeezing them out 
of high and mid-level bureaucratic positions. In addition, the black and to some extent 
the mulatto elite found its old position as civilizados (civilised) coming under attack 
as the colonial state began tightening the regulations and privileges of those with this 
status. Although local structures of Portuguese colonialism allowed for the formation 
of an urbanised, metropolitan oriented colonial elite, the political and economic 
weakness that allowed this elite to come to prominence also made for a situation that 
eventually blocked their social mobility and progressively alienated them from the 
colonial system. 
 
2.5 The Assimilados (the assimilated) and the Indígenas (natives) 
 
 The result of the state’s discriminatory policies was the hardening of the 
indigenous class structure as the Portuguese state implemented specific legislation to 
divide the population into categories that had different privileges and rights. Although 
a small minority gained some benefits from these legal categories, they also created a 
sense of shame and racial humiliation that was to deeply embitter a section of the 
colonial elite against the colonial state. Between 1913 and 1927 the Portuguese state 
began to tighten and regulate the definition of urban African elites. As white 
immigration increased, the government set about disenfranchising the small existing 
African elite and controlling its numbers and privileges by introducing the álvara de 
assimilação (certificate of assimilation) which gave its bearers honorary white status 
as opposed to the mass of the population who were deemed indígenas and subject to a 
different legal code (Penvenne 1979: 18). This was vigorously resisted by members of 
the colonial elite, who were insulted by having to apply for what had previously been 
their birthright. During the Republican period legislation dealing with assimilação 
was being continually and repeatedly drawn up but political weakness, irregular 
implementation, local resistance and a bewildering succession of governments who 
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rapidly gained and just as quickly lost power in Portugal limited its effects. However 
there was a political hardening after the overthrow of the republic and local resistance 
to assimilação faded as the consequences of this resistance became more severe 
(Hedges 1999; Penvenne 1989)  
The overall result of the new legislation was that the previous measures of 
independence and power available to the colonial elite were drastically curtailed. 
While assimilados still enjoyed many privileges in comparison to the majority of the 
population their role had been transformed from a self-confident indigenous elite to 
low level functionaries of the colonial administration. Their very existence was now 
dependent on the state and governed by the colonial bureaucracy as one can see by the 
requirements necessary to gain the status of assimilado. To become an assimilado one 
had to apply to the colonial government and satisfy a set of criteria: 
 
1. He must read, write and speak Portuguese fluently. 
2. He must have sufficient means to support his family. 
3. He must be of good conduct. 
4. He must have the necessary education and individual and social habits to make it possible to 
apply the public and private law of Portugal to him. 
5. He must make a request to the administrative authority of the area, who will pass it on to the 
governor of the district for approval (Mondlane 1969: 48). 
 
Once approval was given one was then theoretically given the same rights and 
privileges as a white person. This, however, was not the case in practise.  Assimilados 
received lower wages, had to live in specific parts of town and suffered routine 
discrimination. Despite the blatant double standards connected to assimilação (for 
instance white people did not have to be literate to enjoy civil rights), people 
continued to seek this status and to subject themselves to the humiliation of 
certification, since there were significant advantages in being an assimilado. 
Assimilados were exempt from forced labour or military service, they could travel 
freely within Mozambique and were allowed urban residence, they had increased 
access to education for themselves and their families and they enjoyed relatively more 
opportunities for advancement, especially in the civil service (in many cases 
assimilado status was a requirement for many positions). In all these respects, 
assimilados were considerably advantaged by contrast with indigenas. Until the legal 
category was abolished in the 1960s, assimilados were never more than a tiny 
minority of the population. In 1950 they numbered 4439, under one percent of the 
population (Sheldon 2002: 59). As the requirements show, it was assumed that an 
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assimilado would be a man, although wives and children of assimilados were 
normally granted the status as well.  Out of the 4439 assimilados in 1950, 2651 were 
men and 1788 were women (ibid). Even after the status of assimilado was obtained, 
one had to be careful with one’s actions, as the status could be rescinded for 
“backsliding” into former “heathen” habits like polygyny or traditional religions. 
  Although the actual numbers of “assimilated” Africans in Mozambique was 
miniscule, the colonial state used the existence of assimilados to justify their claims of 
developing a uniquely harmonious and non-racialist form of colonialism. As noted by 
Hall and Young (1997), while Portuguese colonial territories avoided some of the 
crudest aspects of the colour bar, at least for the colonial elite, the sense of racial 
humiliation and grievance among assimilados was perhaps even more profound than 
what was found in other colonies. The memoirs of many former assimilados reflect 
this sense of humiliation. Raúl Honwana bitterly explained to an interviewer after 
independence the process one had to go through to become an assimilado: 
 
Africans who wanted to be considered “civilised” had to pass an examination by 
answering certain questions and by allowing a committee to go to their homes to see how 
they lived and if they knew how to eat at a table the way whites did, if they wore shoes, 
and if they had only one wife. When Africans passed these examinations, they were given 
a document called the “certificate of assimilation” for which they paid half a pound 
sterling or its equivalent (Honwana 1988: 52).  
 
Another former assimilado described the humiliation of it in an interview shortly after 
independence: 
 
You see, comrade, an assimilado was one who was taught to despise his own mother. To 
despise his own father. To have nothing to do with his relatives. 
Q. But the Portuguese did treat assimilados as they did themselves? 
R. Nothing of the sort. They taught us to despise our own people and to praise them. 
Q. Them who? 
R. The Portuguese… They taught us to be ashamed of ourselves… We were ashamed to 
be found together with our friends and relatives who were not assimilados… Then you 
were in danger of becoming a non-assimilado (Sithole and Ingwane 1977: 5-6). 
 
In addition to what many felt as being forced to refashion oneself as a pale 
imitation of those who were oppressing them, there were also thousands of petty 
injustices assimilados had to suffer. Despite being theoretically equal to the 
Portuguese, assimilados had to live in segregated areas in Lourenço Marques, that 
while better than the shacks of the majority of the population were still staggeringly 
expensive and lacked the amenities and transport links of the white areas (Penvenne 
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1995). Assimilados also suffered discriminatory wage scales, as a Frelimo militant 
explained to Eduardo Mondlane: 
 
I also worked in a mine store doing the accounts, where I earned 300 escudos. When a 
Portuguese came to do the accounts, he earned nearly 4,000 escudos and did less work 
than I had done. I was alone while he had an assistant, but he still earned 13 times as 
much as I did. In fact, it was his African assistant who did all the work; he just signed it. 
The African got 300 escudos a month like me; the Portuguese got 4,000 (Mondlane 1969: 
49).  
 
As the colonial period progressed and assimilados realised that their social mobility 
would be permanently blocked under this humiliating system, many became 
progressively more alienated from the colonial state. This was especially the case with 
Protestant educated assimilados, who historically had an insecure relationship with 
the state, as Protestant missions were suspected of “de-nationalising” Portuguese 
subjects and were treated with suspicion.
32
 As African nationalist movements 
elsewhere began to score successes and liberate their respective countries, many 
among the colonial elite began to feel that a far better future was promised in an 
independent nation than as a province in the Portuguese Empire. However, in contrast 
to the case with other colonial powers such as Britain and France, an authoritarian 
government that had firmly invested its legitimacy on the continuance of the empire 
ruled Portugal. There was thus no question of a peaceful or negotiated settlement that 
would lead to independence. In the bloody conflict that followed, the revolutionary 
movement was led by modernist revolutionary elites, who were often drawn from 
assimilado or prospective assimilado origins but were ashamed of its servile and 
collaborationist connotations. The Frelimo leadership was a group that became 
progressively more radical as they envisioned the entire re-creation of society to yield 
something that was not based on what existed before colonialism, but rather was 
completely new (Hall and Young 1997; Mateus 1999; Newitt 1995). 
 
2.6 A Luta Armada (The Armed Struggle or Liberation Struggle) 
 
 In many ways it is surprising that a small coalition of educated, urban, former 
assimilados, many of whom hailed from the south, combined with some often less 
educated guerrilla leaders from the north came to control the national liberation party. 
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 The reasons for this are discussed in more depth in the following chapter. 
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Furthermore, many of these initial leaders became the dominant force in the 
revolutionary elite after independence.
33
 To understand how this happened one has to 
focus on developments that took place during the liberation struggle against the 
Portuguese. The path to independence in Mozambique was long and torturous. As 
previously stated, until the very end Portugal refused to countenance any thought of 
independence for its African colonies and internal political action was forbidden. The 
colonial secret police, PIDE (International Police for the Defence of the State), were 
very efficient in discovering and suppressing political activity among the African 
population. The movement that grew into Frelimo had a fragmentary beginning. It 
was based on disaffected southern intellectuals and central and northern embryonic 
political movements that had grown among migrant workers residing in neighbouring 
Tanzania, Malawi and Rhodesia. Due to political constraints the party of Mozambican 
nationalism had to be formed on foreign soil and, until independence, had its 
headquarters outside of Mozambique’s borders. 
 Frelimo was formed on the 25
th
 of June 1962 in Tanzania. It was an 
amalgamation of Udenamo (National Democratic Union of Mozambique) which had 
been formed in Rhodesia and was heavily influenced by Joshua Nkomo’s National 
Democratic Party; MANU (Mozambican African Union) which was formed in 
Tanzania and modelled after KANU of Kenya and TANU of Tanzania and grew out 
of the ethnic based Makonde African National Union; and finally UNAMI (National 
Union for Mozambican Independence) which was based in Malawi and also drew 
heavily on ethnic and regional support from Tete province (Munslow 1983: 79-80). 
Leaders of the three movements, under pressure from the OAU (Organisation of 
African Unity), decided to broaden their appeal by forming a united front to work for 
the liberation of Mozambique. Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, a foreign educated prominent 
southern intellectual, nationalist figure and the first black Mozambican to obtain a 
PhD, was elected as the overall president. Dr. Mondlane was able to utilise 
international contacts he made through his previous post at the UN to bring the 
movement to international attention. He was also able to recruit educated southerners 
through NESAM (Nucleus of Mozambican Secondary Students), a movement 
founded by him and later banned by the Portuguese, whose membership included 
future top-ranking Frelimo officials such as Joaquim Chissano, Armando Guebuza 
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and Pascal Mocumbi (Casimiro 1979).
34
 Frelimo was aware that Portugal would not 
negotiate for independence. After witnessing the bloody suppression of the abortive 
Angolan rebellion of 1961, Frelimo decided that a well-planned armed struggle was 
the only way to achieve independence. 
 Almost immediately after Frelimo was formed, the party was beset by 
factionalism and internal disputes (Finnegan 1992; Mondlane 1966, 1969; Opello 
1975). The original leaders of MANU, Udenamo and UNAMI were soon displaced 
and leadership positions were often filled by an influx of better-educated southerners 
who had come with Mondlane (Cabrita 2000). Many of the displaced former leaders 
responded with accusations of growing southern domination. While Frelimo absorbed 
most of the rank and file members of the former parties, especially MANU, these 
displaced former leaders attempted to reconstitute their organisations with small 
numbers of followers (Opello 1975). MANU was reorganised by Matthew Mmole 
(former leader of MANU) and Lawerence Millinga (former Secretary-General of 
MANU). Others who lost power struggles within Frelimo formed various splinter 
groups. They appeared and disappeared with a bewildering succession of acronyms, 
ideologies and overall goals. The majority were still-born paper organisations based 
upon the personality of the leader and had little overall influence. In 1964 four of 
these groups, MANU, Moreco, Udenamo-Moçambique and Undenamo-Monomotapa 
joined to form Coremo (Mozambican Revolutionary Committee) and were later 
joined by further dissidents from Frelimo (Opello 1975). Coremo was the closest 
thing Frelimo faced to a nationalist rival, but was for the most part politically and 
militarily ineffectual (Finnegan 1992; Opello 1975).  
  Despite the internal turmoil within Frelimo, the party was able to launch the 
armed struggle after two years of preparation on the 25
th
 of September 1964. Frelimo 
had its primary headquarters in Tanzania and devoted its initial efforts towards 
infiltrating the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado and the sparsely populated 
Niassa. Their greatest early successes were in Cabo Delgado, in the Mueda Plateau 
among the Makonde. Makonde immigrants who were originally trying to escape the 
slave trade in Mozambique had settled the Mueda Plateau; it was relatively 
inaccessible and ideal for guerrilla tactics. The Makonde also had a history of hostility 
towards the Portuguese, based among other things a recent massacre when a 
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demonstration by primarily Makonde protestors had been fired upon by the 
Portuguese military causing large numbers of casualties.
35
 Building from the former 
MANU’s strong base among the Makonde, Frelimo was well-established in the 
Mueda Plateau and the Makonde served as Frelimo foot soldiers. In the early period 
of the struggle Frelimo put relatively little thought into administering the areas where 
it was dominant. Initially regulos (“traditional” chiefs, often originally appointed by 
the Portuguese) who were thought to side with the colonial state were assassinated. 
However, during the struggle Frelimo leaders and militants tried to develop a working 
relationship with regulos who were more sympathetic to their cause (Munslow 1983: 
Opello 1975). 
Although Frelimo had early successes in parts of Cabo Delgado, by 1966 they 
suffered a series of military setbacks. The campaign in Niassa stalled shortly after its 
launch and suffered some reverses. Frelimo cells in the capital were discovered by 
PIDE and rounded up. Frelimo was seen as a Makonde movement by the Makua, a 
northern ethnic group that was probably the largest in the country with a history of 
hostility towards the Makonde and the Makua generally sided with the Portuguese. 
Finally efforts to open new fronts in provinces in the centre failed and Frelimo was 
driven back.  
 This series of set-backs combined with the fact that Frelimo was organised as 
a broad front of Mozambican nationalists and incorporated people of various 
ethnicities, class positions, and overall political opinions, led to still more internal 
conflict. Different groups within the party had drastically divergent ideas as to how to 
win independence and what form the country would take afterwards. There were two 
principal groupings in the second round of power struggles that racked the party. The 
first coalesced around Mondlane and the relatively well-educated and cosmopolitan 
southerners. Many members of this group had studied in foreign universities and were 
influenced by the socialist ideas they encountered abroad. However, southerners of 
lesser education such as Samora Machel and some of the younger generation of 
northern guerrilla commanders, such as Alberto Chipande, were also leading members 
(Finnegan 1992). The southerners and the younger generation more generally tended 
to follow a radical line that became more pronounced through the struggle. They 
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defined social class as the central point of oppression and felt that in addition to 
ending colonial rule it was also necessary to fight a protracted “people’s war” that 
would lead to an egalitarian social revolution to re-make Mozambique (Hall and 
Young 1997; Newitt 1995; Opello 1975). This group tended towards socialism and 
was multiracial. The radical younger generation’s principal opposition came primarily 
from older, mission educated and more conservative members of the leadership from 
the centre and the north of Mozambique. They defined race as the central cause of 
oppression and opposed allowing non-blacks to hold leadership positions. They 
leaned towards capitalism, as many of them had business interests that would be 
threatened by the plans of the radical younger generation. In general they broadly 
distrusted the “social revolution” and elements of the younger generation’s anti-
traditional stance (Cabrita 2000; Hall and Young 1997; Newitt 1995; Opello 1975).  
As the internal conflict continued throughout the 1960s, Frelimo’s leadership 
was deeply divided. The ages of the members of the central committee ranged from 
barely 30 for the youngest member, Jorge Rebelo, to close to twice that for the oldest, 
Lazaro Nkavandame. Besides the generation gap, the ideological differences between 
the radical younger generation and their older compatriots became more pronounced. 
These differences soon spilled over to strategy. The younger radicals wanted to 
politicise the army and prepare for a long, drawn out “people’s war”, while older 
conservatives wished to concentrate on the war and not social revolution (Newitt 
1995). There was growing conflict between the two factions (Isaacman and Isaacman 
1983; Munslow 1983; Newitt 1995). 
Frelimo dissidents in the central committee became alarmed at the growing 
strength of southern assimilados within the leadership and charged that northerners 
were being discriminated against (Mateus 1999; Minter 1994). In 1966 Felipe 
Magaia, the head of the military and a northerner, was killed and replaced by a 
southerner, Samora Machel. This infuriated some Makonde leaders who claimed that 
their people were doing all the fighting while southerners monopolised the leadership 
positions. Some claimed Magaia had been assassinated and that this was part of a 
southern/Shangaan coup. In 1968 conflict broke out in bases in Tanzania as a priest 
and instructor at the Frelimo School, Father Mateus Gwenjere, helped instigate a 
revolt amongst students who claimed they were being denied foreign scholarships that 
had been promised them, and refused to fight in the struggle. The revolt had to be put 
down by the Tanzanian police. Others were furious at the high-ranking positions of 
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the southerners, Jorge Rebelo, of Goan descent, and Marcelino Dos Santos, a mulatto. 
The internal conflict reached a fevered pitch between what became known in Frelimo 
mythology as the “two lines”, which represented the principal groupings in the power 
struggle. One was composed of the more conservative party members from the central 
and northern parts of Mozambique. This group included Gwenjere, Uria Simango, 
Vice-President of Frelimo, and Lazaro Nkavandame, head of the Department of 
Commerce. They were alarmed at the growing strength of the radicals, especially as 
they now controlled the army and Nkavandame increasingly entertained ideas of a 
federal state with autonomy for the Makonde (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983; Newitt 
1995). The other “line” was the radical bloc, which contained many prominent 
southerners such as Eduardo Mondlane, Samora Machel, Marcelino Dos Santos, and 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Joaquim Chissano, a senior member of the executive 
committee. This group also included younger northerners such as Chipande, a military 
commander who led the first attack in the struggle and Raimundo Pachinuapa another 
military commander. This group, fuelled by the desire to completely remake the 
country felt that liberating Mozambique from the Portuguese was only the first step 
for a far wider social revolution.  
The conflict between these two lines demonstrated some of the underlying 
weaknesses of Frelimo’s original formation in 1962 as a broad “national” front united 
by their desire to end colonialism. While all the opposing groups within Frelimo 
agreed that the current system of colonial rule had to end, there was little agreement 
as to what would follow. As stated earlier there was a wide divergence of social 
background between the leaders of the opposing lines. The older generation, with 
their attempts at creating an ethnic power-base and petty mercantile backgrounds 
thought that a federal state with the removal of the Portuguese would gradually open 
up opportunities for Mozambicans while safeguarding “traditional” structures. For the 
more radical younger generation, which contained many urban southerners (who 
tended to lack an ethnic power base) this was exactly what they wanted to avoid. This 
aversion towards the proposals of the conservatives grew from both idealism and 
political realism. The radicals sincerely believed the only way to bring prosperity to 
the people was to eradicate the colonial influence and create a strong, “modern”, 
unitary socialist nation.  For this goal to succeed the radicals felt that “obstacles” to 
modernity, such as ethnic nationalism and many aspects of traditional culture had to 
be swept away. They also knew that with their multiracial members and the conflict 
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based in the north they often lacked an ethnic power-base and could not compete with 
their rivals along these lines. Each of these two groups began to increase their struggle 
against the other to make sure that theirs’ was the voice that prevailed. 
Conflict crystallised in 1968 over where the second party congress would be 
held. The conservative line wanted it in Tanzania where they felt strongest, while the 
radicals wanted to hold the congress in liberated territory in Mozambique that was 
held by their military power-base. The radicals won this conflict and the second 
congress was held in Niassa, a province in the north of Mozambique in July of 1968. 
As prominent members of the opposing line did not attend the conference the radical 
platform was accepted with minimal opposition (Cabrita 2000; Newitt 1995). Efforts 
were made by Mondlane to heal the breach with Nkavandame, but attempts at 
reconciliation failed. Nkavandame was the subject of increasing criticism from the 
radicals for corruption. He ran a network of cooperatives that supplied commercial 
needs for the liberated areas, and he was accused of profiteering since prices at his 
cooperatives were actually far higher than in Portuguese held territory. He was also 
accused of assassinating political opponents within the movement, which he claimed 
was a “trumped up” charge (Cabrita 2000; Isaacman and Isaacman 1983; Newitt 
1995; Munslow 1983). Nkavandame again declared a “southern/Shangaan coup” and 
called for Makonde soldiers to desert. His calls for ethnic solidarity went unheeded by 
the majority of Frelimo troops and his attempts to take over Frelimo-held areas in the 
liberated territories were beaten back by Frelimo loyalists (Opello 1975). Some 
analysts claim that the ideological struggles between these groups simply masked 
elites jockeying for position, as the claims of the various factions of the leadership 
had relatively little effect on the rank and file of the party (Opello 1975). Although 
there is undoubtedly a measure of truth to this, it is instructive to note that many of the 
primarily Makonde troops of Frelimo did not heed calls for ethnic solidarity but cast 
their lot with the modernising plans of the radicals, many of whom were southerners, 
presumably due to their ideological appeal. Furthermore the internal conflict made a 
deep impression on the surviving members of the Frelimo leadership, causing them to 
place great value in unity and fuelling their suspicion and intolerance of ethnically or 
racially based social organisation and quasi-traditional power structures which they 
saw as representing the ever-present threat of disunity and discord. 
In 1969, after five years of revolutionary war and with a further five years of 
conflict in the future, Mondlane was assassinated with a parcel bomb, allegedly 
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arranged by PIDE. Although Uria Simango was vice-president, his leadership bid did 
not have the support of the rest of the executive committee. Instead Mondlane was 
succeeded by a “Council of the Presidency” consisting of Simango, Machel and Dos 
Santos. The struggle for power continued throughout 1969 with several defections 
from Frelimo, one causing the collapse of the military front in the Tete province. By 
1970 with Machel’s assumption of unitary leadership, the revolutionary elite was 
firmly in power and the conservatives were defeated. Simango was accused of 
complicity in the death of Mondlane and was expelled from Frelimo. He eventually 
joined Coremo. Samora Machel was installed as the leader in 1970 and held the post – 
which he later combined with that of President - until his death in 1986. The party 
leadership remained remarkably cohesive after Machel’s ascent to power; they were 
now united in their desire for radical social change.  
Throughout the period of internal strife in Frelimo, Portugal was refining its 
counter-insurgency tactics, studying the example of the Americans in Vietnam and the 
British in Malaysia. In addition to Portugal’s massive military superiority (at the 
height of the war they had around 60,000 troops as compared to the 8,000-10,000 
Frelimo guerrillas), they constructed aldeamentos (fortified villages) to sever contact 
between the population and the guerrillas; used defoliants to destroy tree cover used 
by the guerrillas; and increasingly employed African troops - both fresh recruits and 
“turned guerrillas” - to infiltrate Frelimo areas. Using indigenous troops in attack 
allowed the state to keep Portuguese soldiers out of the line of fire as much as 
possible in an effort to keep down white casualties. The large numbers of African 
soldiers, who were considered traitors by Frelimo, proved to be a source of 
recruitment by opposition forces in the later civil war (Minter 1994). 
In 1970 the Portuguese launched “Operation Gordian Knot” which was to 
destroy Frelimo and the areas it controlled. Although the Portuguese captured many 
bases, most had already been deserted and Frelimo pulled its troops back and then 
attacked in the centre of the country. The Portuguese were spending much of their 
effort guarding the massive Cabora Bassa dam, the symbol of Portuguese permanence 
in Africa. Although Frelimo was unsuccessful in its attempts to destroy the dam, they 
successfully concentrated Portuguese military strength in its defence, leaving its own 
soldiers free to spread their attacks in the centre and further south. In Portugal itself 
major changes were taking place. After the replacement of Salazar in 1968 Portuguese 
leaders began to question the necessity of the empire, especially as closer economic 
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ties were being developed with Europe which were far more profitable than never-
ending wars in far-off corners of the world (Davidson 1984; Newitt 1981, 1995).  
By 1974 it became obvious that although the Portuguese were not defeated, 
they could not win. In addition the strain of fighting three colonial wars at once was 
also becoming unbearable. In 1974 leftwing officers formed the MFA (Armed Forces 
Movement) and overthrew the government of Marcelino Caetano, Salazar’s 
successor. Although more conservative members were opposed to this, the MFA 
formed a transitional government with Frelimo in 1974 and granted full power to the 
party as the only legitimate representative of the Mozambican people, without a 
general election, in 1975.
36
  
 
2.7 Independence and War 
 
 When Frelimo declared independence and assumed full power on the 25
th
 of 
June 1975, they were unquestionably the only major political force in Mozambique. 
Unlike the case of Angola, another former Portuguese colony, the ruling party faced 
no significant internal rivals. Frelimo also enjoyed a wide degree of legitimacy among 
the population for overthrowing the generally detested colonial rule. While only a 
minority among the population may have understood the implications of the social 
revolution Frelimo promised to unleash after the expulsion of the Portuguese their 
programme faced few internal challenges. The party’s promises to remedy previous 
injustices and create a prosperous nation for all were popular. Despite Frelimo’s 
seemingly secure hold on power the party leadership was uneasy for reasons that will 
be explained below and an underlying tendency toward elitism became increasingly 
manifest, egalitarian rhetoric aside. This became more pronounced after Frelimo 
declared itself a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party in 1977. As the leadership became 
more insulated there was a widening gap between the educated revolutionary elite’s 
ideas as to what was necessary to modernise the country and the expectations of the 
fruits of independence for large segments of the population. The rift between the 
leadership and the majority of the population grew as latent weaknesses in the party’s 
control came to the fore and Frelimo’s hold over the country became more tenuous. 
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 Although Frelimo had no credible opposition and would have won an election with ease, the party 
was suspicious that foreigners could manipulate it. This was to cast doubts as to the legitimacy of 
Frelimo for some foreigners later who supported Renamo in the civil war. 
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Even during the jubilation of the first days of independence there were serious 
problems looming on the horizon. Frelimo had governed sections of territory during 
the liberation struggle, but these were sparsely populated, predominantly rural areas. 
The majority of Mozambique’s population had almost no contact with Frelimo prior 
to independence. Furthermore the colonial economy had been geared towards 
providing services to neighbouring colonies, and although the Portuguese had built 
more tarred roads during the war, most transport links were focused on connecting 
neighbouring territories to Mozambican ports leaving weak inter-regional links. In the 
decades preceding independence the Mozambican economy had grown, especially in 
the 1960s, and Mozambique was supposedly the 8
th
 largest industrial economy in 
Africa before independence. But much of this growth was speculative capital and 
achieved through debt. The new government was left with the bill. Despite Frelimo’s 
proclamation of a multiracial society, the relationship between the party and the 
majority of the Portuguese settlers soon deteriorated. There was an abortive settler 
rebellion during the transitional government that resulted in many deaths.
37
 In 
addition many Portuguese felt victimised by the nationalisation of health, educational 
and legal services, coupled with new laws stating that one had to give up Portuguese 
nationality and take Mozambican citizenship if one wanted to stay and work in the 
country. The majority of the Portuguese population soon left Mozambique. As they 
left, numerous acts of petty sabotage were committed and houses and businesses were 
left empty, forcing the government to nationalise abandoned properties and 
industries.
38
  
The Portuguese had made few provisions for African education during their 
rule and the rate of illiteracy at independence was staggering (Hanlon 1990; Newitt 
1995). The government was left to run both the country and its economy with few 
educated or experienced people. Although there were serious economic repercussions, 
this did increase Frelimo’s urban popularity as the level of social mobility was 
drastically increased, clerks became directors and anyone with any education could be 
sure of finding employment, often at a high level (Hanlon 1990). Finally, the newly 
independent Mozambique shared borders with two hostile white minority regimes on 
which they were economically dependent. Frelimo complied with international 
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 The rebellion is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.  
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 The government had not initially planned nationalisations of this scope, at least at that time, but the 
situation did lend itself to many of Frelimo’s more radical member’s long-term plans.  
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sanctions against Rhodesia and allowed ZANU PF (Zimbabwe African Nation Union, 
Patriotic Front, the major liberation movement in Zimbabwe) to operate from bases in 
Mozambique. This decision was economically devastating and resulted in low-level 
war with Rhodesia. The Rhodesians also began to train and equip Mozambican 
dissidents with terrible future consequences.  
Somewhat in contrast was Frelimo’s relationship to its southernmost, and far 
more powerful, neighbour. While Frelimo was outspoken in their support for the ANC 
(African National Congress, the main liberation movement in South Africa), they did 
not wish to overly antagonise the regime in that country, with which they had 
numerous economic links. Throughout the first five years of independence Frelimo 
generally sought an uneasy peace with South Africa and was initially successful, but 
the political climate changed in the 1980s. With the election of Ronald Reagan in the 
United States, the previous practise of cold war détente was jettisoned in favour of 
“rolling back” international communism and the Reagan government funded 
numerous proxy wars throughout the world to aid in this effort. At the same time a 
more hard-line and militarist government, under P.W. Botha, had come to power in 
South Africa and once again theories of détente were jettisoned for a new theory of 
“total onslaught”. Yet, despite the Frelimo state’s limited capabilities and hostile 
international environment, or perhaps in desperation because of their weak position, 
the government decided to attempt a massive restructuring of Mozambican society by 
trying to industrialise the nation, create communal villages and large scale state farms 
and abolish traditional leadership. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these grandly ambitious 
plans soon to fell into difficulties. After the fall of Rhodesia, South Africa, angry at 
Frelimo’s support of the ANC and nervous about the example a successful Black 
Marxist state could set, became the pay masters of the Rhodesian-trained 
Mozambican dissidents. The country was soon plunged into a brutal civil war 
between Frelimo and Renamo (Hanlon 1990; Minter 1992; Newitt 1995, 2002). 
Many analysts have questioned whether one could actually characterise the 
post-independence war in Mozambique as a “civil war” since the rebels were trained, 
supported and financed from the outside, primarily by South Africa (Hanlon 1990; 
Minter 1992).
39
 Although the war did feed off internal discontent, it is extremely 
unlikely that the war could have ever reached the levels it did or last as long without 
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 I continue to refer to the post-independence war as a civil war because, despite international 
involvement on both sides, the vast majority of combatants were Mozambican 
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the direct involvement of South Africa. As noted by Chabal (2002), the leaders of 
Renamo (Mozambican National Resistance, the rebel movement) knew (at least 
initially) that the Frelimo government was widely regarded as legitimate and that they 
could not prevail in democratic elections against Frelimo. Furthermore Frelimo would 
never allow elections that could challenge its power to take place. The apartheid 
government of South Africa also seemed to realise this and their overall strategy was 
not to overthrow Frelimo and install Renamo as the government, but rather to weaken 
the Mozambican state (Minter 1992). Indications point to the fact that both the South 
African government and Renamo realised that the movement had questionable 
legitimacy; its support tended to come from the situation created by the war rather 
than having preceded it (Chabal 2002).  
Yet, it is also true that the direction of the social revolution undertaken by the 
Frelimo leadership alienated sections of the population and made them more receptive 
to anti-government rebels. Foreigners funded the civil war but it also grew out of the 
cultural gap between the revolutionary elite and large segments of the population. The 
Frelimo leadership’s social backgrounds and modernist ideology tended to mean that 
they had a poor understanding of the role of “tradition” in society. For the 
revolutionary elite “tradition” was an obstacle to modernity and held connotations of 
the defeats and humiliations of the colonial period and could be overcome through 
centralised planning and education. In their defence, the party’s plans for social 
revolution were relatively successful in some parts of the country, especially the 
south, but in others they disrupted finely nuanced modes of social organisation 
without providing an adequate replacement. Normon (2004) recounts how, following 
the destruction of previous homes in a flood and a pre-existing distrust for traditional 
authority due to its role in forced labour, Frelimo’s plans to house the population in 
communal villages and abolish regulos were broadly popular in the southern province 
of Gaza. In the work of West (1997, 2001), we see how, in a Frelimo stronghold in 
the northern province of Cabo Delgado, Frelimo’s social revolution had contradictory 
effects. Elements of their villagisitation programme were popular, such as the new 
opportunities for sociability as scattered populations were concentrated in a single 
site, but these programmes had unintended consequences, such as the inability to 
control witchcraft among so large a population. In other areas, such as the Erati 
district of the northern province of Nampula, Frelimo’s directives to abolish 
traditional authority and create communal villages seriously upset the local social 
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system. When Renamo arrived in this area they were initially treated as liberators 
(Geffrey 1991). The success or failure of Frelimo’s social revolution often depended 
on local conditions that were rarely accounted for in planning sessions in Maputo.  
 These difficulties were compounded by the fact that in many cases the grand 
designs of Frelimo lacked sufficient resources and were chaotically implemented. It is 
possible to speculate that the more radical social programmes of Frelimo, such as the 
communal farms, would not have resulted in civil conflict without the impetus of 
neighbouring hostile regimes, nor did they necessarily cause a groundswell of popular 
support for Renamo. But they did cause an atmosphere of discontent that the rebels 
could prey upon during the course of the war. If Renamo lacked widespread popular 
support through much of their history, they could capitalise on an existing atmosphere 
of indifference as to who won the war as long as it would stop, an atmosphere that 
became more pronounced as the war dragged on. Finally as in all wars, while they 
may bring misery to the majority they bring opportunities to a few. Some young men 
in rural areas with few prospects found new avenues of social mobility through one 
armed force or another. In addition the chaos of conflict allowed numerous local 
scores to be settled under the cover of competing movements (Cabrita 2002; 
Dinerman 1994; Geffray 1991; Vines 1991).  
Another question debated by many scholars (and debated in modern day 
Maputo as well) is whether Frelimo was “actually” Marxist (or Marxist-Leninist) or if 
they used “Marxism” instrumentally to gain support from the Soviet Bloc (Chabal 
2002; Hall and Young 1997). While there are many competing opinions, this seems to 
be somewhat beside the point. At its ideological core, Frelimo was a radically 
modernist movement whose leadership was made up of many urbanised, relatively 
well-educated elites with weak links to “traditional structures”. They wanted to 
drastically transform the nation and, as stated earlier, Marxist-Leninism seemed, to 
the Frelimo leadership at least, the most viable and socially just way to do so without 
re-creating the kinds of oppressive forms of exploitation that characterised colonial 
rule. While Chabal (1999, 2002) contends that Frelimo built a patrimonial system, 
similar in many ways to other regimes found throughout sub-Saharan Africa, the 
evidence suggests the contrary. While patrimonial relationships have established 
themselves within the system, the party leadership, at least initially, specifically tried 
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to avoid patrimonial politics and corruption.
40
 This was the reason for the party’s 
stress on poder popular (people power) and efforts to create democratic channels 
within the party (Newitt 2002). But, as mentioned in the beginning of this section, one 
of the major problems was not to be corrupt patrimonial connections, but elitism and a 
lack of connection between the party leadership and the wider population.  
After the first heady days of independence, the Frelimo leadership reacted to 
growing social problems and a mounting insurgency by falling back on previous 
military models of organisation. Hierarchy became more pronounced and official 
pronouncements dealt with social problems in military terms, there were “campaigns” 
for increased production on the labour “front”. Officials were supposed to obey orders 
and not question the leadership. While, in theory, Frelimo was a vanguard party of the 
workers and peasants in a country where around 85% of the population lived in rural 
areas it began to depend on:  “… a numerically weak but relatively privileged urban 
proletariat, a burgeoning state bureaucracy, and an external network centered on 
Moscow” (quoted in Newitt 2002: 206). The Frelimo leadership had initially 
distrusted the urban middle classes as few had been involved in the struggle. Yet they 
soon came to depend on them; they shared a similar social origin and outlook and 
they were one of the few groups that had the skills to staff the growing bureaucracy. 
As Frelimo’s dependence on these groups increased so its distance from the peasantry 
also grew.  It was the peasants, some of whom had worked closely with the party 
during the struggle, who found themselves marginalised. These trends were 
exacerbated, ironically, by the very social mobility the victory of the revolution had 
allowed. The party leadership soon worried about the lack of qualifications amongst 
its cadres and education became the key to social advancement, highlighting an 
already existing elitism (Hanlon 1990). Joseph Hanlon was present at a meeting at the 
Ministry of Education that described this trend perfectly: 
 
In 1980 I attended a seminar on mathematics teaching. At one session led by Education 
Minister Graça Machel, several educators spoke in flowery Portuguese about didactic 
methods and teaching aids. Finally, a primary school teacher from Niassa stood up. In 
basic but clear Portuguese he pointed out that this elevated discussion was meaningless 
when he did not have a blackboard or textbooks, taught classes of 60 pupils or more, and 
he and his fellow teachers only had four years of primary schooling themselves. The 
audience broke into laughter. It was a time when an astute political intervention could 
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 One could argue that any socialist state, or state for that matter, is a patrimonial system as resources 
are specifically directed towards sections of the population in return for political support, yet this was 
not supposed to be done for personal gain. 
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have reversed the meeting. The Minister could have said it was important to consider the 
problems of the bulk of the teachers. Instead, she joined in the laughter. The embarrassed 
teacher sat down and the colonial-trained educators continued their discourse (Hanlon 
1990: 199). 
 
This is a prime example of the social gap between the revolutionary elite and those 
who lived in rural areas. Although the category of assimilado had been abolished, the 
social distance that characterised the previous colonial elite still existed. Many of the 
reforms enacted by the Frelimo leadership, such as the abolition of traditional 
leadership and the construction of communal villages, were deeply unpopular in parts 
of the nation and added to the flames of the post-independence war. The revolutionary 
elite had an ideal of modernity that was attractive to some segments of the population, 
but a distant abstraction to many others. What started as a radically egalitarian 
movement became increasingly distant and cut off as the party leadership and the 
mass of the population often shared deeply different assumptions as to the nature of 
the society they shared. These trends are still prevalent today. 
 
2.8 Conclusion: A Luta Continua? (the struggle continues?) 
 
On October 15
th
 1992 Frelimo and Renamo finally signed a peace agreement 
that brought the civil war to an end. Although peace was greeted with guarded 
optimism, the country was devastated. Up to a million people had died, both due to 
the conflict and associated diseases and starvation. In addition many of the impressive 
gains of the revolution, such as widely available heath care services and education 
provision had been knocked back to pre-independence levels. Rural areas had suffered 
worst during the civil war; infrastructure in these areas generally lay in ruins. The 
Frelimo leadership’s dream of presiding over a “modern”, industrialised and 
egalitarian society also appeared, by the end of the war, to have been stillborn. 
Mozambique’s structural adjustment programme resulted in the slashing of 
government subsidies and services for the poor, while simultaneously devaluing the 
currency and making thousands of workers redundant (Hanlon 1996). Although 
conditions for many urbanites appeared to be precarious, levels of government 
corruption seemed to be increasing and state officials were now, in contradiction to 
previous egalitarian norms, openly displaying their new wealth (ibid). Mozambique’s 
economy appeared to mirror its pre-independence role, serving as a transport hub for 
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South Africa and Zimbabwe and as a producer of primary agricultural products. 
Mozambique was also a transport hub for a growing illegal economy. Both drugs 
from Asia and cars stolen in South Africa found their way to Europe through 
Mozambique’s ports (Ellis 1999; Hanlon 1996; Hibou 1999). Although Frelimo still 
ruled Mozambique, the country bore only the slightest resemblance to the vision they 
had proclaimed at independence.   
Despite all the changes that had affected Mozambique in the first 17 years of 
independence, there was an underlying theme of continuity through the colonial elite 
to the revolutionary and independence elites. While there had been a series of political 
changes, the revolutionary elite remained a group where many members have shared 
origins as urban-based elites with weak ties to traditional power structures in the 
colonial period. As the political system shifted away from socialism and earlier ideals 
were abandoned one continuity that remains is the role of elites as the “engine of 
modernisation” Through all the trials and chaos of the civil war period this remains 
central to the self-justification of elites and informs the way they view the nation they 
control. When Frelimo first took power after the liberation struggle the leadership 
tended to view Mozambique as a “blank slate” on which they could impose their 
models of a modern nation. Despite all of the changes that have convulsed through 
society since independence this elite view of Mozambique as an empty canvas has not 
entirely disappeared. After the civil war the nation was to have another “new 
beginning”, this time refashioned as a capitalist democracy (Hall and Young 1997: 
219-220). The following chapter examines the elites’ relationship to the changing 
project of modernity and discusses the ways in which modernity can be translated into 
social power. 
 82 
 
Chapter Three 
 
Cosmopolitan Modernity and Mozambican Elites 
 
But our friends in the West say that if we go about well dressed, if we shave, if we have 
decent housing we shall lose our African characteristics. Do you know what African 
characteristics are? A skin, a loincloth, a wrap around cloth, a stick in the hand behind a 
flock, to be skinny with every rib sticking out, sores on the feet and legs, with a cashew 
leaf to cover the suppurating wound, jiggers in the toes – that is the African. That is what 
they see as African characteristics. So when tourists come, they are looking for an African 
dressed like that. Since that is the “genuine African”. Now when they find us dressed in a 
tunic and trousers – we are no longer African. They don’t take photographs (Samora 
Machel, quoted in Munslow 1985: 91). 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 One night during my fieldwork in Maputo I met a friend, Josina, who is a 
member of the independence elite, at a bar in a nice part of town. Over drinks she 
explained to me that although her parents were high-ranking members of Frelimo and 
had fought in the liberation struggle and served the government during the socialist 
period, she herself was a fervent capitalist and advocated Thatcherite-style reforms for 
Mozambique. I voiced doubts as to whether the current neo-liberal model would ever 
do more than benefit the elite, leaving the majority of the population in desperate 
poverty. Josina told me that my problem was that I had seriously misunderstood 
Mozambique and the nature of Mozambican society. It was not so much that the poor 
were being denied opportunities, but that they (the poor) were not actually interested 
in them. 
 
There is a huge difference here that I do not think you understand. You spend all of your 
time here with people like us; we are educated, westernised and modern. We are very 
different from most of the people. There is a vast difference in style of living between the 
rich and the poor here, yes, but it is not what you think. Those of us who are privileged 
have tastes and desires that are different from the rest of the people. It is really a question of 
interest. Most people in this country are peasants, they have a machamba (a small plot of 
land) that they farm and they are interested and satisfied with that. More needs and 
education are not really necessary and most people do not really want it. For instance my 
father came from a poor background in a rural area. He liked to read, but he was not that 
interested in education.
41
 He did not become interested until he saw the Portuguese and how 
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 The vast majority of the population was illiterate during the pre-independence period; the fact that 
her father could read and had access to books demonstrated that he came from a relatively privileged 
rural background. 
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much they had compared to how little he did. Even still my grandmother has stayed a 
villager at heart. We invited her to come and stay with us here (in Maputo), but she was 
never comfortable. She could not get used to this kind of house and would sleep out with 
the empregadas (maids, her grandmother would sleep in the servants quarters that many 
houses in Maputo are equipped with). She never did get used to things here and eventually 
made us send her back to her village, where she still works on her machamba. Most people 
in Mozambique are like her. They just want to be left alone to farm their machambas. It is 
those of us who are privileged, we are the ones who want and need all of these modern 
things (Field notes 7 February 2004). 
 
 What interested me about Josina’s response was not just its resemblance to 
some of the former colonial justifications of inequality. It was also noteworthy for 
being a not uncommon attitude among the independence elite of Mozambique, despite 
the fact that many of their families had achieved their positions under a supposedly 
egalitarian socialism. Throughout my research I noticed there was an almost implicit 
assumption with both the revolutionary and independence elites that because they are 
educated and “westernised” (modern) they are fundamentally different from the vast 
majority of the nation’s population in many important ways. This sense of difference, 
as demonstrated in Josina’s statements above, often served as a justification for 
continuing social inequality.
42
 This chapter examines what it means to be modern for 
Mozambican elites and how, through different periods of history, this sense of 
modernity confers a sense of uniqueness in a country that they see as still “backward”.  
Through tracing the elites’ relationships with modernity in different periods of 
history I argue that although “modernity” has been a strong continuing factor in 
conferring legitimacy and social power to elites, the elite project of modernity has 
been by no means static. In the first section of the chapter I examine the concept of 
“nationalist modernity”. I argue that modernity in the initial post-independence period 
was conceived along universal and hierarchical lines and consisted of mass 
mobilisation for sweeping social change. To make sure that Mozambique was never 
again brutalised, exploited and humiliated under the rule of foreigners the nation 
would have to “catch up” to the western powers and become a strong, unified 
industrial state. This grand project did not involve simply improvements of 
infrastructure but a vast reformation of the society as a whole. After the chaos, 
destruction and near economic collapse of the post-independence civil war, the mass 
mobilising strategies of nationalist modernity lost legitimacy among many members 
of both the revolutionary and, especially, the independence elites, although some of 
                                                 
42
 I examine reactions to this elite justification for social inequality by members of some non-elite 
groups in Chapter Five. 
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the moral aspects of nationalist modernity have a continuing legitimacy amongst other 
social groups. This will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Five. 
 A new manifestation of modernity has come into being, intertwined with yet 
another great “top-down” reformation project in Mozambique, the transformation 
from a one-party socialist system to multiparty capitalist democracy. The forms of 
social power that have grown through this transformation are symbolic of the new 
version of modernity; they are more individualistic and technocratic. In the later 
sections of the chapter I examine the reasons for the emergence of nationalist 
modernity and the later manifestations of modernity that has supplanted (although not 
eradicated) the earlier forms of modernity. I argue that changing social experiences 
among the independence elite, especially through the roles of elite education and 
changing habits of consumption, are key for the construction of the new form of 
modernity. Throughout the chapter I demonstrate that although the elites’ relationship 
with modernity is always changing, modernity, in one manifestation or another is 
central to elite social class position; in a sense elite modernities both create and are 
created by the structures that sustain it.    
 
3.2 Modernity and Nationalism 
 
 “Modernity” has been a hotly debated, although often vague concept in 
Africanist anthropology. During late colonialism and the early independence period 
many liberal observers felt Africa, following prevalent social evolutionary theories, 
would join the supposedly inevitable advance of modernity. This was usually 
described as the end point of a linear progression that would move away from small-
scale “tribal” societies and evolve into centralised state structures, increased 
infrastructure and education, and for many, widespread adherence to Christianity; in 
other words, to become more like the “west”. In the post-colonial period the linear 
nature of modernity has come under attack for its underlying ethnocentrism (for 
examples see Asad 1973; Ferguson 1999; Moore and Sanders 2001; Rowlands 2002). 
In addition, the widespread political and economic crises that have characterised 
much of Africa following independence and the continuing prevalence of cultural 
practices such as sorcery and the importance of ethnic identities have raised serious 
doubts as to the overall western character of modernity (Comaroff and Comaroff 
1999; Ferguson 1999; Geschiere 1997). Africanists such as Chabal and Daloz (1999) 
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have argued that post-colonial developments in Africa actually point to a process of 
“re-traditionialisation”, which paradoxically leads to the formation of a new type of 
specifically African modernity based, in part, on ethnicity, sorcery and patronage as 
opposed to earlier visions of an eventual western homogenisation. 
 In fact, as much recent ethnography has shown, modernity is in many ways a 
collection of local cultural constructs, instead of a completely homogenised prevailing 
worldview (Chakrabarty 1989; Donham 1999; Moore and Sanders 2001). Recently 
though, as demonstrated in the introduction to this thesis, some scholars have begun 
to question what exactly is meant by academic uses of the word “modernity” (Cooper 
2005; Ferguson 2006; Miller 1994). Ferguson (2002, 2006) has observed that while 
the idea of “alternative modernities” may be influential in academic circles, the 
conception they were meant to replace, a hierarchical and universal modernity still 
has a strong hold on the imaginations of many in post-colonial Africa.  
This appeared to be the case for members of the revolutionary and 
independence elites in Mozambique. For many of my informants modernity is still 
viewed as something approaching a universal linear progression and, in fact, they are 
in that process of progressing. The idea of a specifically African modernity based on 
witchcraft and ethnicity would inspire horror in many of my Mozambican friends. 
The view of modernity that inspired many of my informants’ parents, the 
revolutionary elite, during the late colonial period and the early days of independence 
and continues to have an impact, albeit in a very different form, in contemporary 
Mozambique is the modernity of nationalism. This view did not involve a distinctive 
or re-traditionalising process so much as it was based on the need to catch up with 
those who had so brutally exploited them. The modernity that grew from the 
liberation struggle in Mozambique is similar to what Donham (1999) described for 
Ethiopia during its revolution. Like Ethiopia, a local elite led the Mozambican 
revolution. This elite, through their experiences with colonialism and their contact 
with the Portuguese, created their own conception of a linear view of development 
that put some nations and societies ahead and others behind on a hierarchical scale. 
For the revolutionary elite, one of the central preconditions of creating a new and just 
society was to “catch up” to the colonial powers (Mondlane 1969; Newitt 1995). 
 The desire to “catch up” and create a strong nation often inspires nationalist 
elites under colonialism, yet this also creates a problem. As stated by Morris, the 
European narratives of modernity that have influenced colonial and revolutionary 
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elites also say that modernity is something that has already happened somewhere else 
(quoted in Chakrabarty 1997: 373). This leaves something of a problem, as 
nationalism is legitimised by a sense of national uniqueness. Yet in some ways 
nationalist modernisers are engaged in a task that seeks to emulate those who oppress 
them (Chakrabarty 1997; Chatterjee 1986). The way forward then for many 
nationalist elites was to “re-discover” the essence of the nation and create new ways 
of being different but modern. In Tanzania a vast state sponsored project of social 
engineering was given the name “African Socialism”, which supposedly recalled 
Tanzania’s pre-colonial golden age which was reminiscent of Marx’s “primitive 
communism”, yet recreated for the needs of a modern nation-state (Donham 1999; 
Freund 1981; Nursey-Bray 1980; Samoff 1981). Here nationalist modernisers, 
consciously or not, tried to disguise the full meaning of their vision for the new state 
by claiming it was a return of older values.  
In post-independence Mozambique there was also a need to find a 
“Mozambican identity” for the new nation. Yet the Frelimo leadership’s plans for 
modernisation were in many ways more ambitious than the previous examples 
mentioned. Certain forms of cultural expression, such as dance and the arts were 
encouraged as they demonstrated national identity (Mondlane 1969: 183-187). But 
many cultural behaviours were not. They were labelled as inimical to the social 
progress of the new state. For the revolutionary elite in Mozambique, the choice of 
political ideology was to form the core of the new national identity not traditional 
cultural forms. The use of ideology as a basis of identity combined with the rejection 
of the old has often been used by radical movements. In Peru Sendero Luminoso (The 
Shining Path) a Maoist movement recruited embittered modernists of Amer-indian 
descent by attacking “traditional” Indian culture. “The ‘coldness’ of Sendero ideology 
– its appeal to ‘science’ and its rejection of things indigenous as superstition – gave it 
emotional power and gave those who embraced it a meaningful new identity” 
(Gledhill 1994: 175). Thus for regimes like the Derg of Ethiopia and Frelimo, their 
adherence to socialism, and later Marxist-Leninism, gave them the theoretical 
weapons necessary to modernise their nations without overtly aping those who had 
exploited and humiliated them. Socialism was often extremely attractive for 
nationalist elites for a variety of reasons that will be discussed in this chapter, a very 
important one being that it is an ideology of modernity from the west that is also 
critical of it and of the oppression meted out by the colonisers (Donham 1999). 
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 While the creation of a socialist developmentalist state may have given new 
modernising ruling elites a form of identity and a sense of mission, they were not 
always successful in transmitting these values to the wider population, or even in 
understanding exactly what the population actually wanted (Cooper and Packard 
1997: 9). The leaders of new nations spoke in the name of their people, and many may 
have sincerely believed in what they were doing, but the “developmentalist” state they 
created remained in many ways an elite project. Despite the nationalist rhetoric 
frequently employed by new leaders, a substantial social gap remained between them 
and the subjects of their nations. By giving the party a monopoly of all power Frelimo 
hoped to dramatically reform Mozambican society in a matter of mere decades. 
Although when Frelimo came to power they spoke in the inclusionary language of 
nationalist mobilisation and socialism that was born of a long peasant based liberation 
struggle, the leadership of the party viewed their nation with a specific gaze. This 
gaze was affected by the revolutionary elite’s social position during the colonial 
period and was in many ways unique to them. The revolutionary elite’s fundamental 
goal was not only to create a better more just society for their citizens, but to build the 
Novo Homem (new man), a new modern citizen for a new and modernising nation.  
As shown by Josina’s statement at the beginning of the chapter, elements of 
nationalist modernity, such as its linear and hierarchical nature are still present for the 
independence elite. Most of my informants from this group believed in a modernity 
that would be similar to what they imagined – and had experienced to be 
characteristic of Europe and the west, a sort of “high modernity”. This encompassed a 
strong centralised state built on “rationalist” principals, increased education and 
infrastructure, changing gender relations and social roles, transparency and a lack of 
corruption among the government. These ideals of the nature of modernity have been 
at the forefront of elite conceptions, although in different forms, during the colonial 
period, socialism and the current “democratic” period. Yet the mass mobilisation and 
stress on unity of the early socialist period no longer appears as a major feature of 
current concepts of modernity. In its place a more individual sense of patriotism 
appears. Perhaps due to the ambiguities inherent in the transition from nationalist 
modernity to a more individualist form, uncertainties are expressed at the direction the 
country was taking and may even be phrased in a racialist vocabulary more 
characteristic of the colonial period. As one member of the independence elite 
explained to me, the problem with Mozambique lay with its inhabitants. 
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The problem is we blacks are still two hundred years behind. I mean politics here is a joke, 
it’s all about lining your own pockets, we are totally corrupt. When we get power we just 
become lazy and don’t do anything but steal. There is no impersonal bureaucracy; 
everything depends on who you are and who you know. When something goes wrong we 
just blame the outside. It’s the west or spirits it’s always something. I mean the whites and 
the Indians can steal this country and we just give it to them. If a black guy opens a shop in 
an Indian area all the other Indian shopkeepers will combine and close him down. We never 
do that, we just ask for money. It’s more than just politics here. Everything comes down to 
the ancestors. If something goes wrong everyone goes to a witchdoctor to find out what it 
was. It’s not just disease, I mean they know something about herbalism and that can 
actually work, but for stupid things, like problems with a boyfriend or girlfriend. Women 
think magic can keep a man from cheating on her. You would be surprised about the people 
I am talking about; I mean people that have been to university, they are educated and should 
know better. I am telling you we’re two hundred years behind (Field notes 9 January 2003). 
 
In the above quote my friend expresses aspersions on the supposed modernity of 
members of the revolutionary and nationalist elites, but she does not question the 
overall modernising goal. Members of the revolutionary and independence elites are 
still supposed to be paragons of modernity in Mozambique, even if the immense 
setbacks of the civil war period and claims of growing corruption and political rot in 
the democratic period have dented their self-confidence. This does not mean that 
elites are becoming more like their “pre-modern” people. My friend often described 
herself and her family as “modern” and felt this did make her significantly different 
from the wider population. What really galled her in the above quote was that 
“backwardness” was being expressed by people who are “educated and should know 
better” as opposed to the rest of the population. They have had the necessary training 
such as university to make them modern. Failures to act in a “modern” way damage 
the legitimacy of the elites, as modernity is one of the central justifications for their 
high social status. 
My informant’s quote and its expressed distaste for “tradition” reveal much 
about the continuing legacy of nationalist modernity. As with other Marxist 
movements in Africa, socialist modernisation came with officially sponsored attacks 
on elements of traditional culture that were viewed by party leadership as 
impediments to the building of new nations. Neto, the leader of the MPLA stated his 
party’s cultural goal in Angola as: “We are trying to free and modernise our people by 
a dual revolution: against their traditional structures which can no longer serve them’ 
– such as ethnic separatism, witchcraft belief, the oppression of women – ‘and against 
colonial rule” (Davidson 1984: 800) 
In Mozambique Samora Machel explained his party’s motivation as follows: 
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When Frelimo took up arms to defeat the old order … We felt the obscure need to create 
a new society, strong healthy and prosperous, in which people freed from all exploitation 
would co-operate for the progress of all. In the course of our struggle, in the tough fight 
we had to wage against reactionary elements, we came to understand our objectives more 
clearly. We felt especially that the struggle to create new structures would fall within the 
creation of a new mentality… (Davidson 1984: 800). 
 
In the above quote Samora Machel speaks in the terms of nationalist mobilisation for 
sweeping change, yet the underlying message seems to be that the ideas for the new 
society will flow from the party to the population and it is the people who will have to 
change to adapt to them. This is not uncommon among nationalist politicians and 
political parties. In a similar vein, Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, would 
publicly laud the peasantry for their great contribution to the cause of independence 
and the founding of a new nation. In private he viewed the peasantry paternalistically 
and would describe them as: “dull, personally uninteresting and carried away by 
passions” (Chatterjee 1986: 148). In practice Nehru, like Frelimo, put his faith in a 
secular and paternal state that would rise above all of the social divisions and 
complications of everyday life and carefully plan the development of the nation in 
what he viewed as the best interests of all (ibid). Ideological differences of these two 
examples aside, this view of the state (or the party that controls the state) as the 
originator, moral guardian and engine of social change while the population is a 
passive mass which exists to carry out plans that are ultimately for their own good, is 
central to the developmentalist state. 
 In a very different social setting, Rabinow describes state centred 
developmentalist tendencies as “middling modernism” (Rabinow 1989). In his work 
on French bureaucrats, Rabinow states that “middling modernism” was expressed as:  
 
In their discourse society became its own referent, to be worked on by means of technical 
procedures which were becoming authoritative arbiters of what counted as socially real. 
Discursively, both norms and forms were becoming increasingly autonomous – freed 
from their previous historical and natural constraints, defined by their own operations, 
and claiming universal status (Rabinow 1989: 13). 
 
According to Rabinow there was also a socialist variant of “middling modernism”, in 
this case the greater good would be achieved by state through its focus on: “The 
welfare of the population, the maximizing of individual potential, and the linkage of 
the two engineered by an efficient administration manned by committed specialists 
dedicated to the public good” (Rabinow 1989: 320). The revolutionary elite shared a 
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similar conception of the role of the state and its abilities to act for public good. In 
addition their insistence on the central role of the state as the engine of social change 
was not entirely unpopular. As shown in Chapter Two, while Frelimo did encounter 
resistance, elements of their social programmes were popular in diverse communities. 
One of the central problems was that, unlike France or even India, Frelimo did not 
have the power to actually enact their ideologically driven proposals.  
The party’s attempts to abolish aspects of “traditional culture” such as 
witchcraft, traditional healing, lobolo, polygamy, traditional leadership, “tribalism”, 
and various religious practices floundered not only because they were “culturally 
insensitive” (which indeed they were), but also because, outside certain groups of the 
population like educated urbanites, Frelimo could not offer much in the way of a 
coherent replacement. For much of Mozambique’s population, especially peasants, 
the benefits of the promised modernity never seemed to be coming. It is difficult to 
introduce sweeping social changes with a lack of qualified cadres, a population that 
does not entirely understand the party’s message and a climate of economic instability 
that undermines the social programmes at the same time as they are being enacted. 
The result was a party leadership that was becoming increasingly out of touch with 
the population and one that tried to overcome local resistance to their initiatives with 
growing coercion. The final blow to nationalist modernity (or at least its outward, 
socialist expressions) was the civil war, which destroyed many of the signs of 
progress that Frelimo had made.
43
 The increasingly poisonous social environment 
allowed Renamo to portray their war, to at least some embittered sections of the 
population, as a “war of the spirits” against the culturally distant and oppressive cities 
and: “… their literate, educated and lusophone inhabitants (that) belonged to 
FRELIMO” (Geffray, quoted in Fry 2000: 120). Frelimo officials also recognised 
their failure in this respect. Once at a coffee shop I was introduced to the former 
Minister of Agriculture. He asked what I was doing in Mozambique and I explained I 
was studying post-socialist elites. He looked at me, shook his head and boomed: “No, 
you are incorrect. This is not post-socialism; we never managed to actually achieve 
socialism. You are studying post-centralisation that is what we managed to do”. 
Through his statement he acknowledged that the socialist state (in name only 
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 Sections of the population, such as the urban middle class, still yearn for some of the moral 
underpinnings of nationalist modernity though. This is explored in depth in Chapter Five. 
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according to him), while always exhorting its citizens to further sacrifices, rarely was 
able to deliver the prosperity that was supposed to result from such heroic effort.  
The form of modernity that the revolutionary elite initially subscribed to had, 
as one of its primary purposes, the role of legitimising Frelimo’s control of the state 
and by extension the commanding social positions of the party leadership. This was to 
be achieved by utilising the state to reform society and create a better, more socially 
just nation for Mozambique’s population. The nationalist modernity of the 
revolutionary elite differed in many important ways from the currently popular 
academic ideas of “alternative modernities”. Many members of the revolutionary elite 
(and the independence elite of today as well) would have a difficult time 
understanding how “alternative modernities” are not actually descriptions of “pre-
modern” cultural traits that continue to exist today. For them modernity was a 
universal and linear scale on which, sadly, Mozambique ranked low. What was 
necessary was mass mobilisation and a Herculean effort to “catch up”. In the 
Mozambican case many of nationalist modernity’s failures were evident. The question 
remain though as to why a radical expression of this form of modernity, coupled with 
a disdain for existing cultural practices within Mozambique, were so attractive to the 
revolutionary elite. An examination of the social origins of this group will go some 
way towards answering this question. In addition, through this, we can better 
understand in what ways later manifestations of modernity, such as those expressed 
by the independence elite, draw upon these origins and in what ways they have 
changed. 
 
3.3 The Social Origins of Changing Modernities  
 
 The core of Frelimo’s leadership and by extension, the revolutionary elite, was 
heavily drawn from southern, Protestant assimilados (Cruz e Silva 2000).
44
 Members 
from this group made a common cause with alienated members of other groups, also 
primarily from the south, but including some northerners as well, that were privileged 
in comparison to the population as a whole, but were subordinated to the ruling 
factions of the colonialists. Many of these members came from Mulatto, Indian and 
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 This does not mean that all Protestants joined Frelimo or that there were no Catholic members. I 
examine one of the reasons why Protestant assimilados were well-represented in Frelimo in the 
following section.  
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Segundo (white Portuguese who were born in Mozambique and were discriminated 
against for this reason) backgrounds, although as stated in the introduction there were 
exceptions. The social origins of many members of the revolutionary elite, especially 
its strong assimilado component, influenced the society they tried to create after 
independence 
Fry (2000) argues that socialism in Mozambique followed a very assimilado 
logic. Although the stated goal of Portuguese colonialism was to incorporate their 
African subjects into the glories of Portuguese and European culture, it was based on 
deeply racist foundations. Therefore it was thought that while assimilation would take 
generations, only small numbers of assimilados could be created while the vast 
majority of the population would be left as a repository of exotic customs (Fry, 2000). 
Frelimo was far more ambitious and inclusionary; they felt they could recreate the 
entire society in a short period of time. Yet there are underlying, if probably 
unintentional, similarities of logic between their version of socialism and assimilação 
(assimilation). 
 
In spite of the anti-colonial discourse of the center and FRELIMO in general, it is 
impossible not to observe that the socialist project for Mozambique was if anything more 
“assimilationist” than the Portuguese ever dared to imagine and it is tempting to suggest 
that this is one of the reasons why the Mozambican elite found the socialist program so 
attractive. Structurally speaking there was little difference between an authoritarian 
capitalist state run by a small body of “illuminated” Portuguese and assimilados and an 
authoritarian socialist state run by an equally diminutive and equally enlightened vanguard 
party (Fry 2000: 129). 
 
This ideological outlook came under increasing pressure though as the civil war 
progressed, and faced serious challenges at the end of the conflict. Fry (2000) 
suggests that since the end of the civil war in 1992, Frelimo’s re-conceptualisation of 
tradition and its place in national life led to the party taking a more locally based, less 
elitist view. In addition, the powerful international aid agencies which have become 
increasingly dominant since the end of socialism have also become strong supporters 
of “tradition”, perhaps disillusioned by the failures of the previous “modernist, 
universalist” development regimes (ibid). Fry (2000) argues that the party’s efforts to 
embrace tradition exemplify the changing logic of power as the leadership tries to 
broaden its base and distance itself from its assimilado roots. For Fry, when speaking 
of Frelimo’s abandonment of their former Marxism and modernism and of the moves 
to reclaim the place of “tradition”: “It is as if the universalist pretensions of both the 
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forms of external power (Marxism and modernism) have finally succumbed to the 
imperatives of the usos e costumes (usages and customs) they (Frelimo) so despised” 
(Fry 2000: 135). 
 Fry makes an important point by recognising some of the ideological 
continuities between assimilação and the post-independence socialist project. These 
conclusions are based on the fact that the colonial practice of assimilação envisioned 
that generations were needed to bring the social level of the colony’s African 
inhabitants to a sufficient stage where they could become members of a European 
culture. Furthermore, for immediate purposes the process was to involve only 
relatively small numbers of people and was theoretically based on personal choice 
(one could choose to become an assimilado) (Fry 2000: 129). As previously shown, 
the nationalist modernity and socialism of the revolutionary elites tried to turn these 
assumptions upside down.  
 While there is undoubtedly an element of truth to Fry’s argument, it misses 
some of the very real differences in the way modernity was conceptualised by the 
Mozambican elites between the colonial and socialist periods. For much of the 
revolutionary elite, nationalism was based, in part, on a deep sense of personal 
grievance and racial humiliation (Hall and Young 1997: 65).
45
 For many assimilados, 
and the colonial elite in general, there was a love/hate relationship with the colonial 
power. They admired aspects of the modernity the colonialists represented but hated 
the fact that they were only allowed partial and subordinate entrance to it (ibid). 
Although many members of Frelimo’s leadership had assimilado backgrounds, the 
idea of assimilação was an anathema to what they wanted to create. Assimilados drew 
their prestige from, and were seen as, the modern section of the African population 
due to their close contact with the Portuguese. Frelimo felt that Assimilados closeness 
to the Portuguese was not only a betrayal of the nationalist cause, but also a deeper 
sign of humiliation; they were seen as “uncle Toms”. As I was once warned by a 
friend who was arranging an interview for me with her uncle, a man who was once an 
assimilado: “Watch it, he hates the word assimilado, if you call him an assimilado he 
will throw you out of his house”. 
 Yet a “retreat” into traditional culture was also not a viable option. Members 
of the revolutionary elite associated “traditional culture” with defeat, humiliation and 
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subjugation. For them it was exactly this “cultural backwardness” that made 
Mozambique weak and easy prey for the Portuguese. Despite Frelimo’s vaguely 
Maoist rhetoric of worker and peasant alliances, peasants, the embodiment of 
“traditional culture” were often viewed with deep contempt by the leadership (Hall 
and Young 1997: 84).
46
 For the revolutionary elite the “tradition culture” of the 
peasant masses was not a vision of Mozambique’s future, but a symbol of its 
shameful past and it would have to be drastically reformed for the state to advance. 
This played a large role in Frelimo’s insistence on the creation of the Novo Homem, 
the new man who was not corrupted by what had happened before independence.  
Frelimo wanted to create a state and society that could beat the Portuguese at their 
own game, one that was progressive and modern, yet sovereign and had overcome of 
the legacy of humiliation and defeat.   
The revolutionary elite’s nationalist modernism grew, in part, from their 
personal social experiences of colonialism and the victorious example of the 
liberation struggle that proved that almost anything could be accomplished with 
sufficient discipline and will. It was a way to be modern like the Portuguese, but 
different and critical of them at the same time. Furthermore it was a way to expand 
and deepen the superficial modernisation that had gone on during colonialism and 
create a new and unified nation. Like Donham’s “Marxist Modern” in Ethiopia, 
nationalist modernity was a way to: “cut history off at the pass” (1999: 127).     
After the fall of socialism the outward display of nationalist modernity was, to 
a large degree, discredited and the younger generation of independence elites do not 
have the same personal experiences of rancour with the former system that gave 
nationalist modernity its immediacy for previous generations. The modernity of 
preceding elite incarnations drew its inspiration from the Portuguese or the socialist 
world; the modernity of the independence elite is more widely cosmopolitan and 
eclectic It is influenced by Europe, America, South Africa and Brazil, where they 
have often studied and worked. For the independence elite the fact that they were 
modern never suffered the same degree of doubt as their parents, who grew up under 
colonialism. They were raised at the pinnacle of an independent state that is both a 
creation and a symbol of Frelimo’s modernity (Bertelsen 2004) This does not mean 
that members of the younger generation do not suffer doubts as to Mozambique’s 
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place in the world. Many of my friends from this group have travelled widely and 
compare the situation in foreign nations with what they perceive as the poverty, 
political and cultural shortcomings they see at home.
47
 There are also frequent 
complaints about the power that aid agencies and foreigners in general are able to 
wield in Mozambique, which can be ironic as many of my informants work with these 
same people and organisations.  
Despite the problems of contemporary Mozambique, few of my informants 
among the independence elite feel personally responsible for them and, in many cases, 
through their daily experiences it seems as if things are gradually getting better. I was 
once at a café with four members of the independence elite and I listened, as they got 
into an argument about the place of nationalism in contemporary Mozambican 
society. While all present claimed to be proud of being Mozambican a young man 
asked why this was so rarely demonstrated in the post-socialist period. He compared 
the example of Mozambique with that of Angola whose population, according to him, 
was famous for their rabid nationalism. He could not understand why a country that 
was in his terms a “disaster” inspired such fervent devotion among its citizens. A 
reply came from a young woman sitting at our table. She said: “That is exactly why 
they are such nationalists, Angola is an absolute disaster and they do not have 
anything else. We do not need to be”.   
As with the life experiences and social conditions of different generations of 
elites, the manifestations of modernity have changed from independence to the 
present day, although previous manifestations influence the following ones. This has 
not been a seamless evolution. In actual practice the world is filled with ambiguities 
and many, both among elites and the wider population, wonder in what direction the 
present manifestation of modernity will lead.
48
 But one factor that has remained is the 
importance for some form of modernity to legitimise the social position of elites.  To 
follow the lead of Gledhill modernity in Mozambique, through its various 
incarnations, creates the unifying political culture in which various Mozambican elites 
operate (2002). This political culture is built on the belief that the elites of 
Mozambique have their positions because they will lead the country to progress, 
whether through socialist nationalism or capitalist NGO driven development. In the 
current era there is increasing cynicism towards this belief. It is often a cynicism with 
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a basis in reality. Despite the best intentions of the party leadership the revolutionary 
elite has developed some of the characteristics of what Leys (1982) and M. Cohen 
(1982) described in this thesis’s introduction as the “national bourgeoisie”. In practice 
social and family connections are crucial in maintaining the position of elites. But 
there are still efforts to legitimise this by pointing to the fact that it is the members of 
the elites who have the “modern” skills to fulfil these positions. This is true for the 
Frelimo cadres of the socialist period and the NGO field representatives of the 
capitalist period. The remainder of this chapter examines two crucial ways in which 
elites are “modern”, education and consumption. I argue that education and 
consumption serve the dual purpose of both the means to inculcate elites with the 
values of their generation’s dominant modernity and as symbolic markers of it. 
 
3.4 Education 
 
 Portugal’s colonial record for providing education in Mozambique was dismal 
at best. A common saying among the older generation was that the former British 
colonies got schools, roads, railways and general infrastructure, while Portugal was 
only good for building churches. There is some truth to this statement; comparatively 
Portugal invested little in their overseas colonies and official state education for 
“natives” was left primarily in the hands of the Catholic Church (cf. Cruz e Silva 
2001; Pitcher 2002). Toward the end of the colonial period some measures were taken 
by the state to widen the educational system to include a larger percentage of the 
population. Even so, the overall numbers of students remained incredibly low. When 
independence was declared in 1975 the nation was facing a crisis due to the lack of 
trained personnel. 
 
Frelimo was left to run an effectively bankrupt country with virtually no trained people. 
The illiteracy rate was over 90 percent. There were six economists, two agronomists, not a 
single geologist, and fewer than a thousand black high school graduates in all of 
Mozambique. Of 350 railroad engineers working in 1975, just one was black and he was an 
agent of the Portuguese secret police (Finnegan 1992: 30). 
 
Other estimates put the rate of illiteracy at independence between 95% and 97% 
(Hanlon 1984; Munslow 1983). The limited educational facilities that did exist 
primarily benefited the white population. Like the British in South Africa, the 
educational system that was available for Blacks was first and foremost targeted at 
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creating a local elite whose interests were tied to the regime (Krige 1993). Yet even 
this limited goal was inadequate and discriminatory in practice. Access to good state 
or Catholic schools in colonial Mozambique was a rarity among the colonial elite and 
for the majority of the population it was far worse. For someone of a non-elite 
background to gain access to any schooling at all was a challenge. The most the 
majority could hope for would be a few years of catechism from the local Catholic 
mission, or access to so-called “native” teachers, who were those who had some 
education and gave rudimentary classes to the children of neighbours in return for 
labour on their lands (Cruz e Silva 2001).
49
 The following example shall detail the 
types of education that were available for one of the lucky few who came from 
comparatively privileged background: Educational opportunities often depended on 
luck and white patronage. 
 
Roberto’s Early Education. 
 
Roberto was born to a relatively affluent family in the province of Inhambane during the 
late colonial period. Although his family were not legally considered assimilados, his 
family had long connections with Swiss Protestant Missions that were strong in the area 
and though this connection they were well-educated and affluent by local standards, with 
access to education, a well and a sewing machine. Roberto’s father became a teacher for 
Methodist Missionaries and operated a one-room mission school across the border in 
South Africa, although his family remained in Mozambique. Roberto attended a Catholic 
Mission School as there were no others available at the time, although this was not his 
parent’s first choice. When describing the Catholic Mission School to me, Roberto said it 
was basically a joke. There was one large room that was filled with children of all ages all 
reciting the alphabet. The rest of the day would be filled with some religious training and 
then student labour, usually farming the Mission’s fields. The produce collected from the 
fields were then given back to Mission, although the students still had to pay fees for their 
attendance. Roberto moved to Maputo with his mother and his brothers when he was five 
years old. He was enrolled in another Catholic school when he arrived, but his mother 
was worried about the quality of the education offered by the Missions. He attended a 
Catholic Mission school until the 3
rd
 year, but then his mother decided to try and move 
him to a different school. It would be very difficult for a black child to move to the fourth 
year immediately, even though Roberto had top marks, and delay would be costly as one 
could not attend secondary school if one was past 14 years old.
50
 Through the intercession 
of Roberto’s white godfather, a good friend of his father’s, Roberto’s mother managed to 
have him placed at an privileged white school. The new school was next to the elite 
Portuguese commando’s headquarters. Roberto stated it was rather rough, he was one of 
about ten black students in the school and he took a lot of racial abuse, both from the 
students and the neighbouring commandos. Roberto said that the most overt abuse eased 
over time. Despite his high marks, Roberto was put into the lowest academic category. 
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 There was an alternative route to acquiring education through Protestant Swiss Mission schools. 
These schools were only located in the south and due to their limited numbers and state harassment 
they only provided educational opportunities to a tiny minority of the population. Their social effect 
though was far greater than their enrolment. This will be described later in this section.  
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 Roberto’s identity card states his age as two years younger then he actually is, to try and avoid school 
age limits. It was common to doctor birth certificates for Black men of his generation who attended 
Catholic schools. 
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Later he had a new teacher from East Timor, who was more sympathetic to the idea of 
revolution. She placed him into a higher academic category (Field notes 13 April 2005).   
 
 Roberto was comparatively lucky for a Mozambican of his generation. Only a 
few had the sufficient social connections to be able to bypass the official schools 
available for Africans and obtain a higher quality of education. During our interview 
Roberto told me that the purpose of African education for the majority was to create 
loyal workers who knew the rudiments of Catholicism. The few history lessons he 
received at the African school basically ignored Mozambique entirely and focused 
instead on the glories of Portuguese civilisation. This was the concept of assimilação 
at its lowest and most basic level. African students were taught that there is no such 
thing as Mozambique, or Mozambican history, independent of Portugal and 
Portuguese history. The logic of assimilação greatly intensified as he progressed up 
the educational ladder. Roberto only secured a place at an elite white school through 
white patronage. While the racial abuse he suffered lessened over time as the student 
body gradually became used to his presence, like assimilados throughout 
Mozambique, to progress he had to try and make himself as much like the Portuguese 
as possible and even then he remained a junior partner. For the fortunate few though, 
there was another avenue to obtain an education in the colonial period. 
As shown with Roberto’s parents in the example above, the Swiss Protestant 
Mission provided one of the alternative sites of education for colonial elites in the 
south. The Swiss Mission made contact with the authorities of various indigenous 
kingdoms of the south and had established themselves even before the Portuguese 
consolidated their hold on this area (Cruz e Silva 2001). Because of their relationship 
with indigenous kingdoms, the Mission was initially greeted by the Portuguese as 
possible sites of subversion. This distrust grew as the dominant Catholic Church 
complained about Protestant Missions usurping their educational role. The Catholic 
Church was allowed free reign in education provided they would also educate their 
students to become Portuguese subjects. There was a real fear that foreign Missions 
would teach in languages other than Portuguese and “de-nationalise” students by 
bringing them into the orbit of other European powers (ibid). While the state allowed 
the Swiss Mission to exist, the schools generally faced petty official harassment, 
restrictions on areas they could operate and pupils they could enrol. Graduates often 
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faced a pervasive sense of governmental suspicion, and the Mission occasionally 
faced more serious actions such as temporary closures and threats of expulsion. 
Aside from the Swiss Mission’s possible role in “de-nationalising” Portuguese 
colonial subjects and the competition they provided the approved Catholic schools, 
their style of teaching also caused friction with the colonial state. Many Mission 
schools provided education and religious services in vernacular languages as opposed 
to Portuguese, which was official national policy. In addition their curriculum often 
set them at odds with official state procedure. While Mission staff did not knowingly 
promote a nationalist agenda among their students, there were serious differences 
between what they taught and the government educational methods. Lessons were far 
more comprehensive than those of the typical “native” school and it is possible that 
teachers communicated their sense of frustration with the colonial state and wider 
Protestant critiques of Portuguese colonialism more generally to their students. In 
general the Mission was one of the few places that provided an atmosphere that was at 
least permissive of anti-colonial sentiment before the beginning of the liberation 
struggle (Cruz e Silva 1998:224). Of equal, if not more importance, according to Cruz 
e Silva (1998, 2001), were informal methods of teaching. The Mission adapted certain 
local social structures to their pedagogical purposes. What is especially interesting in 
the terms of this discussion is the mintlawa (group), which was based on age grade 
organisations. The purpose of the mintlawa was as follows: 
 
… were intended to stimulate self-reliance, develop individual skills, broaden knowledge, 
promote Christian values and a new worldview. It placed particular emphasis on fostering 
skills such as information gathering and interpretation, critical analysis, and encouraging 
individuals to reflect on, and understand, their own position. This amounted to a form of 
“capacity development” which enabled youth to adapt their education to their own 
individual and collective advantage (Cruz e Silva 1998:226). 
 
Interviews collected by Cruz e Silva with former Mission graduates who later became 
high-ranking Frelimo members frequently pointed to the mintlawa as an institution 
where students developed the skills to critically analyse situations (1998, 2001). 
These groups were originally intended to discuss and interpret the bible, but members 
were able to also begin a critical engagement with the ideas of colonialism and of 
Mozambique as a nation. This aided students’ abilities to conceive of a Mozambican 
identity separate from Portugal. 
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 Much has been made of the role of missionaries in the formation of 
overarching identities in colonial Africa. Ranger persuasively argues that mission 
involvement in colonial Rhodesia was a crucial component in the development of a 
wider Shona identity amongst groups of people who shared linguistic traits, but had 
never before thought of themselves as sharing an overall identity (Ranger 1989). 
Harries (1989) demonstrates how the Swiss Mission was an integral feature in the 
creation of a Tsonga identity in both South Africa and Mozambique. According to 
Harries, a mission educated petty-bourgeoisie was a major component in the 
emergence of a wider Tsonga ethnic identity. This happened in part due to 
instrumental reasons involving South African ethnic politics and also through the 
codification of disparate Tsonga languages as the bible was translated into the 
vernacular. The evolution of disparate groups into a broad Tsonga ethnicity is evident 
in the writings of one of the more famous Swiss Missionaries, Henri Junod. Arising 
from Junod’s time in Mozambique in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, his 
exhaustive work “Life of a South African Tribe” (1962a, 1962b) uses the “scientific” 
criteria of the day to categorise linguistically related groups into a unified tribe, albeit 
one split into four major clans.  
 While a wider “Tsonga” consciousness was important in introducing Mission 
students to a world wider than their particular villages and home regions, by the 
middle of the 20
th
 Century the students’ relationship with the Mission was producing 
an even wider, if still embryonic, national identity. Cruz e Silva makes a strong point 
in locating the Swiss Mission as an important part of the formation of nationalism 
among an emergent elite. The permissive atmosphere allowed students the freedom to 
engage critically with the wider social situation. This, coupled with a sense of a 
hostile government and the humiliation of graduates who saw less educated Catholics 
promoted ahead of them, increased alienation towards the state. The influence of the 
Mission can also be seen in revolutionary policy and the idea of the Novo Homem. 
While the Mission used vernacular languages and adopted certain customs and forms 
of social organisation to their own use, they were very critical of cultural behaviours 
they saw as “heathen”. While they respected elements of local traditions, they also 
wanted to construct a new kind of Christian subject free of previous “superstitions”. If 
anything, the Frelimo leadership was to go much further in their anti-traditional bias. 
Finally, the Mission’s policy of securing scholarships for some gifted students to 
study abroad allowed the formation of a more cosmopolitan elite who could compare 
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their situation in Mozambique to those they found in other nations. As a result, they 
were able to engage with other theories, such as socialism, which were critical both of 
colonialism and the missionaries. Thus it is also important to understand how this 
embryonic sense of nationalism soon outgrew its original home.  
Upon their assumption of power the Frelimo leadership displayed overt hostility 
not only towards Catholicism, but also toward organised religion more generally. 
Certain missionary activities and their educational freedom were severely curtailed. 
The new state was militantly “anti-tribalist” and discouraged any outward display of 
ethnic consciousness. While many militants may have stated that the mintlawa system 
deeply influenced their ability to engage critically with the colonial system, no efforts 
were made to reproduce this kind of educational model in schools after the revolution. 
In actual practice, shades of the former colonial educational system were more 
evident as Portuguese was the only language of instruction and students were 
punished for speaking African languages. It seems as if the freedom provided by the 
Swiss Mission allowed an emergent elite to discard not only the colonial logic of 
oppression, but also many of the core teachings of their missionary allies.    
  The revolutionary elite may have turned against some of the specific methods 
of education found in the Swiss Missions but they tended to fetishise the concept of 
education as a vehicle to introduce nationalist modernity. Education was thought to be 
the foundation of all of the wider goals of the struggle (Mondlane 1969). As I have 
mentioned earlier, Frelimo’s ideal of modernity was embodied in the concept of the 
“Novo Homem” (new man), one free of the evils of colonial exploitation and African 
“ignorance”. The creation of the “New Man”, in part, depended on education. In fact 
the idea of the New Man was central to the socialist educational system. Frelimo 
defined their system’s educational goals as follows: 
 
The New System of Education has as its central objective the formation of the New Man, 
a man free from obscurantism, superstition, and the colonial-bourgeois mentality, a man 
who will assume the values of a socialist society (People’s Republic of Mozambique, 
1985, quoted in Gómez 1999: 356, translation, mine). 
 
Education during the socialist period was a prime expression of what some analysts 
have termed Frelimo’s “blank slate” ideology, the idea that Mozambique was 
unformed clay (after the eradication of inappropriate cultural behaviours) waiting to 
be shaped. Frelimo’s educational policies would ideally bind the populace, especially 
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much of the peasantry who were thought to be the most “obscurantist” sections of the 
population, more tightly to the party and serve as a means of transmitting the values 
of nationalist modernity to the people.   
Education was also crucial to the revolutionary elite’s goals for pragmatic 
reasons. After independence there was a mass exodus of Portuguese settlers and the 
incoming government lost much of its managerial personnel; there was a desperate 
need to train replacements as soon as possible.  It has now become common for the 
party and some sympathetic international agencies to blame many of the failures that 
occurred during the socialist period on the lack of qualified personnel to run the 
nation’s administrative apparatus. As a former officer in the liberation struggle and 
general in the post-independence army told me:  
 
Those were very exciting days. We were sure that we could do a better job than the 
Portuguese had. They were foreigners and they wanted to exploit the country for their own 
purposes. We were Mozambican and we were going to make things better for our people. 
We were very ambitious and very young; we had immense responsibilities for people our 
age. That was part of the problem I guess. We wanted to educate the nation, but we were 
barely educated ourselves (Field notes 28 September 2002). 
 
A former Frelimo supporter who is now a Professor at Eduardo Mondlane University 
told me: “The problem was we had an elite big enough to run a revolution, but not big 
enough to run a country”. These statements show some of the contradictions, however 
practical they may be, between Frelimo’s utopian ideology of socialist assimilation 
for the entire nation and the needs of consolidating the power of the revolutionary 
elite. The new Frelimo government did make dramatic gains in education. Schools 
were opened throughout the country and in urban areas adult education was available 
(in some cases obligatory) for all. Those who could read and write were enlisted as 
“barefoot” teachers in emulation of revolutionary Cuba and China’s literacy 
campaigns (Hanlon 1990). The new teaching conditions were not always ideal as a 
Mozambican friend, who attended school shortly after liberation before she left for 
Portugal, explained to me. 
 
It was a strange time. Former guerrilla soldiers would just come to schools and start 
classes. Many of them did not have any education, but they had just freed the nation from 
the Portuguese and they thought that was enough. They would sit in front of the students 
and just talk about their lives. They thought that was teaching. Even the other teachers 
had almost no experience. Many of them were very young and they just had a few years 
of school themselves. When I first came to Portugal I was terribly behind in math and 
sciences because very few of the teachers we had knew anything about them. Oddly 
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enough though I was ahead in reading and writing, I think it is because my teachers in 
Mozambique did not really know how to read and write either and we were learning 
together (Field notes 17 October 2004).        
 
The above quote demonstrates a problem that was to bedevil many of the 
revolutionary elite’s grand plans to transform the nation. The plans were incredibly 
ambitious but the ability to carry them out was limited and implementation was often 
haphazard and erratic. Yet not all who attended school in the initial revolutionary 
period were so disparaging and Frelimo’s efforts improved over time. Naema, who 
now works as a teacher in a private school, was a secondary school student when 
Frelimo took power. Although she made no comment about the academic quality of 
schooling during this period she strongly appreciated the attempts at nation building.  
 
It was all very exciting. We did not know much about Frelimo when they came. I remember 
before liberation I had seen the word Frelimo written on a wall and I asked my uncle what it 
meant. He told me I was never to say this word, especially if there were strangers around, 
we could get into trouble. When they came and got rid of the Portuguese we were all 
rejoicing, especially the young. We were going to build a new Mozambique. They would 
come to schools and teach us about our new country. They (Frelimo) would often have 
demonstrations, everyone would hold a placard and together it would form the flag, you 
know like the North Koreans do. I was always picked for the demonstrations; I was very 
small and cute. They would also give those who took part in the demonstrations lunch and 
it could be hard to get food then. We would do voluntary cleaning in the city on Sundays; 
they wanted us to be good citizens. That was really good. Now the city is filthy and no one 
does anything. Many of my students do not even know the words to the national anthem. 
Patriotism does not mean anything anymore and they do not try and teach it like they did 
before (Field notes 7 July and 8 November 2003). 
 
  
Naema greatly approved of the strong emphasis on nation-building and 
nationalism, which was transmitted through education during the socialist period. 
As her comments show there was a sense that everyone was being drawn together 
in a unified nation and individual interests were subordinated for the good of the 
many. The manner in which Naema was educated, with its focus on the nation, is 
in direct contrast to that of Roberto under the Portuguese. In this sense the 
revolutionary elite was successful in transmitting their modernist goals. Yet 
Naema was educated in the capital of Mozambique, at the centre of power, and 
the party’s goal to reproduce this experience throughout the vast nation was far 
more problematic. 
The revolutionary government did make concerted efforts to bring their ideal of 
educated modernity to the nation as a whole, although as previously stated in a rather 
chaotic manner. As with other socialist nations in Africa, such as Angola and 
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Tanzania, education was rapidly expanded, but the infrastructure to absorb increasing 
numbers of students was inadequate (Hodges 2001; Samoff, 1979). In the effort to 
provide teachers, as the first example illustrated, many were not properly trained.  
Furthermore, even in the capital, according to many informants, schools were 
overcrowded, with huge classes. The demand was so great that many schools had to 
run throughout the day and evening in shifts, a practice that continues today. The 
outbreak of the civil war and the following economic collapse put intolerable strain on 
an already overburdened system.  
 In addition to the inadequacies of the educational system, Frelimo itself was 
instrumental in creating an educational class structure. The Frelimo leadership had 
always been an elite and their “elitist” tendencies became more pronounced after 
Frelimo redefined itself as a “vanguard” party in 1977. Although nationalist 
modernity was predicated on mass mobilisation it required an enlightened vanguard to 
lead the way.
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 Soon after independence the party created the Frelimo School, which 
was to exclusively service the children of high-ranking party members. As the 
following example will demonstrate, despite the school’s underlying socialist 
ideology, it offered concrete educational benefits to its students.   
 
Catarina 
 
Catarina was born in 1975 and came from a Frelimo family. Her father had been a 
Minister in the socialist government. Catarina was educated at the Frelimo School until 
the ninth grade (year). There were 30 people in her class and all were the children of 
high-ranking Frelimo members. She remembered the discipline was extremely strict. 
When the teacher entered the room all the students had to stand at attention and greet the 
teacher and wait for permission to sit. The curriculum was rigorous and students were 
also required to work in the fields as part of the party’s efforts to keep the elites close to 
the people during the early socialist period. There were advantages to attending the 
Frelimo School. The teachers were mostly expats from other socialist countries; many 
were East German and well trained. The students were provided with better food than 
other schools. In addition, students were provided with a bus to transport them to and 
from school. The normal students walking to school would often mock them and make 
comparisons with the school bus and cattle transport trucks. Another friend of mine 
remembered resenting the Frelimo schools and its privileges and recalls her friends 
throwing rocks at the bus as they walked to school. Towards the end of the socialist 
period Catarina recalled that many students started to leave to study abroad or be sent to 
the increasing number of private schools available in Maputo. Catarina’s father felt that 
she should experience school as normal Mozambicans do and was sent to a state run 
institution. For Catarina it was something of a shock, she had wanted to be sent to a 
private school in Swaziland. Discipline in her new school was lax and the teachers were 
not often very good or very interested in their job. Catarina now had to walk 45 minutes 
to school and had to arrive early to be sure to get a desk, materials were very scarce. At 
this time Renamo was periodically attacking Matola, a town on the outskirts of Maputo 
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 As Fry (2000) noted, this policy does bare a strong, if probably unintentional, resemblance to many 
members of the revolutionary elite’s former status as assimilados. 
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and students were made to undergo military training and dig trenches, measures, which 
were ineffective and cut into teaching time. (Field notes 28 April 2005). 
  
Catrina’s example does not only demonstrate the prevalent inequalities between the 
education reserved for the children of the revolutionary elite and everyone else; this 
example also coincided with the shift away from nationalist modernity and towards a 
more distinctive and technocratic form. The revolutionary elite was increasingly 
shifting their children from the party school, which was steeped in socialist and 
nationalist values, and sent them to private and foreign schools where the young 
members of the independence elite learned a wider, more cosmopolitan form of 
modernity. As demonstrated by Simpson in his study of a Missionary Boarding 
School in Zambia, access to education, even despite the intentions of the school’s 
founders, became the site of the social reproduction of the nation’s bourgeoisie, and 
created significant social barriers between the lives the students now aspired to and 
the realities of the lives of the vast majority of the nation’s population (2003). In 
Mozambique the elitism inherent in the idea of a social vanguard began to harden into 
a class structure expressed through differing access to education.  
In the post-socialist period a quick stroll through Maputo is usually enough to 
demonstrate the difference in schooling between the elites and the rest of the city’s 
residents. Although there are multiple schools on the streets, some dating from the 
colonial period while the socialist government constructed others, many are in bad 
repair. The paint of the school is peeling and many of the windows are broken. Wave 
after wave of students issue from the schools as overcrowding still necessitates 
operating the schools in shifts. On the other side of town, in Bairro Triunfo 
(neighbourhood of triumph), the situation is rather different. In a somewhat secluded 
cul-de-sac slightly off the main road is a street housing many of Maputo’s private 
schools and international schools, such as the Portuguese and American Schools. The 
road is still unpaved, but the difference between the schools here and those in other 
parts of the town is striking. Many of the schools are two or three stories, the paint is 
fresh, all of the windows are intact and the students are dropped off by an array of 
expensive cars and 4x4s. While many of the younger members of the Mozambican 
elite study abroad for at least part of their academic career, they complete much of 
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their initial schooling within Mozambique.
52
 The state’s initial attempts to consolidate 
elite social reproduction through superior schooling have gained momentum in the 
post-socialist period. Currently elite children are beginning to bypass the state system 
entirely; in their youth they attend either private or international schools within 
Maputo, gaining the skills to study abroad. Class divisions among urbanites can be 
demonstrated, in part, by those who have to rely on the national education system and 
those who do not. 
 The growing educational class structure is enhanced by the ability for elite 
families to send their children abroad. Foreign education is prized by elite 
Mozambican families for the qualifications it bestows, but also because of the status it 
confers and the social networks it fosters. Although the effects on the children can be 
somewhat traumatic as they are sent away from home and exposed to different social 
systems and often high degrees of racism, there are benefits. Many of the young elites 
I knew had formed long lasting friendships that were created when they studied 
together in various places. They also formed relationships with the children of other 
African elites. In some ways these relationships are perhaps the most important part 
of foreign education. It also assists in the formation of the current form of modernity 
by inculcating the values of cosmopolitism in the independence elite, while giving 
them high qualifications and the ability to “fit in” and easily interact with 
international elites, such as those who run the aid agencies. As the next section will 
show, the inculcation of these values are the foundation of the everyday 
demonstration of elite status in Mozambique; it both legitimises and is symbolic of 
their social position. 
 
3.5 Distinction 
 
 The social importance of certain modes of consumption and self-presentation 
was brought home to me at a conversation during a friend’s birthday party. At this 
party I met the daughter of a high-ranking Frelimo official. After a while we started 
talking about the government. She said although there were problems with corruption 
she and her family were still strong Frelimo supporters. She felt that, corruption aside, 
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 As demonstrated in the introduction, of the 23 members of the independence elite I knew well during 
fieldwork, 22 had studied abroad. The major destinations were South Africa, the United Kingdom, 
Portugal, Brazil, Swaziland and the United States. 
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there was no one else who was capable of running the country. In her opinion the 
opposition, Renamo, were simply uneducated peasants. To illustrate her point she told 
me a story. 
 
I remember in 1992 when peace was declared and Renamo came out of the bush. They were 
given houses, at least the big guys in the party were. It was one of the conditions for peace. 
Dhlakama (the leader of Renamo) said he would not come to the capital because he did not 
have a house. The government finally had to give him one; it had originally been built for 
the European Union. When they (Renamo) came here they had no idea how to live in a city, 
they were fresh from the bush. They used to wash their clothes and leave them on the front 
lawn to dry! Can you believe that? These people think they could run a country. It’s a joke; 
they had never been out of the bush before (Field notes 28 September 2002). 
 
At the time I found it remarkable that after all the horrors of the civil war, this woman 
disqualified Renamo for political leadership because they displayed “peasant habits” 
with their washing. I asked her if members of Frelimo did not act in a similar way 
when they returned from the bush after a ten-year liberation struggle. She just laughed 
and replied: “Are you kidding? Frelimo knew far more than that”. I did not realise it 
at the time, but my friend was alluding to a common conception amongst elites that 
equates the display of “peasant habits” with poverty and a fundamental 
backwardness. This chapter’s introductory quote by Samora Machel demonstrates the 
humiliation in thinking that outsiders equate being “African” with poverty and 
loincloths. This frustration was also evident in the ideology of nationalist modernity 
with its stress on “catching up” and earning the respect of the west. This is again seen 
in Machel’s quote through his seemingly thwarted attempts to make people 
understand their modernity: “we wear tunics and trousers”. During the socialist period 
there were efforts to bring this form of modernity to the nation, although as the 
vanguard, the revolutionary elite were already thought to embody it. After the fall of 
socialism, these forms of consumption and self-presentation have increasingly 
become the distinctive mark of the independence elite. For young elites, the 
distinction that flowed from certain forms of self-presentation was not only about 
differentiating themselves from the wider population, as the above comment shows. 
For them this was often all too obvious.
53
 It was also about making outsiders (i.e. the 
west) understand the distinction between elites and the rest of the population. If one 
cannot make outsiders understand that the entire nation is cosmopolitan and modern 
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 The ways in which elites conceive of the rest of Mozambique’s population are explored in more 
depth in following chapters. 
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(although there are still undercurrents of this) at least they should be able to recognise 
that the independence elite are.  
 This manner of consumption and self-presentation has it roots in the colonial 
period. Assimilados were noted for their European dress; it was a mark of distinction 
(Penvenne 1979; 1989). Granjo, in his work on lobolo in Mozambique relates the 
story of an older assimilado man during the colonial period who, due to the 
restrictions of assmilação, was no longer able to request bride wealth for the marriage 
of his daughters. He circumvented these restrictions by asking his daughter’s suitors 
to give him a tie if their proposal was accepted. This symbolic payment not only 
helped to fulfil the requirement of lobolo, but it acknowledged the man’s status and 
position. A tie was almost a badge of rank for assimilados (personal communication). 
By adopting European fashions, assimilados were demonstrating their modernity and 
status, showing themselves both worthy of respect from those below them in the 
social hierarchy and demonstrating that they were worthy of equal treatment from the 
Portuguese. While the symbolic roots of the importance of elite consumption have 
their genesis in the colonial period, the introduction of socialism and its resulting 
“economy of privation” was a crucial influence for current understandings of the role 
of consumption. 
 In her work on republican elites in Yemen, vom Bruck (2005) observed the 
crucial link between forms of consumption and elite status. Thus in contrast to older 
displays of status associated with the monarchy, such as a cultivated aestheticism and 
religious knowledge, for the republicans: “The ability to acquire, display and 
distribute wealth has become one of the defining criteria of the new elite…” (vom 
Bruck 2005: 257). It was not simply consumption itself that indicates status, but 
specifically the ability to consume high-status foreign goods. The ability to access 
foreign products becomes a symbolic marker of social worth and a display of the 
cultural capital of the ruling elite (ibid). As shown by Granjo’s example of the 
assimilado and the tie, a similar logic operates in Mozambique and has longstanding 
roots. Certain forms of consumption not only act as markers of one’s relationship to 
the project of modernity, but the ability to access western goods also serves as a 
symbolic statement of equality. Yet one of the major problems of nationalist 
modernity and socialism was that they resulted in chronic shortages that made these 
symbolic displays ever more difficult, even for privileged urbanites and the 
revolutionary elite themselves.    
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 Once when attending a dinner given by a middle-class Mozambican family, 
the mother pulled out a photo album filled of pictures of her and her husband 
marrying and establishing a family shortly after the revolution. Her children and some 
other relatives were present during the dinner and they all began to laugh while 
looking through the pictures. As with teenagers everywhere, the children were 
amused by the pictures of the now outmoded fashions of their parents, in this case 
flared trousers and large afro-hair styles. They were also shocked at how thin 
everyone was and the shabby quality of the clothes and home furnishings. The eldest 
daughter was particularly offended by the sandals everyone wore, while her mother 
tried to explain that there were no others available. The mother mentioned many 
times that it was the tempo de fome (the time of hunger). During much of the socialist 
period and the civil war, urban residents were on a strict system of rationing. Many of 
the old socialists in Maputo made the strong point to me that while food was not 
plentiful, at least the state tried to make sure that everyone was fed. Yet many others 
referred to the system of rationing as kilo-kilo, a derogatory reference to the pitiful 
monthly amounts that were allowed. As many explained to me it was one kilo of rice 
per person, one kilo of beans, small bony fishes that taste terrible and are still hated to 
this day and so on. A friend of mine from the independence elite, who used to date 
the son of Samora Machel, was once invited to dinner at the Presidencia. She was 
later devastated to find that they ate the same rations there as everyone else (or at 
least they did when company arrived) and the dream of a good dinner was no closer 
to fulfilment. Other friends told me that one of their favourite games was to sneak 
into the Foreign Exchange Shops, shops that sold rare and hard to find goods for 
foreign currency. They were for foreigners, as there were many legal restrictions for 
Mozambicans regarding the possession of foreign currency. As I was told that while 
the shops would not be all that impressive now, they were a cornucopia of goods in 
this era. Children would gaze longingly at ice cream displays before being chased out 
by guards. It was not always light-hearted though; the husband of the family with the 
photo album was briefly imprisoned when he tried to buy milk from a foreign 
exchange store for his sick child with 20 US Dollars.  
 Shortages went beyond foodstuffs; almost all consumer goods were difficult 
to obtain. In certain parts of the country, the monthly wage of an industrial worker 
was a shirt, and this was considered a decent wage, as they were impossible to find 
and could easily be bartered (Finnegan 1992). The rational behind the socialist 
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programme espoused by Frelimo was that it would modernise the nation and bring 
prosperity. Thus a new and modern Mozambique would serve an assertion of equality 
with the rest of the world. Instead the economy was ruins, as all of the party’s 
previous economic mistakes had now been compounded by an incredibly destructive 
civil war. Access to rare consumer goods increasingly became a mark of distinction 
for the elites, as they were among the few who had the ability and the social 
connections to obtain them and even then in limited supply. I was told that the 
Maputo airport would take on the appearance of a street market when those who had 
been visiting relatives in Portugal returned laden with consumer goods. Furthermore 
for the young, when anyone was returning from a trip abroad one made sure to bring 
many copies of cassettes of popular music. With those one enjoyed great esteem 
amongst one’s friends. Access to rare consumer goods, while bringing esteem, could 
also be dangerous and inspire jealousy, I was told of one example where an 
informant’s mother was denounced to the police when a schoolteacher noticed that 
her daughters were wearing high quality shoes that could not be obtained normally 
and must have come from the black market.  
 Since the end of socialism the shops in Mozambique have gradually 
replenished their stock. During the time of my fieldwork, from 2002 to 2004, I was 
amazed by how many boutiques were opening on the main streets. The streets were 
clogged with new model 4x4s and there is even a café that specialises in crepes. The 
prosperity brought by capitalism is only enjoyed by a select few, but the shortages of 
the past no longer apply to elites, and they are free to engage in modern consumer 
capitalism. Despite this relative abundance, the social meaning of consumption as a 
marker of modernity has probably increased. In today’s neo-liberal dominated world, 
levels of consumption often serve as a benchmark of modernity. In an example that 
probably just about every African abroad has encountered, a Mozambican friend, who 
had grown-up in the capital, was once telling me about a trip he had taken to Sweden. 
He was both amused and insulted by the questions posed to him by Europeans who 
were raised on a steady diet of National Geographic Magazine. He was frequently 
asked if his country had cars and electricity, or if he had any experience with wild 
animals and hunting. Another Mozambican friend who worked at the US Embassy 
related to me with amused disgust stories of new American officials who arrived in 
Maputo with a year’s worth of toilet paper and canned food, convinced that these 
items would not be available in Mozambique. She told me that one of the Marines 
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who works as an embassy guard had mentioned to her that he had thought that he 
would spend his time in Mozambique living in a tent and that the embassy would 
have been a much bigger tent. She could not understand why Mozambique is still 
considered a hardship posting when, if one has a steady salary life is actually quite 
pleasant in Maputo.  
While the examples given above may seem just another in a long list of 
instances demonstrating western ignorance, cultural arrogance and the enduring 
power of colonial stereotypes, I posit that one of the many reasons elites found this 
insulting is that it denied the notion of modernity that has so long been the ideological 
underpinning of their social position. The ability to access this ideal of modernity is 
both the cause and the effect of the elite’s privileged place in society. This ideal of 
modernity is not simply displayed at elite parties, but in all aspects of life. While 
Mozambique may not be the centre of the global economy, through a specific mode of 
consumption, elites can still access the attributes of modernity and demonstrate their 
equality with the wider world. This can be seen in the imported clothes from Brazil, 
South Africa and Europe that the elites wear, the cars they drive, the small, expensive 
cell phones, often around twice the monthly wage of an urban worker, and the ability 
to spend half of the monthly salary of the average domestic worker at lunch in one of 
the many restaurants and cafes where the elite spend their leisure time.
54
 The patterns 
of expenditures had become marks of elite status. Families usually paid for their 
children to study abroad, in the case of the UK this would average between £3000 and 
£9000 a year in tuition alone. Even for less expensive universities such as those in 
South Africa, families would usually spend between £2000 and £3000 per year for 
tuition and living expenses. These patterns of expenditure were reproduced in 
Mozambique as well. Elites would purchase their cars in South Africa, where they are 
cheaper than in Mozambique, but still averaging around £4000, a sum it would take 
the average worker years to earn. The entrance fee to the discos frequented by young 
elites had a cover charge of around three or four pounds, between two and three times 
the daily wage of an urban worker.  
These patterns of consumption and expenditure are part of elite self-image. As 
shown by Baudrillard: “Consumption no more homogenizes the social body than the 
education system homogenizes cultural opportunities, it even highlights disparities 
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 For example, the empregada (maid) at my house earned around £20 a month, which was considered 
a good salary. The minimum wage for an industrial worker was about £30 per month. 
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within it” (1998: 58). The patterns of consumption among elites display their 
modernity, which, ideally, justifies their status.
55
 Elite privilege is demonstrated 
through a mode of consumption that helps to create what Bourdieu termed 
“distinction” (1984). For Bourdieu: 
 
…social status involves practices which emphasize and exhibit cultural distinctions and 
differences which are a crucial feature of all social stratification…Status may be 
conceptualised therefore as lifestyle; that is, as the totality of cultural practices such as 
dress, speech, outlook and bodily dispositions…While status is about political entitlement 
and legal location within civil society, status also involves, and to a certain extent is, style 
(Turner, quoted in Jenkins 1992: 130). 
 
The patterns of elites’ consumption and self-presentation, or “style” demonstrate 
their modernity and its inherent social power both to the wider population and abroad. 
The elite are not simply flaunting their wealth but showing their privileges exist 
because they are the only ones capable of running the country and the economy. The 
meaning of the symbolism of status is not unrecognised by members of the wider 
population. Although they may dispute the justification of the elites’ social position, 
they understand how certain forms of consumption demonstrate social power. Once in 
a café I was approached by a Mozambican man who felt as a foreigner I was duty 
bound to help him find external funding for his revolution against the unjust state of 
affairs that currently exist. When I asked him what the outcome of his revolution 
would be, he smiled and replied: “I will be the one driving the Mercedes”. Although 
this man was decrying an unjust state of affairs, he was also operating under a similar 
logic as displayed by elites. He made no arguments about a form of redistribution, but 
instead argued that as a foreigner I should recognise that the markers of modernity 
and social power (i.e. a Mercedes, the car issued to government Ministers) are being 
held by the wrong people. His revolution would make sure these objects were 
possessed by the “proper” people, i.e. him. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
 Throughout this chapter I have examined how the social power and status of 
the revolutionary and independence elites in Mozambique has been closely tied to 
their relationship with modernity. While these incarnations of modernity have 
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 This is often deeply contested though and is examined in more depth in Chapter Five. 
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undergone significant changes since independence, one continuity is that, unlike 
recent academic trends of multiple or alternative modernities, in Mozambique it is 
conceived of as universal, hierarchical and linear. Thus some nations, and some 
groups of people within nations, are ahead on the scale of modernity and others are 
behind. After the revolutionary elite won independence, there was an attempt to create 
a nationalist modernity, which through heroic effort and mass mobilisation that would 
transform the nation and bring the population to the level of modernity already 
achieved by the revolutionary elite. After the failure of this vast effort, the form of 
modernity epitomised by the independence elite was more personal and technocratic. 
Instead of the leadership acting as a beacon to lead the nation on the way to progress, 
modernity became more of a distinguishing feature of the elite, with progress for the 
nation pushed away to the distant future. One of the primary mediums for transmitting 
the values of changing forms of modernity is through education. In this sense, 
modernity both structures and is structured by changing forms of education. 
Stemming from the cultural mores associated with education, elites have developed a 
“distinction” buffered by modes of self-presentation and specific patterns of 
consumption, which not only distinguish them from the wider population of their own 
country but act as an implicit statement of equality with powerful outsiders.  
 In the following chapter I examine in more depth how elites’ ideology of 
modernity effects their conceptions of the wider population within Mozambique 
through the discourse of race. As with the ideology of modernity itself, the elites’ 
discourse of race has its roots in the social experiences of the colonial period, but has 
undergone a continuous evolution through the liberation struggle and the 
independence period. I specifically examine the connections between race and the 
wider project of modernity.    
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Chapter Four 
 
Race and Elites in Mozambique 
 
“Not so very long ago, the earth numbered two thousand million inhabitants: five hundred 
million men, and one thousand five hundred million natives” (Jean-Paul Sartre, in Frantz 
Fanon’s “The Wretched of the Earth” 1963: 7). 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
During fieldwork I was often struck by the contradictory way in which the 
independence elite in Maputo would speak about race. I frequently heard that racism 
was a growing problem in Maputo. This caused concern as many elites were proud of 
the non-racial ideals that Frelimo had championed; and many held Mozambique as a 
model of tolerance in comparison to neighbouring South Africa. Still people made 
frequent comments about other racial groups, ranging from casual joking to the truly 
venomous. For example, I was once told by a Mozambican of Indian descent that the 
problem with black people is that their hearts are as black as their skin. At certain 
White and Indian social gatherings one could easily forget that Mozambique’s 
population was predominantly Black, as the gatherings seemed to demonstrate the 
opposite. Yet when racially “mixed” social gatherings occurred, people mingled with 
ease. People of different races had known each other since childhood and were often 
related to each other as well. Elite bars and discos were usually quite integrated with 
all groups cheerfully chatting and dancing together. In fact it was not uncommon to 
hear people in mixed groups make apparently derogatory remarks about race that did 
not seem to cause any offence but rather prompted hilarity. Almost no one, regardless 
of background, used the word negro (black person), but instead always used the more 
pejorative preto (literally the colour black, derogatory when used for a person). 
Relatively early in my fieldwork I was speaking to a black friend, who in the past, had 
made bitter remarks concerning the ways in people of Portuguese and Indian descent 
treat black Mozambicans. During our conversation I told her of some negative 
remarks I had previously overheard some white Mozambicans make about black 
people. To my surprise, instead of being offended she started to laugh. When I asked 
her why she replied: “Admit it, you know it’s true”. At the time I thought this implied 
an acceptance of inferiority on her part. As I spent more time in Maputo I realised that 
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her response was symptomatic of a wider, and to me at least, seemingly contradictory 
understanding of race. 
Elements of this racial discourse seemed to expand beyond their original 
meaning and to permeate the way in which relationships of status and power were 
expressed between members of both the independence and revolutionary elite and the 
wider population. On occasions this happened to such a degree that it almost appeared 
as if the members of the black elite who had gained their dominant position through 
the liberation struggle had taken on some of the practises held by the former 
colonisers. An example of this occurred when I was driving with a black friend, João, 
a member of the independence elite, to a country house he had in Namaacha, about 60 
kilometres outside the capital. Namaacha is an old colonial town nestled in the 
mountains near the border with Swaziland. It was a popular vacation spot with the 
Portuguese during the colonial period, as it is much cooler than the coast. It is a 
beautiful town whose colonial architecture managed to survive the civil war largely 
unscathed. My friend’s father had acquired a factory and a house from a former 
colonialist. The house was a large bungalow on two to three hectares of land. João 
proudly demonstrated how he was going to rip out the maize the caretakers had 
planted and add a swimming pool and a tennis court. We went around the back to a 
collection of ramshackle huts, where the caretakers lived. My friend had bought some 
boots to give to one of the caretakers. The caretaker was not in and his wife came out 
to greet us. She referred to my friend as patrão (master). João absent-mindedly 
handed her the boots while relaying orders for what needed to be done around the 
house and she knelt, bowing her head and putting her hand under her elbow, 
supporting the arm (a gesture of respect) to receive the boots, even though she was his 
senior by about 20 years. I thought she must have acted in a similar way for the 
Portuguese colonialist who formerly lived there. Later over gin and tonics my friend 
explained to me that the advantage of living in the UK, in his opinion, is a highly 
stratified class system where everyone knows their place and what is expected of 
them. It seemed he had not noticed the deference shown towards him, and had failed 
to recognize that his remarks about stratification and hierarchy were equally 
applicable in Mozambique. . 
Throughout the day I kept thinking about the scene of a woman in late middle 
age bowing before a 30 year old man. I had seen countless similar scenes during 
fieldwork. These, while they struck me as seemingly neo-colonial, went unnoticed by 
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everyone else.  In everyday practise they were completely banal for the independence 
elite.
56
 I then began to realise that, contrary to my friend’s remarks about the UK, 
independence elite racial discourses did describe a system of social stratification with 
strong class overtones. When they spoke about “Blacks” their remarks presumed 
equivalence between blackness and low social status: their remarks about “Blacks” 
were referred not to themselves but to others.  
Independence elite racial discourse is not directly reducible to class position 
though. In certain situations racialised stories also purport to describe the “defining 
traits” of various groups, even ones of comparatively high status. Once, when relaxing 
at a cafe with two black friends who were members of the independence elite, a 
mutual acquaintance, who is a Mulatto, came up to show off his new mobile phone. It 
had a colour screen and a camera and a range of games including “Battleship”. 
Phones with all of these accessories were relatively uncommon at the time, and 
mobile phones in general were prestige items. After he had left, both of my friends 
started to laugh. I asked why and they said: “Oh, that guy, he is a classic mulatto”. 
When I asked what that meant they replied by telling me a joke. “A mulatto guy wins 
a contest and he is given a choice, he can have a Mercedes and a gold chain for a 
week, or a free, all-expenses paid, trip around the world. The Mulatto says give me 
the car and the chain, and the announcer of the contest asks if he is sure, he can only 
have them for a week. The Mulatto says I know, but if I take the trip no one will know 
about it, but everyone in my neighbourhood will see me driving around in the car with 
the gold chain”. This stereotypical portrayal dovetails neatly with widely-held ideas 
about the place of Mulattos in the post-independence elite hierarchy. While Mulattos 
in general are disproportionately represented in the elite, they often hold mid-level 
positions and enjoy the trappings of power although it is less common for them to be 
able to enter its highest echelons and wield “real” power.57 Thus my two friends were 
referring to a commonly held attitude that mulattos in general tended to prefer style 
over substance, the symbolism of power over its actual exercise.  
As well as being contradictory, racial discourse in Mozambique is shifting and 
unstable. One heard frequent expressions of pan-racial solidarity when various elites 
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 There appear to be differences in the conceptualisation of race between the ways in which members 
of the revolutionary and independence elites and members of other high-status groups, such as 
members of the Indian merchant class. This will be mentioned later in this chapter but an in-depth 
examination is beyond the scope of my analysis.  
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 There are of course exceptions to this general rule. For instance during the socialist period the 
position of Vice-President of Frelimo was held by Marcelino Dos Santos who is of mulatto descent. 
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recalled instances of racism they had suffered in their personal lives. Yet even 
solidarity could be inscribed with racial difference. A friend from an 
Indian/Mozambican family told me a story about the racism of South Africans. She 
was enraged when at a petrol station, a South African tourist had told her children: 
“Let the kaffir (an extremely pejorative Afrikaans term for black people) go first,” as 
they queued for the toilet, assuming my friend did not speak English and could not 
understand what they were saying about her. She used this example to explain how 
racism was much worse there than in Mozambique, but she ended her story by saying: 
“anyway, why kaffir? I am not black, I am coloured”!58 One could also hear examples 
of negative solidarity, such as the example quoted in Chapter Three from the 
informant who declared: “We Blacks are two hundred years behind”, or when one 
asked about corruption, why people were late, or why something did not work, a not 
uncommon joking reply was a cheerful shrug of the shoulders and the statement “Oh 
you know us Blacks/Africans”.  
When the independence elites talked about race, it often had multiple 
meanings depending on who was being spoken about. Race for my informants was 
often drawn from a larger idiom that originated in the colonial period and was used to 
express social difference, not just among Blacks, Mulattos, Indians and the 
Portuguese, but also, between members of the colonial elite and the larger population. 
Thus assimilados would often use the idiom of race to draw social distinctions 
between the “savagery” of the majority of the population and their mastery of 
European “civilisation”. In the current era this discourse, although greatly changed 
over the course of time, fulfils a similar function in demonstrating the “cosmopolitan 
modernity” of the independence elites in contrast to the “backwardness” of the 
general population.  In turn various non-elite groups, both then and now, point to the 
racially mixed nature of the revolutionary and independence elites and use the idiom 
of race to cast them as foreign parasites that were exploiting them. One of the most 
common examples of this appeared in numerous conversations concerning the 
privatisation period. I was frequently informed that during socialism Indians had 
dominated the Ministry of Finance. Supposedly during privatisation Indian employees 
of the Ministry had used their connections to take over various economic enterprises 
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 This conversation took place in English, which is I why I think my friend used the common South 
African term for a person of mixed descent, although it is interesting she did not at this time identify 
herself as Indian, perhaps because she more resembles a Mulatto and was referred to as one while 
residing in South Africa. 
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and basically rob the state and its people of their patrimony. Frelimo had stressed non-
racialism as a way of uniting the various ethnic and racial groups of Mozambique into 
one national identity. This had been re-interpreted by some members of non-elite 
groups as giving the opportunity, often in return for bribes, for corrupt groups of 
dubious national loyalty to enrich themselves at the expense of the nation.   
As I mentioned earlier in the section, the racial discourse of independence 
elites had a strong class component and it can be tempting for the analyst to reduce it 
to a coded way of speaking about class differences. This situation is not unique to 
Mozambique. Posel warns about a tendency in Southern African anthropology and 
other social sciences to “reduce racial identities to mere effects of class position” 
(1999: 101). Outside of the African context there has been a tendency to see a more 
totalising model of race as the norm. A prime example of this is the racial model 
usually ascribed to the United States, where race is thought to be based strictly on 
descent and is one of the major factors in determining ones place on the social 
hierarchy (Wade 2002: 123). Thus nations with a more fluid concept of race are 
judged to be “less racist” over all. A prime example of this is Brazil, which is often 
referred to as a “racial democracy” as racial categories are thought to be superficial, 
based on changing gradients of appearance and “really” refers to class position (ibid). 
Members of the independence elite often use a similar argument, stating that because 
their system is more fluid they are not really racist, South Africans are. Wade makes a 
convincing case that many manifestations of racism contain elements that are more 
fluid and class based and totalising at the same time. The problem with much of the 
analysis of race, according to Wade, is that it tends to follow the dichotomies inherent 
in the Brazil vs. the US model of class vs. descent. “The phenomenon has been placed 
in a debate about the theoretical and empirical relations between race and class, rather 
than in a consideration of how racialised phenotypes are constructed differently in 
different regions” (Wade 2002: 5). 
In this chapter I attempt to follow Wade’s insight by examining how racial 
discourses are specifically constructed by the elites in Mozambique. For the 
independence elite race is a way of expressing social difference that is intimately tied 
to existing power structures, yet also variable and situational. The racial discourse of 
the independence elite does tend to follow class lines in the ways in which it separates 
the black elite from “poor blacks”. This is often how it is understood by members of 
the independence elite, I was quite bluntly told by one young woman that in 
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Mozambique when people talk about race they are talking about class differences: 
“You hear it all the time, when people talk about race they really mean poor people”.  
In situations like this high status black people could enjoy derogatory remarks about 
Blacks made by other racial groups, as they knew these remarks did not refer to them. 
But racial discourse is also situational and in almost the same breath can be used to 
describe the negative character traits of members of high status groups during intra-
elite squabbles. For Wade racial discourse, despite its ability to be fluid and totalising 
at the same time, is still based on local ideas of biology. 
 
 … if the (apparent) specificity of “nature” or “biology” is abandoned to include cultural 
racism, it becomes increasingly hard to see what racism is, as distinct from other forms of 
discrimination. Class discrimination would be classifiable as racist if “socially inherited 
characteristics” or difference in a “culturalist idiom” were the defining feature (2002: 8). 
 
The vocabulary of racial discourse in Mozambique can take on seemingly biological 
connotations. Yet local ideas of biological difference are rarely the reason for social 
or racial difference given by members of the independence elite. After years of anti-
racist Marxist indoctrination, most explanations for the causes of social and racial 
differences are based on history, patterns of behaviour and the groups’ relationship to 
Mozambique’s power structure independent of biology and descent. This is far more 
obvious when examining the descriptions given by black elites for lower status 
Blacks. In Mozambique racial discourse provides a ready vocabulary of difference 
that has been expanded beyond biology, as noted by Balibar: “… culture can also 
function like a nature, and it can in particular function as a way of locking individuals 
and groups a priori into a genealogy, into a determination that is immutable and 
intangible in origin” (1991: 22, original italics).     
This chapter argues that the racial discourse of the independence elite has 
elements that are both totalising and fluid. It is totalising to the extent that 
independence elites tend to think that as “modern” and educated urbanites they are 
fundamentally different from much of the wider population, especially the peasantry. 
Yet this sense of difference is based on history, not biology, which allows elements of 
fluidity. A peasant is not a genetic category and can change over time. In addition, the 
status of being an educated urbanite does not necessarily exempt one from being 
included in negative racial categories. This discourse is not an entirely new creation 
but both a continuing outgrowth of earlier elite ideologies and a response to the 
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changing social conditions following the introduction of capitalist democracy. To 
understand how racial discourses in Mozambique have taken their shape we must 
trace their genesis and evolution through the colonial period and socialism.  
 
4.2 Colonial Influence on Elite Racial Discourse 
 
In this section I examine the effect of colonialism on racial discourses. I start 
by discussing an author who was extremely influential among the revolutionary elite, 
Frantz Fanon, and how they re-interpreted his writings to re-form some of the 
divisions inherited from colonialism. Frantz Fanon, one of the prophets of the anti-
colonial movement, investigated the subjective effects of colonial racism on 
populations suffering colonial occupation. A psychologist by training, Fanon 
described how indigenous cultures, in his view, inevitably began to crumble under 
foreign onslaught and the colonised populations internalised racist ideologies and 
identified with the dominant culture of the colonial state (1967). Fanon was 
particularly worried about the role of African elites.  Having been educated under the 
colonial system, he felt they would equate civilisation with the metropolitan culture 
and view the masses of their own populations as ‘backwards’ (1963, 1967). This was 
an accurate characterisation of the positions of various African elites, such as early 
elites in Lagos, Nigeria, where a small group of elites who had embraced Christianity, 
gained access to education, and managed to use their closeness with the colonial 
rulers and their mastery of aspects of colonial culture to create a local power base 
(Mann 1985). Fanon’s account was equally applicable to assimilados in Mozambique. 
Yet the question of how to counter this kind of slavish imitation was not easy to 
answer. Fanon felt that the cultural revival of pre-colonial forms would be pointless. 
These forms had been corrupted beyond repair and were in reality simply another 
form of “mystification”.  To revive them would be to lull the masses with past glories 
yet to leave them trapped in colonial, or neo-colonial relations (ibid). Fanon theorised 
that the only way to create a new and viable form for colonised countries was through 
the purifying violence of a liberation struggle. Only then would a new and free 
national culture be born (Wolf 1973). 
 
During the struggle for freedom, a marked alienation from these practices (traditional 
beliefs) is observed. The native’s back is to the wall, the knife is at his throat (or, more 
precisely, the electrode at his genitals): he will have no more call for his fancies. After 
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centuries of unreality, after having wallowed in the most outlandish phantoms, at long last 
the native, gun in his hand, stands face to face with the only forces which contend for his 
life – the forces of colonialism. And the youth of a colonised country, growing up in an 
atmosphere of shot and fire, may well make a mock of, and does not hesitate to pour 
scorn upon the zombies of his ancestors, the horses with two heads, the dead who rise 
again, and the djinns who rush into your body while you yawn. The native discovers 
reality and transforms it into the pattern of his customs, into the practice of violence and 
into his plan for freedom (Fanon 1963: 45).   
 
Therefore, according to Fanon, the only way that the negative effects of colonial 
racism could be overcome is the creation of a new national culture that is constructed 
through protracted independence struggles. Influenced by Fanon as well as bringing to 
bear their own set of experiences, the leadership of Frelimo felt that this was the only 
way to create a nation from the brutalised and fractured society that had been created 
by Portuguese colonialism. Yet the underlying theme of these ideas is an ideal of 
“modernisation”. The goal is to move beyond the pre-colonial past and beat the 
Europeans at their own game, as shown by Nandy: “Let us not forget that the most 
violent denunciation of the West produced by Frantz Fanon is written in the elegant 
style of a Jean-Paul Sartre” (1988: xii). Nandy further points out that the great evil of 
colonialism, in his view, is that it creates a culture in which the oppressed are 
constantly tempted to strike back within the parameters of colonial culture (1983). For 
Nandy: “Colonialism is first of all a matter of consciousness and needs to be defeated 
ultimately in the minds of men” (Nandy 1983: 63). While the Frelimo leadership was 
aware of this, they perhaps underestimated how deep its effects could be. The society 
Frelimo wanted to build, based upon the “Novo Homem” (new man), held legacies 
from the colonial past that were internalised in the structures that they themselves 
created. While the party was committed to ending the system of racial privilege that 
existed in the colonial period, echoes of colonial ideas of superiority reappeared in the 
post-colonial society. 
 Racial ideologies, both those in colonial settings and those stemming from the 
metropole, take many different forms throughout history. Foucault places the 
beginnings of the modern form of racism at the end of the feudal period in Europe 
(Stoler: 1995: 64-65). According to Foucault (as read by Stoler), as feudalism ended, 
the myriads of private wars fought by various nobles were subsumed into national 
struggles. Ironically the growth of the “King’s peace” created a permanent state of 
war as now one “people” was set against another (ibid). Yet this was a not a rapid 
development. Racism was initially an aristocratic pastime. In the early colonial 
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period, rank-and-file Europeans often adopted the dress and customs of colonial 
populations, intermarried intensively and recognised their offspring (Stoler: 1995, 
1997). The situation began to change with the rise of the bourgeoisie in Europe; and 
the growing acceptance of ideals of “universal rights of man”. Within this conception 
lay a paradox though, and entire sections of humanity were declared subhuman to 
explain why the “rights of man” did not apply to them (Cooper 1997, 2000; Cooper 
and Stoler 1997; Stoler 1995, 1997). The new type of racism, the so-called “scientific 
racism”, came to fruition in the 19th Century, forming a “transitional moment”. For 
the new colonial bourgeoisie, it was not only colonial subjects who were seen as 
potential agents of “pollution”. Those who blurred boundaries, such as “educated 
natives”, mixed-race colonial subjects, and citizens of the metropole who had been 
born in the colonies and who were potentially prone to “backsliding” into native 
habits, were all viewed with alarm. 
 In Mozambique these anxieties were expressed in the rhetoric of assimilação. 
In the beginning of the 20
th
 Century, the more “open” colonial society came under 
growing pressure to promote white supremacy. As will be demonstrated later in the 
chapter, assimilados, Mulattos, and Segundos (white Portuguese who were born in 
Mozambique and therefore ineligible for the highest colonial positions) were 
gradually but steadily disenfranchised. The older form of social advancement for 
Mozambican elites, assimilação, the ability to develop Portuguese cultural attributes 
for social advancement, rang increasingly hollow. While the transitional moment for 
mainstream European racial ideologies may have been in the late 19
th
 Century, for 
Mozambican elites disgruntled by the growing permanence of their inferior social 
status under the Portuguese, this transition truly began during the liberation struggle 
and came to fruition though the transition to socialism. Modern elite racial ideologies, 
although derived in part from older ones, began to take their current shape. 
In Mozambique, the legacy of racial discourses began to openly reappear after 
the fall of socialism. In a recent article, Bridget O’Laughlin (2000) recounts some of 
the difficulties Frelimo encountered as they tried to refashion the socialist constitution 
for the new political order. One of the major problems was citizenship. The previous 
constitution had been unitary and inclusive. Given that the vast majority of the 
population is Black African, but there is a minority of European, Indian and Mulatto 
descent who often wield disproportionate economic and bureaucratic power, there 
were serious questions about whether a unitary and inclusive model should continue 
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to be employed. The question before the party was whether citizenship should be 
limited to those of “Mozambican origin” and what exactly that meant. One argument 
that was advocated by Hami Thai: “member of parliament and the political bureau of 
the ruling Frelimo party, a general, and veteran of the national liberation struggle” 
(O’Laughlin 2000: 5). He stated that: 
 
If I were to define who is of Mozambican origin, I would put it this way: the original 
Mozambican is anyone who in the colonial period was known as a native (indígena). Of 
Mozambican origin is anyone who in the colonial period paid the hut tax. Of Mozambican 
origin is anyone whose ancestors or descendents were deported to São Tomé and Príncipe, 
to Angola and to other unknown places. And I would say more, of Mozambican origin are 
all those who did forced labour (chibalo), all those who after Gungunhana’s defeat in 1895 
were deported with him to Fourth Island or Third Island or whatever it was exactly, to die 
there far away, separated from their wives, never more to father children of Mozambican 
origin (O’Laughlin 2000: 6).59 
 
Thai’s response is unusual in at least two respects. Firstly, Thai’s definition of 
who should be a Mozambican national is not based strictly on geography, or even 
nation of origin in the extreme case, but on descent, labour and former colonial 
categories. In the second case Thai’s response, if taken to its logical extreme, has the 
potential to exclude former assimilados and those from other racial groups who were 
exempted from many of the forms of oppression he describes. In effect Thai was 
asking politbureau and Central Committee members, many of whom have assimilado 
or mixed race backgrounds, to declare themselves as foreigners. Perhaps this is why 
Thai’s argument did not carry the day.  
The dual role of the elite as a colonial creation yet the overthrower of the 
colonialist regime exemplifies the ambiguity of racial discourses in Mozambique. 
Although Frelimo overthrew the colonial regime and promised a non-racial, unitary 
future, the gap between rhetoric and practise remains and is perhaps increasing as the 
formerly socialist revolutionary elite consolidates its power and privileges. As noted 
by Wallerstein, former colonial categories of race linger in the construction of 
divisions in post-colonial Africa (1991: 123). While the discriminatory legislation of 
the colonial regime has been abolished, elites continue to use a discourse of race that 
began in the colonial period to express their class difference, modernity, and ability to 
rule over the larger population.  
                                                 
59
 As mentioned in Chapter Two, Gungunhana is the former ruler of the Gaza Empire who was later 
lionised as an early resistance hero by Frelimo due to his ill-fated war against the Portuguese. 
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The remainder of the chapter investigates how a specific racial discourse was 
formed in the colonial period. I then examine how the transition to socialism became 
the “defining’ moment for the elite conception of race. Finally I discuss how a 
shifting discourse of race has to come to inform the way current elites express 
difference and superiority. 
 
4.3 The Colonial Ideal of Race 
 
 In the volume “Tensions of Empire” Stoler (1997) describes the very specific 
place of mixed race Indo-Europeans in Dutch colonial rule and the terrific effort and 
anxiety that was attached to determining who was “Indo” and what their place in the 
empire would be. 
 
In 1884 legal access to European equivalent status in the Indies required a “complete 
suitability (...) for European society,” defined as a belief in Christianity, fluency in spoken 
and written Dutch, and training in morals and ideas. In absence of an upbringing in Europe, 
district authorities were charged with evaluating whether the concerned party was “brought 
up in European surroundings as a European” But European equivalency was not simply 
granted on the display of a competence and comfort in European norms. It required that the 
candidate “no longer felt at home” (…) in native society and have already “distanced” 
himself from his native being (…). In short the candidate could neither identify nor retain 
inappropriate senses of belonging or longings for the milieu from which she or he came. 
The mental states of potential citizens were at issue, not the material assets alone. Who 
were to be the arbitrators? Suitability for which European society and to which Europeans? 
The questions are disingenuous because the coding is clear: cultural competence, family 
form, and a middle-class morality became the salient new criteria for making subjects, 
nationals, citizens, and different kinds of citizens in the nation-state (Stoler 1997: 216). 
 
There are many similarities in Dutch thinking about Indo-Europeans and the 
Portuguese policy of assimilação (assimilation). As shown in previous chapters 
assimilação became part of the overall ideological basis of Portuguese colonialism in 
that they were bringing the grandeur of European and more specifically Portuguese 
civilisation to the wider world. Assimilação “proved” the non-racial aspect of their 
colonialism as opposed to that of some other European powers. Anyone could join the 
greatness of Portuguese civilisation regardless of colour; all that was necessary was to 
assume Portuguese cultural attributes and to distance oneself from “African” culture. 
Yet this claim was largely false. Assimilação only affected a tiny segment of the 
population and even they continued to deal with racial discrimination and humiliation 
on an everyday basis. 
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 Despite the grand-sounding intentions of assimilação, assimilados occupied 
an ambiguous place in colonial society, like the mixed-race Indo-Europeans Stoler 
spoke of. They were in many ways the middle-men of colonialism. This was 
understood by some assimilados and Portugal’s civilising mission did not impress 
them. They became assimilados for pragmatic rather than more high-minded reasons: 
it made life more bearable and allowed increased opportunities for their children. In 
addition to this pragmatism though, assimilação also operated as a partial entrance to 
modernity and the basis for new forms of identity. Though the origins of assimilação 
were rooted in colonial oppression and came into being as Blacks were increasingly 
losing power and position in the south to newly immigrated Portuguese, it also lay at 
the basis of a new colonial elite with a common language, a growing common identity 
and a sense of grievance against the colonial state.  
In various ways assimilados became a group apart, one that had African roots 
but also was beginning to master the middle-class bourgeois manners of the 
Portuguese elite. Assimilados often held low-level petty-bourgeois positions in the 
colonial administration; they wore European clothes and communicated in 
Portuguese. Portuguese (and increasingly English in some contexts) remains the 
primary language of Mozambican elites today; many among the young cannot speak 
an African language or dialecto (dialect) as they are called in Portuguese. There are 
similarities with other colonial “middle-men”, such as Anglo-Indians.60 Caplan (2001) 
describes how English has remained a status marker in post-colonial India. According 
to Caplan many of his informants, often with a “hint of pride” (2001:9), claim they 
cannot speak or even learn Tamil. The clothes, manner and language of assimilados 
(and Mozambican elites today) were markers of difference showing that they had 
mastered colonial forms and were the “civilised” or “modern” segment of the 
population. 
 Despite their privileges, assimilados were in a vulnerable position in relation 
both to the colonisers and to the rest of the population.  
 
Assimilados were always vulnerable to white tolerance, due in part to their own aspirations 
for equal treatment, and their historical role as a comprador group. Thus, they often found 
themselves the first to be sacrificed to white ambition. They were harassed and humiliated 
by whites and tolerated, distrusted, or despised by other blacks. They were called “pocket 
whites” or “paper whites,” black men who, due to the legal papers they carried in their 
                                                 
60
 For other examples see F. Cooper for the role of colonial “middle-men” in the west African labour 
market (1997, 2000). 
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pockets, were encouraged to identify with whites, as distinct from “natives,” but only when 
it suited white needs. They enjoyed token material benefits as favoured sons, but the 
fragility of their position became increasingly obvious as the century progressed and the 
white population grew (Penvenne 1979: 18). 
 
The increasing numbers of white immigrants in Mozambique and the decline of the 
African elite’s position drew worried responses from the elite from the early 20th 
century onward. Yet the early colonial elite often seemed more upset by the fact that 
Portuguese settlers, especially those who were illiterate and uneducated, denied their 
modernity and civilisation, than by the oppression of African blacks more widely. 
These attitudes can be seen in early editorials in African newspapers decrying 
discriminatory treatment. In subtle ways it seemed that many early assimilados were 
internalising elements of the colonial racial discourse at the same time as they were 
decrying it. 
 
…leave the native in a state of primitive ignorance so that the Negro only serves as manual 
labour under the yoke of the white man, illiterate though he may be, so that the white man 
can honestly issue his whip lashes if the black does not tip his hat or doesn’t stand when 
[the white man] goes by… All this would be tolerable if it were simply the case with bush 
country blacks, but Merciful Lord, this is spreading to the middle classes (quoted in 
Penvenne 1989: 270, italics added)! 
 
As the 20
th
 Century progressed it became increasingly obvious that the Portuguese 
would never accept the Mozambican elite as equals. The more embittered and 
alienated sections of the elite began to see a common cause between themselves and 
the wider population as victims of colonial oppression and humiliation. Newitt 
demonstrates this with wry understatement: “It is difficult not to conclude that the 
New State made a fundamental error in allowing a small assimilado class to emerge 
and then systematically subjecting it to personal humiliation and depressed status 
(1995: 477). 
 This “fundamental error” can be seen in the writings of former assimilados. 
Luis Honwana is the son of Raúl Honwana, a man who has been introduced 
previously in this thesis. As stated previously the Honwana family were assimilados, 
although Raúl became an assimilado for the privileges it bestowed rather than because 
he aspired to the goals of assimilação. Raúl Honwana worked for the colonial civil 
service and the family, while not wealthy, was relatively privileged by African 
standards. In addition to Raúl’s position with the state, the family also owned a small 
freehold farm, livestock, and employed the services of a young African empregada. 
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Luis Honwana wrote a book of short stories where he describes his upbringing in 
colonial Mozambique. Many of his stories describe the racism, brutality and 
humiliation that even Mozambicans from the higher social strata had to endure. In one 
of his most famous stories, “Papa, the snake and I”, Luis recalls the ways in which the 
racial domination at the heart of the colonial system could poison the relationships 
between people in even the most mundane situations. In this case a snake killed a 
white neighbour’s hunting dog.  
 
At that point Senhor Castro’s (the white neighbour) car drew up in front of our house. Papa 
walked up to him, and Mama went to talk to Sartina. I followed after papa. 
‘Good afternoon, Senhor Castro…’ 
‘Listen, I have just found that my pointer is dead, and his chest is all swollen. My natives 
tell me that he came howling back from your house before he died. I don’t want any back 
chat, and I am telling you – either you pay compensation or I’ll make a complaint at the 
Administration. He was the best pointer I ever had.’ 
I’ve just come back from work – I don’t know anything…’ 
I don’t care a damn about that. Don’t argue. Are you going to pay or aren’t you?’ 
‘But Senhor Castro…’ 
‘Senhor Castro nothing. Its 700 paus. And its better if the matter rests here.’ 
‘As you like, Senhor Castro, but I don’t have the money now…’ 
We’ll see about that later. I’ll wait until the end of the month, and if you don’t pay then 
there will be a row.’ 
‘Senhor Castro, we’ve known each other such a long time, and there’s never…’ 
Don’t try that with me. I know what you all need – a bloody good hiding is the only 
thing…’ 
Senhor Castro climbed into his car and pulled away. Papa stayed watching while the car 
drove off. 
‘Son of a bitch…’ 
‘Papa, why didn’t you say that to his face? 
He didn’t answer. (1969: 45). 
 
Later in the story, Luis Honwana sees his father praying and asks why he always 
prays when he is upset. 
 
Papa looked at me as if he were seeing me for the first time, and exploded. “My son, one 
must have hope. When one comes to the end of the day, and one knows that tomorrow will 
be another day just like it, and that things will always be the same, we have got to find the 
strength to keep smiling, and keep saying; ‘This is not important!’ We ourselves have to 
allot our own reward for the heroism of the everyday. We have to establish a date for this 
reward, even if it’s the day of our death! Even today you saw Senhor Castro humiliate me: 
this formed only part of today’s portion because there are many things you didn’t see. No, 
my son, there must be a hope. It must exist! Even if all this denies him, he must exist!” 
 Papa stopped suddenly, and forced himself to smile. Then he added: ‘Even a poor man 
has to have something. Even if it is only hope! Even if it is a false hope!” (1969: 46) 
 
  Although Raúl Honwana describes himself as a poor man in the story, by the 
standards of the time he was quite well off for an African man. Yet in comparison to 
white colonialists he would always be poor and not just in the material sense. Despite 
everything he achieved in his life under colonialism, he would always be of 
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subordinate status to whites, no matter what the papers in his pocket said. This story 
expresses the lie at the centre of assimilação; although he was legally the equal of a 
Portuguese colonialist he could always be reduced to powerless humiliation by a 
passing white’s whim.  
Disillusionment was not confined only to segments of the assimilado colonial 
elite. Senhor Ferrão, is a man of part Goan descent who later became Frelimo’s 
ambassador to the United States, was non-political as a youth but had also formed 
nationalist sympathies due to his experiences with Portuguese colonialists. As a boy 
he had heard the speeches of Nehru about the re-unification of Goa with India. Once 
when he mentioned these speeches to a friend on the street some passing Portuguese 
beat him. Later, in 1961, when the Indian army marched into Goa and re-unified it 
with India, enraged Portuguese colonialists again beat Senhor Ferrão on the street. He 
was lucky, as the colonial secret police then started to round up Indians of Goan 
descent and confine them to camps to await deportation. His family managed to avoid 
that fate. He explained to me that this was when he began to see the strangeness of the 
colonial situation. He told me that other Goans in Mozambique held blacks in 
absolute disdain, but became utterly servile when whites entered a room. He felt that 
this amounted to self-defeating hypocrisy. This and his other dealings with the 
Portuguese convinced him to join the nationalist cause, while the rest of his family 
stayed loyal to the Portuguese. When he came back from the liberation struggle his 
family was preparing to leave Mozambique for Portugal. They were not impressed by 
the fact that he had joined Frelimo, nor were they happy that he had married a mulatta 
woman during the struggle. His sisters regaled him with stories of atrocities 
committed by Frelimo during the liberation (Senhor Ferrão told me none of them 
were actually true) and relatives warned him that his wife would be unfaithful to him. 
“When I told people about my wife an older relative kept making a gesture with her 
two fingers that meant I should be careful because my wife would be unfaithful; she 
said I should be careful because that is what Blacks are like”. This statement 
epitomised the insidious nature of colonial racism for Senhor Ferrão. Goans had also 
been badly treated by the Portuguese and denied equality. But since they were given 
more privileges than the Blacks and allowed to think they were superior instead of 
siding with other oppressed groups, they despised them and sided with their 
oppressor, the Portuguese.  
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 Bitterness among segments of the assimilado population towards the state 
increased as it became obvious that despite the rhetoric of assimilação social 
advancement and equality were blocked to them. During the colonial period they 
found themselves suffering numerous humiliations at the hand of the state. The most 
radical members began to make common cause with the wider population, despite the 
history of ambiguous relations with these people. It was this wider population that had 
suffered so much more under colonial rule. Rural inhabitants had had little access to 
schools and were obliged to participate in forced labour and compulsory cultivation 
under the frequently arbitrary rule of Portuguese appointed “traditional” authorities. 
For those lucky enough to live in urban areas and find work, conditions were also 
grim. “Legally without citizenship and effectively without civil rights, Africans were 
frozen in menial professions with minimum wages, relegated to separate and inferior 
schools, subject to arbitrary beatings, life-long banishment in penal colonies, and 
forced labour on plantations, railroads and docks” (O’Laughlin 2000: 15). By 
capitalising on the widespread atmosphere of discontent, the revolutionary elite was 
able to build the movement that successfully propagated the liberation struggle. After 
independence the racial discourse of the Portuguese and even the previous colonial 
elite had been utterly discredited during the liberation struggle and the ascendancy of 
socialist ideals created a discourse of solidarity. Social differences could not be 
expressed (at least in public) in racial terms. Instead the revolutionary elite adopted a 
discourse of modernism, and although it shared some similarities with the earlier 
discourse of civilisation, there was a major difference. Under socialism, modernity 
would be brought to the entire nation. The ascendancy of this discourse was solidified 
by incidents that occurred shortly after liberation that showed the danger of the 
expressing social difference in racial terms. 
 
4.4 Race and Socialism 
 
 There has been considerable debate about the place of the black bourgeoisie 
under colonialism. Leo Kuper (1965) describes the particular niche that the black 
bourgeoisie in South Africa occupied under apartheid. In comparison with the 
traditional European meaning of the word (since the industrial revolution), which 
conjures images of the owners of capital and the professional classes as stolid, 
conservative and politically powerful, in South Africa and in fact the wider African 
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context under colonialism, it describes those who are allowed to advance into the 
lower and middle levels of the colonial system. Yet those relative advantages 
bordered on meaninglessness in comparison to the privileges of the whites and in light 
of the way the black bourgeoisie continued to suffer discrimination and humiliation. 
Due to the colonial restraints, members of the African bourgeoisie were often 
attracted to radical ideologies of social change. Kuper states that part of the 
peculiarity of the African bourgeoisie is that they were often the focal point of social 
and political change in colonial Africa.  
 
The term bourgeoisie is thus chosen not only to describe the upper occupational 
categories in African society with certain tendencies to class formation but also to 
emphasize in terms of social change and prospective power is their role at the apex of the 
subordinated society. It is their interests which will shape African action and aspirations 
perhaps along evolutionary lines through the raising of the colour bar and progressive 
recognition of achievement. Or the bourgeoisie, thrown back on the African masses by 
the denial of entry into the dominant society, may interact with them to forge a nationalist 
movement with the goal of African domination, in which case the development would be 
from political power to bourgeois property and not from property to power. Or the 
bourgeoisie may be divided, and sections may seek fulfilment in a revolutionary struggle 
aimed at the creation of a socialist state and the destruction of bourgeois property (Kuper 
1965: 8).   
      
Although Kuper was speaking about South Africa in the 1960s, his description is also 
apt for Mozambique. A section of a tiny African elite, which was denied social 
advancement after a point, tried to create a socialist state and crush the remnants of 
opposed bourgeois elements in the settler community. This same revolutionary elite 
later used political power to assume some of the trappings of the old bourgeoisie. 
What initially united this revolutionary group was a sense of grievance about what 
they had suffered under colonialism and a feeling that they could rule the country 
more effectively in the interests of the vast majority of the population.  
 According to Hall and Young (1997: 64-65), the humiliations suffered by the 
embryonic Mozambican elite under colonialism were deeply influential on the society 
that Frelimo tried to build after independence. Although the Portuguese colonial state 
avoided some of the most blatant forms of racism found in the neighbouring states of 
South Africa and Rhodesia, its version of racial prejudice was nonetheless invidious. 
It made its victims experience themselves as its perpetrators. The blending of the 
categories of oppressed and oppressor caused members of the early Mozambican elite 
to feel somewhat complicit in the colonial system. Samora Machel once stated: “The 
colonial bourgeoisie…wanted to mould society to such an extent that it reached the 
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point of forcing a Mozambican to deny his personality, to transform himself into a 
little black Portuguese” (quoted in Hall and Young 1997: 64). The fact that despite all 
this effort on the part of the assimilado, one would still be a second-class citizen at 
best added even more bitterness to an already humiliating situation. The members of 
the colonial elite who became the leadership of Frelimo were left in an uncomfortable 
situation. They venerated western civilisation as they had first hand experience of its 
power and they felt that it was the only way to develop their nation, yet they loathed it 
at the same time as the cause of their humiliation (Hall and Young 1997: 64-65). This 
sense of grievance was strongest amongst the younger more radical members of 
Frelimo, who became dominant in the party as a whole. During the liberation struggle 
this caused great tension between the younger members of Frelimo, led by Mondlane 
and later Machel, and the older members who had a different vision of the nation’s 
future. The radical wing of Frelimo championed non-racialism as part of their wider 
project. Their vision went far beyond just ridding the nation of the Portuguese to 
encompass dramatic transformation. By reaching out to radical Whites, Mulattos and 
Indians they formed a leftwing bloc within the party that took power after the death of 
Mondlane. The sense of racial humiliation suffered by members of the revolutionary 
elite became the basis for the party’s strident non-racialism after independence.  
 Despite Frelimo’s proclamations of non-racialism much of the white 
population in Mozambique eventually fled the country after independence. Part of this 
was due to certain laws that could have been seen to have specifically targeted the 
white population, including those that decreed the nationalisation of businesses and 
properties that were owned by the Portuguese population.
61
 Yet whites were not 
specifically attacked as whites, instead attacks were framed as being against a colonial 
bourgeoisie or capitalist exploiters. The revolutionary government, in a move to 
distance themselves from the past, and due to the disorders that followed 
independence, was rather scrupulous in avoiding the mention of race as a social issue. 
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 The most famous law would be what was known as the 24/20 decree, which stated that any one who 
held a foreign passport would need to take Mozambican citizenship to continue living, working and 
holding assets in the country. If not they would have to leave in 24 hours and they could take 20 kilos 
of goods with them. Many who held Portuguese citizenship were affected, although Frelimo claimed it 
was not a move against whites, but against foreign exploitation. In addition some white property was 
nationalised, primarily real estate, as Frelimo would not allow anyone to own more than two house at a 
time. Most businesses that were nationalised were nationalised because they were abandoned by white 
owners instead of being taken over outright by the state. 
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The events that immediately followed independence reinforced the necessity of 
explaining social difference through the idioms of class and modernity.  
As shown in Chapter Two the Portuguese military, facing collapse due to the 
need to fight three seemingly never-ending colonial wars, rose up and overthrew the 
remnants of the Salazarist system in 1974. The newly empowered Officers Movement 
offered independence to the leading liberation movements in the former colonies. 
When the coup occurred Frelimo’s military forces were based in the north and central 
parts of the country and they had not advanced past the central provinces. Some 
disaffected Portuguese settlers in the south who were opposed to independence sensed 
the power vacuum and revolted against the new authorities, trying to retain control of 
Mozambique or least to keep power from Frelimo. The settler movement was known 
by the acronym FICO, which also means “I stay” in Portuguese.  FICO started a series 
of attacks and took control of the radio station to broadcast their demands. The 
resulting incitements to rebellion influenced the most extreme elements of FICO, 
which started to attack the outlying black suburbs of Maputo. This soon degenerated 
into a killing spree. FICO had badly misjudged the political situation and their own 
power. They had not realised that without the backing of the state, they were likely to 
cause a fierce reaction as anger over the killings combined with long resentments due 
to brutal treatment during colonialism exploded against them. The resulting violence 
caused the deaths of around 9,000 people (Newitt, 1995: 551).  
Frelimo’s presence in the capital was almost non-existent, but the masses 
spontaneously rose against the Portuguese and engaged in bloody street battles to put 
down the Portuguese counter-coup. The attacks against FICO soon spread to 
encompass the white population in general and then some Mulattos and Indians as 
well. In political terms the counter-coup was a disaster for the reactionary settlers. 
They were crushed, and anti-Frelimo black politicians who were seen to support them 
were easily branded as traitors and sent to re-education camps. The masses came out 
to support Frelimo and they even helped to force the hand of the military government 
in Portugal, increasing pressure on them to agree to Frelimo’s demands to transfer 
power to the party as the sole legitimate political force in Mozambique (Hall and 
Young, 1997). Yet it was a somewhat nervous victory for Frelimo as the chaos that 
followed the counter-coup demonstrated how limited their control really was, 
especially in the face of the continuing violence of racial passions amongst the 
population. The following vignettes will show how the experience of the counter-coup 
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was interpreted by three urbanites who were broadly similar in colonial class position 
and in support for Frelimo, but who come from different racial backgrounds. 
 
Roberto 
 
Roberto is a black Mozambican; he came from a relatively affluent family in the 
Inhambane province. He moved to Lourenço Marques as a small child with his family. 
Roberto was 12 years old when the counter-coup began. Like many people in Maputo he 
had only minimal knowledge of Frelimo, both because he was very young and because 
the information blackout about the party had been relatively effective. Despite this he had 
heard bits of Frelimo’s programme from occasional illicit gatherings that played Radio 
Frelimo, and members of his family had told him that Frelimo would come and help the 
blacks. On the day the counter-coup erupted, Roberto was playing football with his 
friends in his bairro, Machava, on the outskirts of Maputo, which was also near the house 
of the headquarters of PIDE (the colonial secret police). During the game Roberto noticed 
trucks full of white people with guns pulling up near where he and his friends were 
playing. Roberto was not overly worried because he knew some of the men and he told 
me that when the shooting started he and his friends were laughing thinking that the 
whites were shooting in the air to scare them. It was not until two of his friends were hit 
that Roberto ran home terrified and told his mother. They waited in the house to see what 
would happen. That evening local groups of Frelimo-sympathising militants started going 
through the African section of town knocking on all the doors and demanding that every 
male above the age of ten must come with them and prepare to defend the area from the 
settler rebels. Roberto ran to his mother and asked if he could go as well, she said yes, if 
he did not they would be doomed. The boys were given two tasks, the first was to hunt 
down collaborators, although Roberto explained to me that most had left the bairro when 
the violence started, and the second was to defend the bairro from attack. I asked him if 
he was scared, he told me although he saw horrible things such as killing and looting in 
fact he was excited, it was his chance to be with the men and do something important. 
The most dangerous activity he was involved in was forming human barriers. Groups of 
militants would line up on the roads and form barriers to stop cars from entering 
Machava, when the car reduced speed due to the pressure of their bodies they would 
overturn the cars and burn them.   
 
The violence was not entirely random. Whites who were well-liked were often spared 
violence and looting. Roberto’s Portuguese godfather had his shop looted, but there was 
strong community pressure to return his goods. Roberto is somewhat ambivalent today 
about the counter-coup. Although it was a terrible time, it was also a great victory, as he 
later explained to me: “This was before the Frelimo army arrived, we won the battle 
ourselves and victory was waiting for them” (Field notes 29 March 2003 and 13 April 
2005 ). 
 
Roberto felt the fighting was traumatic, but it was also a part of the wider 
liberation struggle. It was a victory to be won to protect the fruits of the revolution. 
Residents of the capital lived far from the fighting during the liberation struggle and 
this was their chance to strike a blow for the cause. For other people who were present 
during the fighting the violence was far more ambiguous. For those of mixed race it 
was a terrifying time as both the white population and the black population suspected 
them of disloyalty. The revolution highlighted the uncertain position that those of 
mixed race occupied under Portuguese colonialism. They had privileges denied the 
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vast majority of the population, and that caused resentment at the same time they were 
also discriminated against by the colonial state. They were caught between the 
proverbial “rock and a hard place”. Under continued Portuguese rule they would 
continue to be second-class citizens, but subjected to a “black revolution” they might 
be disadvantaged in new and unpredictable ways. Frelimo may have held a non-racial 
ideology and much of the leadership came from a wide variety of racial backgrounds, 
yet concrete information about the party was often limited, especially in the capital. 
For many the future appeared dangerous and very uncertain. 
  
Rosa 
 
Rosa is a mulatta and was born in Lourenço Marques. She was raised by her mother as 
her father left when she was a small child.  Rosa was six when the counter-coup began. 
She lived in Matola, a bairro outside of Maputo. Her neighbours were an Indian family 
who owned a car and they often gave Rosa a ride to school in the morning because she 
attended the same school their daughter. Her memories of the counter-coup are 
fragmentary, more impressions of violence. There was a bomb that someone had planted 
at her school. She remembers the explosion and how it knocked a wall down. She also 
recalled hearing shooting and that her mother was terrified. As they were mulattos, they 
were at risk from both the white vigilantes and the black reaction as they belonged to 
neither and were suspected of having sympathies for both depending on who was in 
charge of the questioning. The incident most firmly implanted in her mind is of driving 
with her neighbour and his daughter during the battles to put down the counter-coup. 
They were stopped at one of the anti-rebel checkpoints that were appearing at random all 
over the city. One of the cars further up in the queue contained a white man and the car 
was doused in petrol and set alight. There was no way to leave the queue and to do so 
would be certain death so they waited. When the guards approached them they saw an 
Indian man and what they took to be two Indian children and ordered them out of the car 
and took them over to a spot where the guards were performing executions. The father 
was terrified, but neither of the girls really understood what was happening at the time. 
One of the women guarding the checkpoint took pity on them because the girls were so 
young. Although they had never met her before she told the other guards to let them 
through because Rosa was her goddaughter. It was a lie that saved their lives. Rosa was 
traumatised for some time to come and kept dreaming of all the corpses that littered the 
ground around the checkpoint (Field notes 17 October 2004).   
  
As the examples of both Roberto and Rosa demonstrate, although the violence 
was racially based, race relations were not a clear-cut matter. The enemy may have 
been broadly defined as Blacks, Whites, Indians or Mulattos, but individual acts of 
friendship or pity could alleviate the violence. Ties between people, especially in the 
urban areas, cut across communities in complex ways. As shown by Roberto’s 
example and the following one, personal ties and long term co-residence often 
resulted in people being protected from the violence, no matter what their racial 
background was. 
 
Naema 
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Naema came from an Indian family (although her father was white, but she had very little 
contact with him and broadly defines herself as Indian) that was relatively well-off before 
the revolution. Members of her family even lost some of their social standing after the 
consolidation of liberation. Despite this, in the early days of independence Naema was a 
enthusiastic supporter of Frelimo. She was about twelve years old when independence 
happened and the white counter-coup and the black reaction occurred. Although her 
father had been imprisoned for running guns for Frelimo in the mid 1960s and remained 
in prison until after the war and her mother was in difficult financial circumstances, they 
had wealthy relatives in Maputo who took care of them. Their life was relatively 
privileged. Naema, like many young people in Maputo, did not know much about 
Frelimo, but was excited at the prospect of an independent government. Although Naema 
expected the Frelimo government to bring great and positives changes to the lives of the 
people, she remembers the year-long transitional government as a time of fear and 
uncertainty. When the black reaction to the coup started her family became worried about 
their great-aunt who lived in a primarily black bairro on the outskirts of town. Naema and 
her uncle drove into the bairro to bring her great-aunt to the relative safety of the city. 
They got into the neighbourhood without much trouble and their great-aunt was surprised 
to see them. She did not feel that she was in any danger; she had lived in that 
neighbourhood for many years and was well-known. Her neighbours had protected her 
from any of the fighting that occurred. Naema’s uncle was still worried about her staying 
in an area that was primarily black; he did not feel she would be protected for long. They 
eventually convinced her to come along. As they were driving on the road outside of the 
bairro a black “mob” sighted the car and attacked it with stones and sticks. The road was 
littered with debris and the car could not drive very fast. As they pulled away, the patrol 
followed. Naema and her family eventually found refugee at the hospital, which had a 
military guard and managed to keep the “mob” at bay. They had to stay there for 24 hours 
before it was safe to leave (Field notes 7 of July and 8 of November 30 2003 and January 
2004).  
  
 In Naema’s example, her family’s attempts to rescue their great-aunt actually 
put her in greater danger. Ironically she was probably safer in her “black” bairro as 
she was well-known and would be spared from any violence that occurred. While the 
notion of an exception; i.e. “I don’t like blacks except for Jim who is a nice guy”; is 
common to racial discourse the world over, I posit that in Mozambique this was 
especially influenced by the nature of colonial racism. As this chapter has already 
demonstrated, colonial racism in Mozambique had a strong biological component and 
built up rage after independence was directed against broad racial categories. But the 
simple existence of a concept like assimilação, even if it was basically a farce in 
practice, moved the idea of race away from biological difference and pointed towards 
social position. Therefore Naema’s great-aunt was not targeted as an Indian because 
she lived among Blacks and was not thought to “act” like an Indian: i.e. exploitative. 
After the victory of the revolutionary elite and the suppression of the coup the 
outward and biological aspects of racial discourse were banned, but the racialisation 
of social position survived in a new form.   
 The violence of the coup and the counter-coup helped to solidify Frelimo’s 
policies concerning race in the independent state they were going to build. As shown 
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in Chapter Two, these policies began to take their modern shape during the 
revolutionary elite’s struggle against the conservative northern faction of Frelimo 
during the liberation war. These events formed a drawn-out “transitional moment” of 
racial ideologies in independent Mozambique. Although the revolutionary elite had 
worked out their ideas and policies for a unitary non-racial state they still had to 
transmit these values to the wider population. Their previous experience of 
government had been limited to the sparsely populated liberated zones during the 
liberation struggle, and the coup and counter-coup demonstrated that there might be 
considerable resistance as the revolutionary elite attempted to introduce their ideas 
and policies concerning race to the nation at large.  
 Frelimo was taken by surprise by the violence of the coup and counter-coup. 
Their surprise highlighted their lack of control over the nation, as they had to request 
help from Portuguese troops to help put down the disorders. The financial results of 
the violence were also catastrophic, as growing numbers of the white managerial class 
left the country. Frelimo was anxious to assure the remaining Whites, Mulattos and 
Indians that they would be safe, pointing to the fact that many party leaders belonged 
to these populations as well. However, the violence did have beneficial outcomes for 
the party as it helped to rid Frelimo of a segment of the population – conservative 
Portuguese - that was most likely to be opposed to their future programmes. The party 
leadership felt that the majority of the population, peasants, had relatively little idea of 
internal differentiation among the peasantry itself (O’Laughlin, 2000). By stressing 
the leadership’s version of the class nature of colonial oppression as opposed to its 
specific racial aspects, they could try to rally and unify the population by 
downplaying internal differences and could point to the departing Portuguese (and 
any ideas the revolutionary elite claimed were associated with them) as the source of 
all current problems. 
 Yet, the departure of the majority Portuguese did not entirely reassure the 
Frelimo leadership; they still felt surrounded by enemies (Hall and Young, 1997: 52). 
This was due to the weakness of the party at independence, but also to the specific 
type of Marxist class analysis used by Frelimo as a result of their colonial 
experiences. For the revolutionary elite, class, as it expressed itself in public speeches 
or rallies, was more than just a relationship to the means of production. It was also a 
type of moral relationship to the nation (Hall and Young 1997: 65-66). As stated by 
Henriksen: “Frelimo castigates capitalism more as a wicked instinct than as a mode of 
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production” (quoted in Hall and Young 1997: 66). When Frelimo took power they 
were suspicious of urbanites, as urban areas had been outside of their control during 
the liberation struggle. Urbanites were thought to be those who were the most 
influenced by the “decadence” of Portuguese culture, and were potential “class 
enemies” (Hall and Young, 1997: 84). Class enemies and “agents of imperialism” 
were not defined solely by class status, but also by personal behaviour, those who 
used drugs, went about badly dressed or had long hair, criminals, prostitutes, or those 
who wanted higher wages and went on strike were all seen as enemies of the people 
and had to be swept away for the growth of a new and “pure society” (Hall and 
Young 1997: 66). The class struggle was about a relationship to the means of 
production, but it was also defined in terms of those who did not share the party 
leadership’s ideals of modernity. 
 The revolutionary elite harboured deep suspicions concerning the urban 
population, but a shared social background mitigated some of these doubts. The major 
difference between the revolutionary elite and urbanites of a petty bourgeoisie 
background was that the revolutionary elite had been cleansed of their “impurities” 
through the liberation struggle and the others had not. The shared social background 
between urbanites and the revolutionary elite not only gave urbanites the skills 
necessary to take up party posts, but enabled them to understand the nuances of the 
revolutionary elite’s message, as this message grew from shared social experiences.  
 The revolutionary elite had a different view of the peasantry. Although 
peasants were often publicly lauded in Frelimo’s vaguely Maoist rhetoric, in private 
the party tended to view peasants with contempt for their “backwardness”. The 
leadership frequently spoke of the “hut habits” of the peasantry, which they believed 
described the condition of “unrelieved ignorance” that could be found in the rural 
areas (Hall and Young 1997: 84). Urban dwellers may have absorbed the decadence 
of the colonisers, but the peasantry, as it currently existed, was the symbol of 
everything the party felt was wrong with “traditional” African culture. Here one had 
superstition, tribalism, witchcraft, and the oppression of women, everything that had 
to be erased from the new society. The rhetoric is very different, but one can see 
similarities between the ways in which earlier assimilados described “bush blacks” 
and the way the party conceived of the peasantry. The biological elements of racial 
discourse had been banished after Frelimo’s assumption of power, yet the totalising 
manner in which the revolutionary elite conceived of the peasantry grew from earlier 
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racial discourses and in practice took a quasi-racial form. The major difference from 
the more “familiar” Anglo-American discourse of race being that it was thought the 
peasantry could change over time, although in other respects this appears as an 
extension of the concept of assimilação on a far grander scale.   
 In practice those who did not accept Frelimo’s version of modernity and clung 
to “hut habits” were classed as enemies who must be vanquished in the struggle to 
build a nation. Once enemy elements were reformed of impurities or removed, the 
revolutionary elite felt that what remained would constitute a “blank slate” that they 
could build upon, and one of the fundamental goals was to establish unity amongst the 
people. This was a central factor of the non-racialism that characterised the regime, 
the multi-racial make up of the leadership was a demonstration that the party had 
moved beyond racism, tribalism and regionalism and spoke for the entire 
Mozambican people (Hall and Young, 1997: 52, 83).  Yet the official stance of the 
regime meant that continuing problems dealing with race, ethnicity and regionalism 
could not be mentioned in public, and those who did were “reactionaries” trying to 
sow division amongst the people. Paradoxically the inclusionary stance taken by the 
government began to create new enemies, especially after the violence that preceded 
independence. 
 Despite the official non-racial discourse, things worked differently on the 
ground and in private: Race was still a contentious issue. According to Senhor Ferrão, 
a former high-ranking government official with access to private governmental 
discussions, Samora Machel frequently complained in politbureau meetings about the 
impossibility of making any social progress with the bankrupt state and the brutalised, 
uneducated society the Portuguese left him with. In this case Samora Machel’s 
remarks were both anti-peasant and anti-Portuguese. Ironically Samora Machel was 
far more delicate when speaking publicly of the Portuguese, as he knew that his 
remarks could easily lead to another outburst of violence directed at those who 
remained. Residual racial tension existed outside the ranks of the ruling revolutionary 
elite as well. As a young girl Naema was an enthusiastic Frelimo supporter and had 
joined the youth wing of the party shortly after independence. Her mother on the other 
hand remained unconvinced and was having a difficult time adjusting to the growing 
fluidity of formerly fixed social positions. In the early days of the socialist period the 
party demanded that the population participate in voluntary labour on Sundays. It 
usually consisted of the inhabitants of neighbourhood blocks cleaning the streets and 
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sidewalks of their area. Naema always contributed; it was mandatory and she felt it 
was a good idea. Her mother however consistently refused. She balked at the idea of 
doing work usually associated with an empregada, and she did not want to clean for 
the “Blacks” who should, in her mind, be cleaning for her. Another friend of mine, 
Lina, who comes from a mixed Goan and Portuguese background, explained to me 
that in the current era everyone tends to romanticise parts of the socialist period. One 
of the most common statements is that there was no racism during this period. Lina 
feels that is only partly true. Work places and neighbourhoods were mixed, students 
attended mixed schools and children of all backgrounds played together. Yet at the 
same time she remembers black students chasing her sister home trying to pull her 
hair because it was straight. Lina felt that although the socialist period was less 
outwardly racist than the current one, racism still existed and people were still defined 
by the social positions they inhabited during the colonial era. Another informant, a 
mulatta who was a member of Frelimo, recalled being stopped by former Frelimo 
guerrilla soldiers in the street and asked why she was still in the country. When she 
asked a soldier his reason for this challenge, he replied: “Because we fought the 
struggle to get rid of bourgeois like you”. In his mind she was automatically 
bourgeois as a Mulatta. The roots of the post-socialist racialism, with its assertion of 
fundamental difference from the majority of the population and continuing squabbles 
and jockeying for position among the racially mixed elite slowly grew from these 
sources. 
 
4.5 Race and Post-socialism 
 
 In a manner similar to Kuper’s (1965) description of how the African 
bourgeoisie belied its commitment to the status quo by acquiring an insatiable appetite 
for change, Frelimo originally formed itself as a socialist movement with the aim of 
drastically recreating society based on radically egalitarian principals (Pritchard, 
1996, 2002). Although Frelimo’s overall control of Mozambique was somewhat 
tenuous at independence, they enjoyed wide popular support throughout the country 
and there were high expectations of future prosperity among both the revolutionary 
elite and the population. Samora Machel gave speeches about how they would 
dramatically overcome underdevelopment in just ten tears. The revolutionary elite felt 
that they could recreate the new nation by sweeping away what came before and 
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rebuilding it in their ideal of modernity in the foreseeable future. The pursuit of this 
goal was accompanied by frequent attacks against aspects of Mozambican society that 
the leadership felt needed to be destroyed in order for the new society to advance. 
These attacks fit the logic of the revolutionary elite’s totalising and quasi-racial view 
of the peasantry, but instead of transforming them, large sections of the peasantry 
were alienated from Frelimo and this contributed to the civil war (Geffray 1991).  
 As the civil war worsened during the 1980s the economy faced collapse and 
many areas were struck by famine. During the civil war the party’s control over rural 
areas was sporadic at best and they managed to maintain a firm hold only over urban 
areas, where Frelimo generally had the greatest support. After the end of the war 
Renamo managed to poll a surprising amount of support in rural areas of the centre 
and north of the country. Although Frelimo maintained firm support in the rural areas 
of the south, increasing social distance has grown between the party and sections 
wider population, especially the rural majority of the centre and part of the north of 
Mozambique.
62
 This growing distance has been recognised by members of the 
revolutionary elite as well. As the former Frelimo Minister of Finance told me: “What 
we (Frelimo) had in the socialist period to excess, a desire to be with and work with 
the people, is gone now”.  
For Frelimo residents of rural areas are not just the repositories of 
“backwards” traditions that have proven amazingly difficult to dislodge, but in many 
areas of the country they are now also considered receptive to the political opposition. 
But the leadership did not just conceive of the peasantry as a possible site of political 
opposition. The peasantry also provided a mirror in which elites (both revolutionary 
and independence) could define themselves against. In Wade’s study of race and 
ethnicity in Latin America, he argued that popular conceptions of Amer-indians as 
“backwards” and “archaic” in Panama serve the political needs of the state. Thus the 
state can define itself as the opposite, a progressive and civilising force (1997: 92). In 
Mozambique the peasantry, although racially the same as many members of the 
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 It is tempting to see continuing apathy towards the peasantry as following ethnic divisions due to the 
fact that many members of the revolutionary elite come from southern ethnic groups, particularly the 
Shangaan. While there may be an ethnic component to this division, I never heard any reference to it 
during fieldwork from elites. As stated in the introduction to this thesis, aside from being racially 
mixed, many members of the revolutionary elite married women from other ethnics group hailing from 
the north and centre of Mozambique during the liberation struggle. Their children are often “ethnically 
mixed” and most people I knew were proud that they did not regard themselves in terms of ethnicity, 
but as Mozambicans. 
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revolutionary and independence elites, serve a similar purpose. This has most likely 
intensified as new, more personal forms of modernity supplant the former nationalist 
modernity with its focus on mass mobilisation. The modernity the revolution once 
promised to bring to the nation is becoming more the factor that distinguishes the 
independence elite from much of the wider population. The continuing social distance 
between elites and the peasantry also serves a pragmatic purpose. During fieldwork 
around 60% of the government’s budget was foreign aid and the development 
industry was one of the biggest industries in Mozambique, it was also a major 
employer of the independence elite. In some ways the continuing poverty and 
“backwardness” of the majority rural population is the nation’s greatest resource. 
Despite the fall of socialism the peasantry remain a site in need of 
development; and elites, both revolutionary and independence, remain those who will 
bring development, whether it is in just a few years as promised under socialism, or in 
the distant future as with the current era. The elite paternalism evident in the 
colonialist and socialist era still exists today and can sometimes take rather bizarre 
forms. According to interviews with a former Frelimo member who now works on 
land issues, the government’s current plan for the rural areas is to try and dispossess 
the peasantry and create a rural proletariat. In the party’s opinion this would 
modernise not only agriculture, but also the population: they would be drawn into the 
global economy and settled in concentrated areas accessible to the state. In a 
seemingly neo-colonial throwback one minister felt this would also aid the 
“Christianisation” of the population. 
These attitudes of fundamental difference between elites and the peasantry 
have their roots in the previous generations but they are apparent with the 
independence elite as well. Although the differences between elites and the peasantry 
are often expressed in racial terms, as many of the people making the remarks are also 
black it is not seen as real racism. One young member of the independence elite who 
strongly disapproved of this trend still explained to me that since racism in 
Mozambique is based on class it is different from “real” racism. 
 
You know racism in Mozambique is very different. It’s not like South Africa. There if you 
are black you are black. People will say they do not want to talk to you because you are 
black. It’s all very out in the open. In Mozambique it is more about class. It’s like these 
jokes Samito is always telling (a mutual friend and she is referring to racist jokes). 
Everyone always laughs. I said something about it to some friends, but they asked how can 
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Samito be racist if he is black. But it’s not really about colour, it’s an attitude and it’s really 
very patronising (Field notes 4 April 2005). 
 
The racial discourse of independence elites, as explained to me, does not appear to 
have an ideological bedrock in ideas of biological difference. Instead it is concerned 
with behaviours and social position and has its roots in the colonial and socialist 
periods. Blacks are objects of derision for the independence elite when they come 
from social backgrounds that influence them to act like the stereotypical Africans of 
colonialist discourse. 
 But as I mentioned in the introduction of this paper the racial discourse of 
independence elites is variable and situational. As the ban against the open expression 
of racial differences has slipped away after the fall of socialism many pre-existing 
tensions and new ones that have arisen in the capitalist era are now expressed in racial 
terms. This is especially apparent amongst the independence elite since they are not 
bound by the residue of the party discipline of the socialist period and can express 
disagreements openly and publicly. A prime example can be found amongst whites 
from Frelimista families. Although white families generally have a high standard of 
living in Mozambique and white poverty is basically unknown there is a feeling 
among many young whites that they are slowly being pushed out of positions of 
power. There is some truth to this assertion. Renamo has tried to portray itself as a 
“black power” alternative to Frelimo and they pointed to the racially mixed 
membership of the Frelimo government as an example of its elitism and its distance to 
the black majority. Frelimo is sensitive to criticism of this nature and took steps to 
respond. The public face of the Frelimo government during my fieldwork, the 
ministers and vice-ministers, is now predominately black. This does not mean that 
members of the revolutionary elite from other racial backgrounds were expelled, quite 
the contrary. Many willingly left ministerial service to take up positions with aid 
agencies or the private sector, although they have retained their party membership and 
are still members of party policy making bodies, such as the central committee. For 
young whites whose families gave up their Portuguese citizenship to take part in the 
revolution this perceived glass ceiling is still quite galling, even if it has not resulted 
in the loss of material benefits. As a young white man from a well-off Frelimista 
family once told me: “Não sou elite, não sou preto” (I am not elite, I am not black).   
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 There were tensions between different sections of the revolutionary and 
independence elites that were often spoken about it with a racialised vocabulary, but 
these groups also often knew each others’ families and frequently mingled socially. 
The situation between many members of the independence elite and Indians, 
specifically the Indian merchant class was different. There were prominent Indian 
members in the revolutionary elite, but they often came from Goan backgrounds or 
from Indian families that had been in Mozambique for generations and had 
intermarried with members of the local population (although this was not always 
admitted either). Like other members of the revolutionary elite this group tended to 
have backgrounds based in state bureaucracy and professions and came from a similar 
social background.
63
  
The Indian merchant class have long tended to be a group apart. There is a 
history of racial antagonism between the black population and Indians generally and 
the merchant class is also accused of economic exploitation. During the socialist 
period Indian merchants expanded to fill the gap left by fleeing Portuguese merchants. 
This aroused the suspicion of the revolutionary elite because they were trying to 
centralise the economy under the control of the state and independent merchants, 
often with transnational economic links, were suspected of having divided loyalties. 
Frelimo established severe punishments for many forms of independent economic 
activity. It was labelled “economic sabotage”. In practice Indian merchants were often 
singled out under these laws. A former Frelimo cadre told me of his embarrassment 
when he was giving a group of visiting Soviet experts a tour of a communal farm and 
they saw an Indian man tied to a tree being whipped for the crime of smuggling. He 
told me this was not uncommon, but foreigners were not supposed to see it. The 
experts reacted badly: “One of the women in group started to cry and said how could 
you? We have not had this since the time of Tsar”. Another friend told me about the 
father of a mutual acquaintance who was from the Indian merchant class. Her father 
was convicted of black marketeering in 1983 (I was told he was actually guilty). He 
was to be punished publicly. As Mozambique did not have a state television channel 
until 1987 his execution by firing squad was broadcast on the radio.  
These types of punitive measures have been largely abandoned in the post-
socialist period and many Indian merchants have formed partnerships with members 
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 As shown in the introduction of this chapter, this group garners far less trust from elements of the 
wider population. 
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of Frelimo, but distrust remains. Although members of the Indian merchant class can 
command great wealth and work with members of the revolutionary and 
independence elite on occasion, they are very weakly incorporated into the social 
networks of the revolutionary and independence elites. Social differences between 
young members of the Indian merchant class and the independence elite could grow 
into mutual hostility and throughout fieldwork it was the norm for both groups to 
characterise each other negatively. One black friend of mine, Varnya, from the 
independence elite told me this was because Indians (specifically the Indian merchant 
class) are not secure in their social position in Mozambique 
 
I don’t know man, Indians seem like they have to show off. I mean all these Indian families 
have drivers to take them everywhere. They do not have any more money than we do. They 
just have to make a statement. I was at a club recently and I saw an Indian guy bump into a 
black guy. I guess the black guy did not move out of the way quick enough or something 
because the Indian started shoving and a fight broke out. The Indian guy called all his 
friends who immediately backed him up. It did not matter what happened, but because he 
was fighting a black guy they all joined in. They really keep to themselves. Mulattos used 
to be like that a long time ago, but they mellowed out and are not so cliquey anymore. I 
think it is because Indians are insecure. This is not really their home, but they have nowhere 
else to go (Field notes 23-25 June 2003) 
 
Interestingly, Varyna never made similar statement about other groups with foreign 
roots, such as white Mozambicans, not “belonging” in Mozambique. Nor does she 
feel members of the Indian merchant class could return to India: “they have nowhere 
else to go”. It is not through descent that members of the Indian merchant class are 
“quasi-foreign” but because of the ways in which they behave and their ambiguous 
social position. As astutely observed by Stoler earlier in this chapter, race does not 
always act as a marker of biological differences but physical appearance can act as a 
marker of cultural and behavioural differences. This is neatly summed up in a popular 
Mozambican joke concerning Indians. “How can you tell if an Indian is a 
Mozambican or a recent immigrant from Pakistan? If he is sitting at a bar having a 
beer with his wife he is Mozambican, if he is sitting at a bar having a beer with 
another Indian man he is Pakistani”.64 Although the racial discourses of the 
independence elite take on very different forms depending on who one is talking 
about (i.e. peasants or Indians) it rarely makes reference to any ideas of biology or 
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 In Mozambique the word Indian is used to connote anyone of south Asian background regardless of 
the country of origin. 
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descent, but instead to behaviours and social position that are in many ways 
independent of biology or descent. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
 In Mozambique racial discourse is a pre-existing vocabulary used to describe 
categories of social difference that are connected to race but not entirely dependent on 
it. This discourse has its roots in the colonial period. More specifically, it originates 
within the particular form of colonialism practised by the Portuguese and within the 
colonial elite’s role therein. Like all types of colonialism, the practise found in 
Mozambique eventually became legitimised by reference to the supposed racial 
“superiority” of the colonisers. Yet through the institution of assimilação members of 
the indigenous population were able to participate as quasi-equals in colonial society. 
To some degree, they thus became complicit with the system of colonial domination. 
Many assimilados found this complicity deeply humiliating and some distanced 
themselves from it and eventually from the colonial state as well. But even for these, 
its rejecters, assimilação had more insidious effects. Although the most radical 
assimilados made common cause with disgruntled peasants and overthrew the 
colonial state, many had already internalised a sense of difference between themselves 
and the wider population. Through the “transformational moment” of elite racial 
discourse, through the liberation struggle and independence, this sense of difference 
was no longer phrased in explicit racial terms (at least publicly), but instead came to 
refer to people’s relationship with the project of modernity. 
  In the post-socialist period, as the constraints of the past lessen, this sense of 
difference is once again being phrased in a racialised vocabulary. Yet, the 
independence elite’s racial discourses remain a way to speak about people’s 
relationship to the project of modernity and, increasingly, to social position. In the 
following chapter I will examine another growing sense of difference between two 
groups that were, and remain in many ways, closely united. They are elites and the 
urban middle classes. As with racial discourses, I examine the ways in which the 
onset of democratic capitalism created a sense that the elite are growing ever more 
distant from their previous bases of support. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Legitimacy and Modernity 
 
…to be raised in the house of power is to learn its ways, to soak them up, through that very 
skin which is the cause of your oppression. The habit of power, its timbre, its posture, its 
way of being with others. It is a disease, (…), infecting all who come too near it. If the 
powerful trample over you, you are infected by the soles of their feet (The Satanic Verses, 
Salman Rushdie 1988: 211).  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
  Relatively early into my fieldwork I was invited to the birthday party of a 
French aid worker. At the bar where the party was held, I soon fell into a conversation 
with some of her Mozambican fellow employees. Talk turned to politics and a young 
man sitting near me launched into a litany of abuse against Frelimo. For at least five 
minutes he described a catalogue of what he felt to be the ruling party’s faults, errors, 
penchant for corruption and overall and general uselessness. This young man, a 
Mulatto, was born in Maputo and belonged to the urban middle classes. It would 
therefore be rather unlikely for him to vote for Renamo, yet he obviously considered 
Frelimo a distasteful option. I asked him who his family supports and he said: “Oh, 
they vote for Frelimo”. I then asked who he would vote for and he said: “Frelimo”. I 
was puzzled by his response and asked why he would vote for Frelimo if he disliked 
them so much. He replied: “Because the pockets of Frelimo are already full while the 
pockets of Renamo are still empty”. He was implying that Frelimo would not have to 
steal too much more to support themselves in their current life style, while Renamo 
officials would have to begin from the bottom and work their way up. A vote for 
Renamo would thus be a vote for even greater levels of corruption.  
At the time I found the response very witty, but further into my fieldwork after 
I had heard many similar statements I began to see these types of comments as 
symbolic of the growing tension between the revolutionary elite and their children and 
the urban middle classes. As demonstrated in the previous chapters, although the 
Frelimo leadership initially viewed the urban middle classes with suspicion, their 
shared skills and social origins helped to create a growing bond. The urban middle 
classes soon became one of the party’s bastions of support. Following the introduction 
of neo-liberal democracy the formerly close relationship between these groups is 
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beginning to seem increasingly strained. While most of my middle class friends and 
acquaintances felt they were materially better off since the fall of socialism, many of 
them felt alienated from Frelimo, whom they view as increasingly isolated and 
dependent on international networks to bolster their power and therefore more willing 
to ignore internal opinion. However, as the introductory response shows, many of 
them do not feel there is another viable group to whom they might offer their 
allegiance.   
This feeling of alienation appeared among other former supporters of the 
regime as well. For one such group, it appeared that the only way they felt they could 
make themselves heard now was to go “over the heads” of the party. They did this by 
means of political protest, now legal after the introduction of the democratic 
constitution in 1990. During my time in Maputo there was a weekly demonstration 
along Av. 24 de Julho (24
th
 of July Avenue), a major street in the city that is named 
after the day when the Mozambican government instituted their programme of 
nationalisations during the socialist period. One could hear the demonstrators coming 
long before one saw the official police outriders that guided the march. Many of the 
150 or so marchers that appeared advertised their presence by blowing whistles, 
beating drums and singing. I was walking down the street the first time I heard them 
coming and I stopped to watch. No one on else on the street seemed very concerned; 
in fact very few people seemed to notice them. The public’s lack of interest might 
have been accounted for by the fact that, as I later found out, the march had been a 
regular fixture for some time. As they passed by, one participant noticed my attention 
amidst a general atmosphere of indifference and he tried to get me to join the march. 
Perhaps he thought it would demonstrate that the protesters’ cause had some extra 
significance. Almost all of the marchers were black men in their 30s and 40s, maybe 
the presence of a white foreigner would have been a manifestation of international 
interest in their cause.  
Since I suspected the demonstrators were probably members of Renamo, a 
group that I did not want appear to be visibly supporting, and I had no idea what they 
were marching for, I refused. Their repertoire of flags and symbols did little to 
enlighten me. Many were carrying signs and flags of Germany, the United States and 
a few other assorted European nations. The signs declaimed governmental corruption 
and after the Second Gulf War of 2003, many signs called upon the American 
President George Bush to overthrow the “gang of thieves” that made up the 
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Mozambican government. This surprised me as Bush and his Iraq war were generally 
unpopular amongst many of the people I knew, especially the revolutionary and 
independence elites, most of whom were positive about the rise of Iraqi resistance 
against the American occupation forces.  
I eventually found out that these men had been working in the former East 
Germany through a contract arranged by the Frelimo government. The East German 
government paid these men’s wages directly to the Mozambican government, which, 
in a bizarre parody of the earlier practise with mine workers in South Africa, retained 
part of the money and returned the rest to the workers.
65
 In this case the wages had 
disappeared. Although the former Minister of Labour was widely held responsible, 
nothing had been done and their salaries had never been refunded. I then understood 
why they were carrying German flags, but I still wondered why they included 
American, British and various others European flags in their weekly demonstration. 
Barring an imminent invasion of the “Coalition of the Willing”, which seemed 
extremely unlikely, I could not see what these governments had to do with the matter. 
Upon later reflection it seemed the demonstrators, after numerous rebuffs at the hands 
of the state, were trying a strategy that had worked so well for the Mozambican elite 
in general. They were attempting to speak to one of the most important constituencies 
in the country, the foreigners who run the international agencies that have such a 
powerful presence in Mozambique. Using this method they hoped to go “over the 
heads” of their own rulers, in whom they had lost faith, and try to obtain justice from 
one of the few groups that could make their leaders listen: the “international 
community”. Unfortunately for the demonstrators, they did not - unlike elites - seem 
to be able to make their message successfully heard and their calls fell on the deaf 
ears of a world almost completely unaware of their plight. As with the disillusioned 
voter mentioned earlier, Frelimo had once relied on members of this urban middle 
class group for support. Now, however, they could use powerful international contacts 
as a means to bypass internal opinion. Former supporters, in contrast, were finding it 
ever more difficult to make themselves heard. 
 
5.2 Which Constituency? 
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uncommon with socialist governments. See Bayly (2004) for a description of this practise in Vietnam. 
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As the example above demonstrates, many people in Mozambique, both elite 
and otherwise, recognise the importance of international opinion in the formation of 
national policy. International actors are able to influence local political decisions 
through the distribution or withholding of aid and through insisting on structural 
reform. This has led some authors to claim that the fall of socialism has brought forth 
new sets of relationships between the Mozambican state and international agencies 
that strongly resemble aspects of the colonial period (Hanlon 1996: 80-83). It is, 
however, a rather different aspect of the interconnections between Mozambique and 
international agencies on which I seek to focus attention in this chapter. I will discuss 
how the changing political circumstances that have accompanied the fall of socialism 
have made it imperative for the revolutionary elite to appear legitimate in the eyes of 
the international community, which provides power and resources that allows the 
government to treat previous sources of support, such as the urban middle classes, 
more casually.
66
 While there are aspects of these relationships that resemble older 
colonial forms of power, I draw attention to the internal freedom of manoeuvre that 
elites’ reliance on foreign aid allows.  
Many Mozambicans, not simply those connected to the revolutionary and 
independence elites, have found employment with international agencies. It is 
estimated that they are among the largest employers in country (Hanlon 1996; Pitcher 
2002). Positions range from the more humble, such as driver and secretary to the more 
glamorous, such as field representative or project coordinator. In addition to direct 
employment, I knew many middle class Mozambicans who had tangential 
connections with which they supplemented their incomes, such as offering Portuguese 
lessons to foreign personnel. Yet despite this seeming openness of opportunity, elites 
have the ability effectively to monopolise the highest positions. Aside from the fact 
that elites, especially the independence elite, often have higher degrees of education, 
or at least attended more prestigious universities, they derive an immense advantage 
through their social networks. Elites can call on a wide range of friends and family 
who currently hold, or held, high positions in both aid agencies and the government 
and sometimes both on an almost rotating basis. Throughout this thesis I have argued 
that elite social structures, comprising the revolutionary and independence elites, 
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social trajectory. 
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foreign capitalists and the international community and the more power members of 
the Indian merchant class, in Mozambique share strong similarities with those 
described by Gledhill in Mexico (1998, 2002). As shown in the introduction in 
Mexico, under the PRI government, power was held by multiple elites, some whose 
power bases grew from politics and others who were predominant in the economy, 
although many had interests in both spheres. Yet despite the often-fierce rivalries 
between sets of elites they were united in an overall political culture that buttressed 
their high status positions. While this is generally true for Mozambique as well, there 
are certain cases where power appears even more tightly centralised. As Frelimo’s 
commitment to socialism started to progressively weaken, members of the 
revolutionary elite were able to expand their political power base into sectors of the 
economy and to obtain positions with the aid agencies of the international community. 
The revolutionary elite may not be the only set of powerful actors in the economic or 
aid based spheres, but the fact that they are active in all means that the revolutionary, 
and by extension the independence elite, appear to be, in this case, something more 
akin to the interlocking “power elite” described by Mills (1956).  Therefore, like the 
“power elite” there are structures of power that link elites, the government and the 
international agencies in mutually beneficial and self-sustaining ways.  
Many members of the urban middle classes may have similar social origins to 
the elite and broadly similar if less prestigious qualifications, but they cannot access 
these social networks to the same degree. They thus view elite monopoly of these 
networks as “sinister and conspiratorial”. In this chapter I deal with what many 
Mozambicans feel is the paradox of democratisation: The introduction of democracy 
and free market policies were supposed to enable the “will of the people” to make 
itself felt by a government whose former socialist policies were also based on a 
supposed “will of the people” but were thought by many to have become elitist and 
out of touch. Yet many members of the middle classes feel they are now ignored and 
denied access to high positions. 
During the transition to multiparty democracy, Frelimo spent most of its 
energies addressing and seeking to enlist support amongst its traditional audience, 
educated urbanites (Manning 2002: 132). As was the case during the socialist period, 
the urban middle classes constitute a loosely-connected group which shared Frelimo’s 
dream of creating a “modern nation”. This group understands and identifies with the 
society the elite claim they want to create. Therefore competition for the spoils of the 
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new system in many ways remained an urban “privileged” activity for the elite and 
urbanites who had the education and the social connections (although as previously 
stated, to differing degrees) to take advantage of the new types of opportunities that 
had been created. Some members of the middle classes managed to achieve certain 
levels of prosperity in the new, more open economic system, yet the benefits they 
enjoy pale in comparison to the wealth that elites have able to accumulate. The fact 
that there is now an internationally recognised democratic system in place in 
Mozambique has not necessarily meant that many members of groups outside the elite 
feel that they can effect meaningful changes in their social system. Broadly stated, the 
purpose of democratic elections is to give the victor the legitimacy of the popular will. 
Yet despite the historical closeness and blurred boundaries between elites and the 
urban middle classes, the introduction of democracy seems to be sapping Frelimo’s 
legitimacy, as they are perceived to be increasingly aloof from the population. 
Democratisation and electoral victories have given the revolutionary elite legitimacy 
with international agencies and Mozambique’s major donors. The question remains 
though, in whose eyes legitimacy must be sought: those of the local electorate or 
those of the international community? 
 
5.3 Legitimacy 
 
In a recent and influential book on African politics, Chabal and Daloz (1999) 
claim that African societies are held together by patronage networks, which, in their 
view, means the links in African societies, are horizontal instead of vertical.  
 
Indeed, if class is defined (in keeping with standard sociology) as a self-consciously 
constituted group organised to defend its economic interests and assert these interests 
against other similar ensembles, then the continent is largely devoid of social classes.  
That this is so is not surprising, as should be clear from the arguments we have 
presented so far in this book.  Even if it had achieved the economic means of its 
hegemonic ambitions, any elite which became a ruling ‘class’, thus cutting itself 
from the rest of society, would rapidly lose prestige, influence, and thereby 
legitimacy (Chabl and Daloz 1999: 41). 
 
There may be elements of truth to this assertion when describing certain interactions 
at the local level, but if one reads it as referring to Mozambique overall, it is an 
oversimplification of a set of complex processes. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, 
members of the Mozambican elite have long cultivated connections with powerful 
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groups of foreigners to bolster their power or enhance their status. By the time of my 
fieldwork in 2002-3, elites had started to rely more on these connections than 
previously. In answer to my earlier question, while internal constituencies retained 
some importance, elites are now finding it more expedient to cultivate legitimacy with 
the international community than with the internal population. 
 This type of “balancing act” of trying to cultivate new constituencies, while 
retaining, or at least ensuring the neutrality, of former ones is not specific to the 
Mozambican case, but widely found throughout the post-colonial world. Nor is it 
restricted solely to elites. In his recent work on the Sinhalese elite of Sri Lanka, 
Spencer (2002: 92) questions the utility of using the term “elite” as an analytical 
category by showing how other actors were able to use democratic and nationalist 
agendas of the elite to push their own local interests. Spencer’s ethnography 
demonstrates the existence of many “old” political families who occupied positions of 
power during the colonial period and whose members later became the leading lights 
of post-colonial governments. Yet he is cautious of examining nationalism as an 
instrumental ideology that serves the interests of an elite class (Spencer 2002: 92). 
This is an important point and one should recognise the role of agency in what is often 
described as “hegemonic discourses”. I do not doubt that many local actors in 
Mozambique have been able to harness various elite agendas for their own purposes. 
Seen overall, however, the advent of national ideologies from socialist nationalism to 
democratic capitalism has tended to serve the instrumental interests of elites. In this 
respect the Mozambican case appears to differ from the Sri Lankan one.  
 Despite the historical specificity of post-colonial African nations, the advent 
of widespread democratic transitions appears to demonstrate elements of a certain 
“continent-wide” logic. Manning’s (2002) study of the politics of the post-conflict 
democratic transition in Mozambique notes that while many democratic transitions 
throughout sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s had significant measures of popular 
support from sections of the populace, most were carried out by governments for 
instrumentalist reasons. In Mozambique the case appeared even more expedient. 
When the Frelimo leadership was contemplating the transition from a single-party to 
multiparty state they sent out party cadres to canvass opinion. Admittedly this was 
only possible in areas where the government exercised a high degree of control, so 
areas where Renamo was strong and may have been able to count on popular support 
were not canvassed. Yet the results of the study indicated that the majority of opinion 
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was against the transition to multiparty democracy on the grounds it could create 
more conflict in a country already mired in a civil war (Manning 2002: 19). 
International agencies and most of the donor countries, on the other-hand, operated 
under the assumption that: “… democracy was expected to bring greater 
accountability, better governance, and their improved economic management and 
performance (Manning 2002: 16). As the civil war had reached a situation of 
stalemate and both sides’ cold war sponsors were losing interest in the conflict, as 
wider political and economic changes were demanding attention at home, the 
international community felt democratisation might finally bring the war to a 
negotiated end. Both the Frelimo-controlled state and the rebel Renamo movement 
were dependent on international aid to differing degrees. Democratisation was one of 
the most promising strategies to access foreign funds, and the process was undertaken 
as much to please the international community as for local concerns. During the first 
elections, voting patterns tended to follow the military developments of the civil war, 
in areas where Renamo was strong they dominated the vote, an equivalent monopoly 
was held in areas where Frelimo held sway. Instead of the population “exercising their 
democratic will” in many cases it appeared that the voting was, in part, determined by 
the desire of the population to placate the strongest force in their area (Manning 
2002). Internal legitimacy thus appears to have been low on the list of concerns due to 
the very fact that multiparty elections owed its existence to an externally - rather than 
an internally-generated set of priorities. 
 Although international actors were influential in pressing for democratic 
transition, I do not mean to argue that Mozambican elites were completely held 
hostage by these actors and unable to influence the course of events. As demonstrated 
by Manning, the transition to democracy was not formed by pressure from below so 
much as through an intense process of elite bargaining between members of Frelimo, 
Renamo, and international agencies (Manning 2002: 19). Renamo did not think they 
would actually win the elections and knew they could not compete with Frelimo as a 
“legitimate” national government. Nor was Frelimo initially worried about losing the 
election. Democracy was thus a matter of the division of spoils (Chabal, 2002). 
Paradoxically the democratisation process actually weakened ruling groups’ 
legitimacy among some former supporters as ideologies were jettisoned, former 
soldiers were abandoned to their fate as they were no longer useful, and parties, 
 154 
especially Frelimo, operated under new constraints that meant they lost some of their 
older patronage functions (Manning 2002: 131).
67
  
This observation about the severing of patronage networks and hence the loss 
of legitimacy was borne out by my own fieldwork. Both elites and non-elites 
frequently told me that since the fall of socialism the gap between the elites and the 
people seemed to be growing. Non-elites, especially the middle classes, would 
frequently point to the growing wealth and frequent corruption scandals of 
government officials, their families and close associates as a repudiation of the former 
morality that was enshrined in nationalist modernity. They spoke with bitterness as 
many contemplated their own precarious circumstances. As the introductory example 
shows, there was hope that the “international community” would be able to redress 
some of the more blatant injustices that have occurred in the post-socialist era. In 
private though, many middle class urbanites were sceptical, stating that as long as 
elites did what they were told by their external/international partners they would have 
a free hand to accumulate wealth.  
The growing social distance between elites and “the people” did not, however, 
necessarily translate into a direct loss of support for Frelimo. Although there were 
those among the middle classes who felt they were too disillusioned to bother to vote, 
and while voter turnout was very low, Frelimo won the 2005 election by a landslide. 
The party seems to have retained support in their traditional heartlands of the south, 
far north and urban areas (Manning 2002). In a seeming reversal of patrimonial 
politics, many who criticised Frelimo continued to vote for them as shown in the 
introductory example. One woman came to the heart of the situation by responding: 
“Because we have already been through this with Frelimo, the houses, the cars, 
education for their children. With Renamo we would have to start all over again”. 
Unlike Chabal and Daloz’s formulation, which states that the wealth of a “big man” is 
a measure of pride for community and beneficial as it will be re-distributed through 
vertical social links, many middle class Mozambicans seemed to sense a flow of 
wealth in the opposite direction. They made a reasoned choice between those who 
were already rich and those who would have to steal more and leave them with even 
less (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 42).  
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Beyond the matter of simple “theft”, Frelimo’s growing reputation for 
corruption endangered their legitimacy with urbanites in other ways. “Being corrupt” 
damaged Frelimo’s and the more general Mozambican elites’ ideological claims of 
being a modernising force in the nation. The revolutionary elite had long claimed that 
they were the only available group who had the capabilities necessary to build an 
independent, modern Mozambique. Although these claims were articulated more 
forcefully during the socialist period, they are still a key legitimising factor of elite 
status today.
68
 The growing corruption puts this ideal of modernity in doubt. I was 
often told that this type of corruption would be impossible in Europe, the supposed 
paragon of modernity. In Maputo gossip about various corruption scandals is heard 
constantly. Popular rumours concern not only grand acts of corruption; even minor 
cases can cause outrage. One middle class informant told me a story concerning the 
wife of a very highly placed official who supposedly stole alcohol from government 
residences and then had it resold at a baraca (an informal and typically unlicensed 
bar/kiosk) she owned. My informant finished telling the story and shook his head in 
disgust saying: “This is sad, even in the worse places this kind of corruption is just 
petty, the wife of Idi Amin would never bother with something so small”. Disquiet 
exists among the ranks of the elite itself as the former ideals of nationalist modernity 
seem increasingly irrelevant in today’s society. In response to a question I asked one 
member of the independence elite as to whether democracy actually exists in 
Mozambique; she replied “no” and then described the government as an “incompetent 
oligarchy”. The growing pervasiveness of corruption causes doubts as to the ability of 
elites to modernise the nation - will they simply enrich themselves at its expense? 
Although the elite may be losing legitimacy within one of their traditional bases of 
support, the ideal that has been promised for so long, at least some kind of, modernity, 
is still seen as a legitimate goal.  If this goal were to be compromised, the loss of 
legitimacy might begin to be truly harmful.  
In this chapter I argue that the democratisation process in Mozambique has 
contradictory effects amongst elites and the urban middle classes. Urbanites have long 
been a major base of support for the Frelimo party and were one of the principal, 
internal groups to which Frelimo tried to “sell” democratisation. Yet, while the 
democratisation process has strengthened the revolutionary elite’s legitimacy with 
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powerful foreigners, it has made them less accountable – in contrast to the scenario 
described by Chabal and Daloz - to the internal groups it used to rely upon. 
Democratisation has increased the resentment of the middle classes, but has not left 
them with a suitable replacement. Many urbanites share aspects of the elite ideology 
of modernity and, although there are growing doubts as to the revolutionary elite’s 
intentions, there is currently no one else they believe to be capable of nurturing an 
ideology of, or delivering the fruits of, modernity.  
The remainder of the chapter examines the question of legitimacy by focusing 
on the opportunities and the limits the middle classes have in accessing the new forms 
of wealth that have become prevalent in the post-socialist period. I also describe the 
mistrust that has accompanied elite social mobility, even as many middle-class 
Mozambicans seem to be internalising new elite values. Finally, by using the example 
of the Carlos Cardoso trial, I examine how elite efforts to build legitimacy with 
international backers have simultaneously created conspiracy theories among 
urbanites. 
 
5.4 Elites and the Privileged. Who is Legitimately Modern? 
  
 Cohen, when speaking of the Creole elite in Sierra Leone, remarked that elites 
in open societies are often very difficult or define or delineate (1981: 18). This is 
certainly the case in Maputo, where the boundary between elites and the urban middle 
classes is a blurred one. These groups are connected both by shared social origins and 
an aspiration towards “modernity”. Yet neither elites nor the urban middle classes are 
monolithic, static categories. Can one define where the elite ends and the urban 
middle class begin?
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 Although the middle classes in general cannot equal elites in 
influence or international connections, many – especially those tracing their origins to 
the colonial petty bourgeoisie - share similar social backgrounds, compete for some of 
the same career options, share elite aspirations and as the following chapter will show, 
sometimes form intimate relationships and on occasion marry members of the elite. 
These blurred boundaries are compounded by the fact that the origin of social 
difference between elites and the urban middle classes stems from service in the 
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liberation war, not different social backgrounds. Even though few members of the 
urban middle classes fought in the liberation struggle, due to educational 
qualifications, shared ideological aspirations and broad social similarity to the ruling 
groups have allowed them to overcome suspicions and find places within the rapidly 
expanding government and party bureaucracies.  
 During the post-socialist period urban groups were once again poised to take 
advantage of the new opportunities created by the growing presence of International 
Aid agencies and NGOs and their stated desire for the creation of “civil society”. 
Ironically though, although the urbanites had “proved” their loyalty by staying with 
Frelimo through the civil war, their influence began to wane precisely when new 
opportunities were presenting themselves. Despite the public claims to the contrary, 
the growth of Mozambican “civil society” and the NGO development economy has 
been an intensely political and politicised process (Pitcher 2002).
70
 This has even 
been recognised by aid agencies. A former Peace Corp volunteer once told me that 
during an orientation meeting for incoming volunteers an official from the American 
Embassy stated that the goal for the American aid programme was not simply poverty 
alleviation, but to create a “ruling class” whose wealth would presumably “trickle 
down” through the wider society.  Bayart (1993) has recognised how the formation of 
“civil society” is deeply involved in the practise of politics and the accumulation of 
wealth in African states.  
 
In one way, it is possible to see how the superlative relations of the State to accumulation, 
the interlinking of systems of “straddling” with those of concatenation, and the active 
inter-penetration of “civil society” and “political society”, could be resolved in many 
cumulative “spirals”. These processes work towards the production of a dominant class 
based on the reciprocal assimilation of the social elite. The extent of this molecular 
process of assimilation, and its degree of realisation vary considerably from one historical 
situation to another. It is important to continue to argue against the abundant literature 
and to refuse to relate the postcolonial state to an existing dominant class, which is its 
tenant. As George Balandier has already put it, “contemporary political life does not 
seem to manifest a structure of constituted classes, but rather acts as an instrument of 
class formation (Bayart 1993: 176).       
  
In Mozambique the links between the state and NGOs and “civil society” have 
allowed for a degree of social assimilation between the middle classes and elites and 
have created space for material and social advancement, but many members of the 
middle classes continue to feel at a disadvantage. They may be in state employ, join 
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international agencies, or even open businesses, but in many cases they do not have 
the same level of qualifications (such as degrees from prestigious foreign universities) 
as the established elites.  Nor do they have the same kinds of social connections 
necessary to accumulate and enjoy new wealth. While they remain privileged in 
comparison to the population as a whole, their relative deprivation when compared 
with elites remains. In some cases it is growing as elites amass yet more wealth. In the 
following section I provide four case studies. Two illustrate the avenues of 
advancement open to some of the more privileged, young, members of the middle 
classes - and their limits. The other two illustrate the ways in which their avenues of 
advancement differ from those followed by members of the independence elite. 
  
Osvaldo was in his early 30s when I conducted fieldwork (he was born in 1969 in Maputo). 
He comes from an old southern assimilado family that was well off during the colonial 
period. His elder brother had been a member of the Portuguese scouts, despite the fact that 
it was almost unheard of to be able to enter this organisation if one was black. His father 
worked with the Portuguese army and also owned several houses. He derived a good 
portion of his income from the rents of his properties. Independence was a traumatic event 
for the family; they stayed in their house listening to the sounds of the riots outside and 
worried about their father who was with the Portuguese military. Many of his relatives that 
were involved with business and politics during the colonial period fled the country, 
although his father stayed because he was happy about some aspects of independence. 
Despite Osvaldo’s father’s guarded welcome of independence, he was declared an “enemy 
of the people” and most of his properties were nationalised.71 The family’s fortunes 
declined somewhat and his father ended up working at the state-owned national brewery, 
2M. Osvaldo had conflicting emotions about the socialist period in Mozambique. On the 
one hand he said it was “too communist”, government officials were everywhere, you were 
not allowed to publicly voice disagreement and the rights to private property were severely 
limited. On the other, as a child he had worshipped Samora Machel. He remembers when 
Machel would give impromptu speeches at his school. During one of these visits, Machel 
brought the headmaster of the school on stage and proceeded to give him a public dressing 
down in front of the students for the fact that the school was in a state of disrepair. The 
students considered the headmaster a terror and his humiliation was a day of joy that 
demonstrated there was someone who would protect them from dictatorial, arbitrary 
authority. Machel’s speeches were marathon affairs, sometimes running up to six hours or 
more, but according to Osvaldo, they were not boring and it was obvious he really cared 
about the nation. Osvaldo blames many of the problems that followed independence on the 
bad advisers that surrounded Samora Machel. Although he appreciates the freedoms of the 
new era and prefers many aspects of it to the old, he worries about the increasing amount of 
corruption. Unlike the days of Machel, it is no longer obvious that there is anyone in 
authority putting the good of the nation above their own self-interest. During the socialist 
period children were taught to love Mozambique and it was stressed that everyone had a 
role to play in the new nation He does not think that is the case anymore and is worried that 
Mozambican identity is being killed by capitalism. He agrees with private property but 
thinks that the state should have remained in control of health care and social welfare to 
ensure that provisions remain to care for Mozambicans throughout society. He is especially 
troubled by the children of the revolutionary elite, many of whom he knows socially. He 
told me that although they have been groomed to rule and have had everything handed to 
them, most of those he has met are lazy and, in his opinion, only concerned with living the 
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good life. He feels one of the major problems is that the elite is still composed of the exact 
same people as during the socialist period. This means that even though the political system 
has supposedly changed, they still control everything. Osvaldo continues to vote for 
Frelimo, although with reservations. He does not like many current aspects of the party but 
he has no real affinity for Renamo. His father avoids talking about politics, but Osvaldo 
thinks he supports one of the minor parties that appeared after the fall of socialism. 
 
Osvaldo studied accounting at the Commercial Institute in Mozambique. He was interested 
in social work, but his family felt accounting would provide a more viable future and there 
were not many choices available when he studied. His first job was with an aid agency in 
Niassa (the northernmost province). His job was to help people who were forcibly removed 
during Operation Production.
72
 He found the area interesting, he had not been exposed to 
much of life in rural areas and he told me he spent his free days visiting villages and asking 
questions as an “amateur anthropologist”. He found it fascinating, although strange, 
especially local beliefs about witchcraft, although he does not personally believe in any of 
this. He saved up money from this post and went travelling through South Africa in the 
early 1990s. This ignited a life long love of travel and he has been backpacking through 
Europe, Southeast Asia and The US. His second job was with Oxfam in Zimbabwe, where 
he met his wife, an American aid worker. He speaks flawless English, which he said he 
picked up from music, movies and books. Unlike many Mozambican elites he never had 
much in the way of formal training in English and he did not study abroad. He then returned 
to Mozambique and tried to enter the private sector by working as an accountant at a 
Cashew Factory. This was not a success, he lasted only three months in the job. He then 
became an accountant for USAID and after his marriage he and his wife relocated to the 
Washington D.C. home office. He is not sure if he will return and when I last spoke to him 
he was talking about applying for American citizenship (Field notes various dates, 
compilation).   
 
In many ways Osvaldo’s background is parallel to those of many of my informants 
from the independence elite and he probably would have been a member of this 
privileged category if his father had not been an “enemy of the people”. He came 
from an urban, southern assimilado background, his family had been relatively 
privileged in the colonial period, he is well-educated, and he has travelled and seen 
the world. Up to the present day, his career has been mostly successful as well. 
Osvaldo also shares much of the Frelimo ideal of modernity, the goal of building a 
“rational” and modern state. Although he does not display some of the antagonistic 
contempt of the early Frelimo towards rural areas, or the sometimes thinly disguised 
condescension of young, independence elites, he nonetheless found rural life strange 
and disquieting, if interesting.   
In other ways, however, he differed significantly from his elite counterparts. His 
family’s history was too compromised, and showed too much evidence of 
collaboration, to allow it a place in new party structures. Even though the education 
level and skills of his father enabled him to find a job that would not leave them 
destitute, thus allowing him and his family to maintain a broadly middle class life 
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style, they do not have the social connections within the party elite to reach the 
summit of society. Nor does Osvaldo have a social base outside the aid industry – 
perhaps for this reason his foray into the private sector ended badly. He is bitter about 
the continuing social dominance of the revolutionary elite and the unearned benefits 
of their children, but there is no other party that embodies the ideal of modernity with 
which he identifies, even if Frelimo seems increasingly unlikely to deliver it for the 
rest of the population. In Osvaldo’s view his best chances lie outside Mozambique. 
Thus the move from socialism to neo-liberal democracy, which promised to increase 
the access of the “people” to the political system, has paradoxically left those who are 
dissatisfied with the state few options but individual alienation and retreat.  
The second case study displays the structures of middle class advancement in a 
case where the person in question came from a family not weighed down by political 
baggage after independence. 
 
Joana is in her mid 30s and was born in Maputo. Her father was an assimilado but, 
unusually for a member of this category, had two wives and 12 children. Joana is the 
daughter of the junior wife. The family was essentially apolitical,
73
 although they 
welcomed independence. Her father worked in a furniture factory and earned a relatively 
good salary but did not join any party organisations, outside of the obligatory work units 
set up by the party at places of work. Despite this, Joana had many social contacts among 
the independence elite from parties they used to throw during the socialist period, and she 
has maintained these contacts in the present day. Joana became pregnant at 15 but she 
managed to continue her schooling and eventually went to UEM to study law. During 
university her father died of cancer. He had arranged for his company to split his pension 
between his two wives, but the money was not enough to support Joana’s family. Joana 
had to drop out of school and find work to help support her mother and siblings. Joana 
got various part time jobs to help pay for food and schooling for her brothers and she also 
enrolled in various courses in typing and English. She then got a job as an administrative 
assistant at a company that imports agricultural implements. While working at this 
company she met a man whose wife worked for the American Embassy and she was told 
she could apply for an upcoming position there. She started as a receptionist but has 
worked her way up the hierarchy and now has a mid-level position. Her job pays well, 
but she has probably gone about as far as she can in the Embassy. She now hopes to leave 
Mozambique and try to work in Europe, she had a long-term boyfriend who is Danish 
and she would like to move northern Europe and join him, or perhaps work in Britain. 
She has also been working to obtain a scholarship for her daughter. Her daughter had 
been studying medicine at UEM, but Joana feels she would have a much better future if 
she obtained her degree abroad (Field notes 20 May 2003). 
  
 While Joana does not have the compromised political past of Osvaldo, she 
shares many of the overall limitations which served to restrict his upward mobility. 
Although she has a nice house, a well-paying job, shares a similar social scene with 
the elite and may even be able to send her daughter to study in South Africa or 
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Portugal, it will be very difficult for her to continue to advance beyond her present 
circumstances. Joana is essentially apolitical and tries not to mention many political 
scandals, especially since many involve the families of close personal friends. Yet she 
also occasionally talks about the corruption and cronyism of the revolutionary elite 
and she feels that she would have a better chance of living a good life abroad where 
the social horizon seems, at least from the vantage point of Mozambique, more open.  
 The following two case studies demonstrate independence elite methods of 
social advancement. If one compares them with the cases of Osvaldo and Joana one 
can note significant differences between urban middle class and elite trajectories.  
 
Varyna, studied in South Africa. Upon her return to Mozambique she obtained a job at 
a government Ministry. I asked her what her if the interview process for obtaining a 
government job was difficult and she responded with a bemused look. She told me that 
she when she arrived at the Ministry for her interview she was told that she was hired. 
Her parents had connections with both the major governmental Ministries and 
International organisations and Varyna felt that they probably had a hand in her hiring. 
As her Ministry was not a major one, she also had the best English, which quickly 
made her invaluable. Varyna later felt that she was not being paid enough at the 
Ministry (around £160 per month) and she utilised connections she had made there to 
branch out into the more remunerative international agencies (around £825 per month). 
She worked for a major international agency and a major national one before winning a 
scholarship for post-graduate study in the UK. During fieldwork she would often speak 
about obtaining a development job somewhere else in Africa for a while to broaden her 
horizons, but due to the opportunities available to her it is more than likely that she will 
choose to base herself in Mozambique after her studies (Field notes various dates, 
compilation).   
  
Unlike Osvaldo and Joana, when Varyna returned from her studies abroad she had a 
ready-made social network waiting for her. Through parental influence she easily 
acquired a job, which, while it offered relatively low pay, allowed access to further 
social networks that eventually brought better-paid employment. Varyna’s career 
pattern to date has relied almost completely on the state and international agencies. 
The next example demonstrates the ways in which these employment opportunities 
also co-exist with private sector prospects.  
 
Halima’s father was once an engineer for a state-owned company during the socialist 
period. He is well-connected with many members of the Frelimo elite and after the fall of 
socialism he went into business by buying and selling privatised industries. He also 
developed consortiums with various high-ranking Frelimo members and co-owned 
companies with them. Halima studied in South Africa and then did a degree in the UK. 
Upon her return she studied marketing at a private university in Maputo. After her 
completion of the marketing course she has divided her professional time between 
industries owned by her father and working at an environmental NGO. She then did a MBA 
in Spain and has returned to Mozambique to take a position in her father’s business. 
Although she has siblings, Halima has demonstrated the keenest interest in the family 
business and is considered the heir apparent. During fieldwork she used to talk about 
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working in Europe and only returning to Mozambique to retire. Like Varyna she wanted 
more experience of the wider world, but as she has taken a position in her father’s company 
she will now be based in Maputo (Field notes various dates, compilation). 
 
 There are differences between the two independence elite cases I have demonstrated. 
One family’s operations are primarily based in institutions while the other’s are 
centred on business. Yet there are significant degrees of overlap. Both were able to 
utilise family connections to achieve relatively high positions by their early to mid 
20s. In addition, while both considered leaving Mozambique for a time, it was for 
very different reasons than those that motivated Osvaldo and Joana. It was not 
because they felt alienated and wanted greater opportunities that they were keen to 
leave. Neither was particularly political: indeed, with their social connections they did 
not really have to be. They wanted to leave to experience new things in a world that is 
wider than Maputo. Their eventual decision to base themselves in Mozambique was 
because this is where they had the greatest opportunities.   
The above case studies demonstrate a level of privilege among elites and the 
urban middle classes that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the majority of 
Mozambique’s population to achieve. Unlike the two examples from the 
independence elite, neither Osvaldo nor Joana has managed to develop the social and 
family connections, nor have they benefited from markers of elite status, such as 
education abroad, to advance beyond the urban middle classes. In a similar manner to 
Leys  (1982) and M. Cohen’s (1982) formulation of the African national bourgeoisie 
social position in Mozambique is not based as much on the ownership of the means of 
production as it is on the ability to access political and foreign networks which lead to 
wealth and status in Mozambique. Although the barriers between classes are not 
impossible to transcend, the examples above demonstrate how the lack of a certain 
level of social connections makes advancement difficult. This directly contradicts the 
Frelimo government’s early socialist promise of equality for all of Mozambique’s 
citizens. Although many of the people I knew from the urban middle classes, 
including those featuring in the above case studies, appreciate the new freedoms of 
the post-socialist era, they feel that they are ultimately blocked, despite the promise of 
a new and open civil society. Often, like Osvaldo and Joana, they feel that they would 
have better chances living abroad.  
Another aspect of privilege, which is shared, but somewhat differentially 
enjoyed, by elites and the middle classes respectively, is their access to influential 
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outsiders. Although factions exist among the revolutionary elite, even dissident 
members are able to access social networks that can secure them employment within 
the government, businesses or the international community. While some members of 
the middle classes were able - unlike those mentioned in the opening vignette - to find 
well-paid careers in international agencies, they did not have the educational 
requirements to rise to the highest levels. Thus they found it far more difficult to 
blend positions in international agencies with positions in business or politics, as 
elites are often able to do. The revolutionary elite is not yet in great political danger, 
as many urbanites are still able to secure at least reasonably well-remunerated 
employment.  Furthermore, even the more critical of urbanites, such as Osvaldo, still 
believe in the overall ideal of modernity that elites represent. Yet there is growing 
awareness that some benefit far more from this system than others and the sense of 
solidarity that underlay nationalist modernity is steadily fading. Cohen (1981) spoke 
of the need for elites to create and believe in a “universalistic mystique”, the idea that 
elites are not acting out of pure self-interest, but for the good of the nation. In the 
post-socialist era, the revolutionary elite is having increasing difficulties in 
convincing groups they have traditionally relied upon, such as the urban middle 
classes, that this is the case. Thus, the revolutionary elite face a potential problem. At 
the moment they can afford to alienate former supporters because they can rely on 
international agencies; and for many middle class urbanites, Frelimo still remains the 
only realistic political option. Yet there is a danger of estranging the urban middle 
classes completely. Currently these groups still share strong bonds of shared social 
origins and similar social ideals, yet these bonds are strained by what seems to be the 
increasing inequality of opportunity in favour of elites. The next section examines 
these strains and the growing social mistrust that has come with post-socialist 
mobility. 
 
5.5 Social Mobility and Social Mistrust 
 
Early in my fieldwork I spent an afternoon at a café with two students from 
UEM who were in their mid 20s. We were talking about how things have changed 
since the fall of socialism. They were telling me that while upward mobility seemed 
difficult given the slow and ponderous transition to a market-based society, it was 
different for the elite: after the death of Samora Machel many high-ranking members 
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of the party and their families seem to have become rich overnight. As they explained, 
although the socialist period was arduous, with many privations and with the danger 
that one might be denounced as an enemy of the regime by any one of a widespread 
network of informers, at least there were efforts to make sure that everyone got a 
share of what little there was. They told me: “There was more equality back then. 
Sure the government people got better rations, but even the ministers were thin, they 
did not wear flashy suits or drive their Mercedes to their mansion like they do now”. 
In contrast they both deeply resented the repudiation of nationalist modernity 
symbolised by conspicuous displays of wealth that have become common amongst 
elites in the post-socialist period. Both of them made the point emphatically that 
sometimes it was better for everyone to have very little than for some to have 
everything while others were left with nothing but the bitter knowledge of what they 
lack, as they claim is the case today.  
As with Osvaldo, they also felt that despite the problems and some bad 
decisions, Samora Machel had been a great man. As they explained to me: “Samora 
was both good and bad, but more good than bad. Samora was a good man, the 
problem was that he believed the wrong people, he believed his informers and they 
would denounce people just because they had an argument or something like that”. 
Throughout fieldwork I heard many people explain that the problems of the socialist 
period were not really Samora’s fault. Samora Machel has become an icon among 
members of the urban poor and parts of the disaffected middle classes; many youth in 
Maputo sported t-shirts with pictures of Samora Machel on the front and his slogan a 
luta continua (the struggle continues) on the back. At public protests against 
corruption it was common to see signs emblazoned “Naõ a via acontecer se Samora 
estivesse vivo” (this could not happen if Samora was alive). Many of the problems of 
the period were explained by means of the “good Tsar, wicked Ministers” allegory. 
Such ideas seem to have evolved as a direct response to the party’s claims of 
continuing legitimacy from the heroic era of the liberation struggle and the early 
socialist period. As many of the “bad advisers” continue to play a role in politics 
today, a clear line of demarcation is drawn between what the party once stood for (as 
symbolised by the quasi-martyred figure of Samora Machel
74
) and the perils of the 
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new capitalist period (as symbolised by the supposed venality of the surviving 
Frelimo government). It was often hinted darkly that certain current prominent 
government figures had had a hand in Samora’s death. 
 It was common among non-elites and even some prominent Frelimo members 
who have continued as adherents of leftist/socialist ideas to speak of elites in these 
dichotomous terms: counterpoising old/nationalistic/pure against new/involved with 
international interests/venal. White Mozambicans who had abandoned their 
Portuguese citizenship and joined Frelimo for ideological reasons in the early days of 
independence often made contemptuous comments about the perceived 
acquisitiveness of prominent members of the revolutionary elite and referred to them 
as nouveaux riches. One white former Frelimista told me in despair: “They (the 
revolutionary elite) are just thieves now. Look at the country now, they are acting like 
the colonialists used to”.  These critiques of the present are firmly based in growing 
social inequality, yet their nostalgic idealisations appear retrospectively to downplay 
the existence of status differences during the socialist period. But such differences did 
exist and became more pronounced as the government became increasingly 
authoritarian, even while Samora Machel was alive. By the mid-1980s, high-ranking 
party members were given special rations, special housing, special sections of 
hospitals, special schools for their children and access to special stores and 
restaurants. In Beira, the second city of Mozambique, the leadership was driven in 
military convoys and passers-by were required to stop, move out of the way and 
salute (Hall and Young 1997: 76). Yet among many non-elites, whatever status 
differences existed during the socialist era these faded in comparison to what they see 
as the starker differences of the present. What their remarks suggest is that negative 
memories of chronic shortages and the difficulty of life in general were compensated 
by the more positive memories of “socialist equality”. I frequently heard, from both 
elites and members of the urban middle classes, that while in general times were now 
better and life now much easier than in the socialist period, this had been 
accompanied by a great loss in national identity and social solidarity that were the 
mainstays of nationalist modernity. There is no longer much emphasis on 
Mozambican nationalism. Many negative features of the post-socialist period are 
widely perceived to be the result of elites “selling out” to the World Bank and to 
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foreign business interests. Despite the disasters of the socialist era, according to many 
of my informants, the nationalist modernity of the socialist era, epitomised by Samora 
Machel, seemed more successful in creating a sense of common purpose and unity, at 
least among the urban middle classes and the revolutionary elite.  
Although the relationship of elites and the urban middle classes generally 
remain close as the boundaries between them are blurred in countless everyday ways, 
the modernity of the capitalist period tends increasingly to exclude those who are not 
able to marshal elite social networks. This is typified by the fact for many of the 
members of the middle classes I knew there is no longer a sense that “everyone is in 
this together”. Standards of living have improved for both of these groups (although 
this argument is more difficult to make for the rest of the nation), and very few 
wanted to return to socialism per se.
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 The middle classes feel barred from obtaining 
many of the accoutrements of wealth that elites now display so prominently.  
  Many aspects of modern elite life, such as multiple holiday homes, weekend 
trips to privately owned beach houses, large country estates, and foreign education for 
children, are criticised by members of the urban middle classes as being the unjust 
rewards of growing corruption. But they are also intensely desired. Thus many 
students of the national university, UEM, complained at the perceived discrimination 
in the awarding of scholarships. They claimed that it is the independence elite, those 
who do not need financial assistance, who received government bursaries while those, 
more worthy of scholarships (namely themselves), were ignored. Naema, who was 
also introduced earlier in the thesis, is a middle class secondary school teacher who 
works at a private school. She is very critical of conspicuous consumption and 
corruption of elites, but her frequently mentioned dream was to have a massive house 
with a pool and a white 4x4, and to be able to take trips to Disney World. These are 
the features of the good life that were supposed to come with modernity. Instead 
many urbanites have found themselves occupying a middle ground. They are socially 
close enough to elites to be aware of what they have, but not close enough to obtain 
these things. 
 While many members of the urban middle classes decry what they see as the 
“arrogance” of the ways in which elites display their wealth and interact with the rest 
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of the population, they often act similarly in relation to those who lack their 
privileges. Like the elites, the middle classes often employed one or more household 
servants, had cable television (although not the satellite TV which is common among 
elites) and tried to surround themselves with the attributes of “modern” life. They 
could be just as disdainful towards the rest of the population. I was told numerous 
contemptuous stories by middle class friends of the “failures” of recent rural 
immigrants to adjust to an urban life style.  This was shown by the way they tried to 
keep animals on the balcony of apartment buildings and failed to understand the 
purpose of indoor plumbing. There was even a sliding scale of morality depending on 
class standing. Naema was once complaining to me of elite corruption and nepotism 
in securing places in universities and using influence to change grades. I asked her if 
she ever changed a grade for the child of a friend or family. She replied: “Of course I 
have”. When I asked if that was not nepotistic as well, she responded: “No, what they 
(the elites) do is corruption. I am simply helping my family or a friend, there is 
nothing wrong with that”. In many ways it seemed members of the urban middle 
classes were in the process of internalising elite values and ways of being, while 
steadfastly denouncing them at the same time. 
Throughout this chapter I have been exploring the relationship between the 
elites and the urban middle classes. I argue that these groups are both connected and 
divided by relationships of “blurred” domination, which involve both deeply 
intertwined social closeness and definite hierarchy. Many of my middle class 
informants are deeply critical of this hierarchy, yet they tend to replicate similar 
patterns of social superiority in relations with groups that they see as socially 
subordinate to themselves. While many elites spend their weekends at family parties 
or at holiday houses, older, middle class men often like to visit the outlying bairros of 
Maputo, usually where they were born and often where their families still live. One 
weekend I accompanied Roberto, a man in his early 40s who straddled the divide 
between the urban middle class and the elites,
76
 to his mother’s home in the bairro of 
Machava, about 20 minutes outside of the city centre. His aged mother still lives there 
and one of his brothers runs a small baraca (kiosk) in front of his mother’s house. The 
area is what used to be known as “cidade de caniço” (cane city) as most of the 
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dwellings were huts built out of wood. While the majority of the houses remain 
characteristic of the “cane city”, visible social divisions are growing as some families 
have members who work in the city and can afford to provide them with cement 
houses and electricity. Roberto’s family compound had hut outbuildings, but the 
central house was now made of concrete, was electrified and had a television, all of 
the marks of middle class success. We briefly visited his mother. They discussed 
upcoming projects that had to be undertaken for the house and then he gave her some 
money. As we left we strolled through the dirt path that separated many housing 
compounds and stopped at a neighbour’s house. It was impoverished even by the 
standards of the area. The owner was a man who had fought for the Portuguese during 
the liberation struggle and had lost both his legs in the fighting. He had no family to 
help support him and he was suffering from malaria. Roberto stopped, chatted with 
the man and gave him some money to purchase malarial medication. The unfortunate 
man was obsequious in his thanks and kept referring to Roberto as patrão (master).  
We then walked into the town centre, which was filled with numerous 
baracas. Many men in their late 30s and 40s were sitting at the baracas drinking and 
barbequing meat. Some of the men were notable for being particularly smartly 
dressed, in dress shirts and slacks. They sat in groups that were slightly separate from 
everyone else there, although interacting with them sporadically. Roberto told me that 
many men who had decent jobs in the city would come back to Machava for the 
weekend to drink and eat. We stopped at a baraca where many people Roberto knew 
who worked for an aid agency were having lunch. As with the gatherings at the other 
baracas, although the guests of the luncheon knew many of the town’s residents and 
would occasionally greet them, they stayed slightly separate from, yet visible to, 
everyone else. On a smaller scale than the more established elite, they too were 
demonstrating their status and showing how far they had come in the world. This was 
displayed through certain forms of consumption as well, the plentiful food at the 
lunch, the cars everyone drove to it, and the imported beer and whisky they were 
drinking. As one of the guests said to me when we ran out of Heineken and had to 
switch to 2M, a national Mozambican beer, “It seems we have been exiled from the 
middle classes and now have to live like everyone else”.  
Many of the objections the urban middle classes make towards elites concern 
the decline in moral standards that has occurred since the early days of independence. 
That people feel outraged about a perceived increase in corruption is undoubtedly 
 169 
true, but on the level of practise it seems middle class urbanites are equally worried 
about being specifically excluded from new wealth, regardless of the prevailing 
morality. For many members of the urban middle classes, the transition has brought a 
modest level of prosperity, one that is displayed to the wider population in a manner 
very similar to the way elites display their new-found wealth. Yet it has also 
highlighted their relative level of deprivation in comparison to elites and has brought 
increasing insecurity. The fact that the widely touted “opening” of society has actually 
increased the wealth and power of their former socialist rulers, now with the 
assistance of new groups of international backers, strikes many as a sinister 
perversion of what was supposed to happen under democratisation. As the next 
section will examine, a common discourse used by the urban middle classes to explain 
the changes that have occurred in Mozambique since the fall of socialism is the 
discourse of conspiracy. 
 
5.6 Conspiracy 
 
 In a recent edited volume, Harry West and Todd Sanders (2003) have noted 
that, although calls for governmental transparency are gaining strength 
internationally, this has been accompanied by the increasing visibility of popular 
conspiracy theories. According to the authors of this volume, the use of the word 
transparency by government planners and international agencies derives from a 
particular view of “beneficial” modernity, yet it is one that is opaque and strange to 
many people across the world. Therefore conspiracy theories become a way to seek to 
discover the “real truth” by uncovering the pervasive conspiracies that exist behind 
the façade of transparency. In this way the disquiet about a modernity beyond the 
control of many is tamed. 
 
… modernity is experienced by many people as a fragmented, contradictory, and 
disquieting process that produces untenable situations and unfulfilled desires and that 
power is, in the modern world, perceived by many to be something that lies beyond their 
grasp. Modernity, paradoxically, generates the very opacities of power that it claims to 
obviate. Rather than simply resist power, however, the peoples considered in this volume 
seek to reveal and to steer the hidden forces that they believe animate their world, to 
explore the nuances of power and to take advantage of its ambivalence (Sanders and 
West 2003: 16).   
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In this volume many bewildering paradoxes and stunning inequalities that have 
appeared throughout the world are explained under neo-liberal transparency by 
references to “occult economies”. Thus, people in the southern Nigerian city of 
Owerri connect the growing wealth of the capitalist elite in an era of structural 
adjustment and “austerity” to the ritual murders of children and their use in magical 
practises (Bastian 2003). In northern Mozambique, residents of the Mueda plateau 
interpret the process of voter registration and use of identity cards for the first 
multiparty elections through the lens of their own experiences with the liberation 
struggle and its connections to the older idiom of witchcraft (West 2003). As observed 
by Geschiere (1997) the logic of neo-liberal capitalism can dovetail neatly with the 
logic of witchcraft in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 During my fieldwork Maputo was rife with conspiracy theories, yet few dealt 
overtly with the supernatural. Hellinger (2003) found that conspiracy theories in the 
contemporary United States often highlighted popular fears of the growing difference 
between the foundational ideals of the Republic and its role as an expansionist 
imperial power. The conspiracy theories I heard, like those discussed by Hellinger, 
tended to highlight the growing difference between the foundational ideals of 
nationalist modernity and the current practise of power. Conspiracy theories seemed 
to be a popular way of explaining and relating to the power of elite social networks 
that excluded the majority of the population and thus appeared mysterious. Yet there 
was a clear difference, even among the privileged of Maputo that I knew best. The 
conspiracy theories popular among members of the urban middle classes expressed 
less anxiety about their restricted entrance into modernity than about the possibility of 
regressing from the modernity they had already achieved.  
Many conspiracy theories were popular among elites as well. I spent hours 
having discussions about who really killed Princess Diana and the likelihood of CIA 
involvement with the attacks of the 11
th
 of September. Some elites also worried about 
the nature of Mozambican capitalism. I was told more then once by elite friends that 
Mozambique had a “savage or gangster capitalism” and one man mentioned to me 
that the country had managed to regress to a form of capitalism found in Chicago 
during the time of Al Capone. Yet many elites, interested though they were in these 
“international conspiracies”, were often far more equivocal about popular local 
conspiracy theories. 
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 The most popular local conspiracy theories I encountered during fieldwork 
seemed to involve the decline of the earlier socialist morality. One dealt with the 
death of Samora Machel. It has long been assumed, and most likely correctly, that the 
apartheid State of South Africa engineered Samora Machel’s plane crash in 1986.77 In 
Mozambique the involvement of South Africa was taken as a given; yet many middle 
class urbanites frequently speculated to me that the South Africans had not acted 
alone. I was often told that Samora Machel had planned to engage in a massive party 
purge and weed out the corrupt elements. According to this story, these members of 
Frelimo, who occupy high offices today, then gave the South Africans Machel’s flight 
plans, thus facilitating his demise.  
Another major theory involved the death of General Mabote. He was accused 
of planning a coup against the Frelimo leadership to stop the transition to multiparty 
capitalism. His subsequent trial was the first televised trial in Mozambique. He was 
eventually acquitted due to lack of evidence, but died a few years later in a swimming 
accident while on holiday in the beach town of Bilene to the north of Maputo. Once 
again many middle class Mozambicans assured me that his death was no accident, but 
a cleverly planned assassination because he “knew too much”. Most of my elite 
informants tended to be sceptical of these theories, but they held an enduring 
fascination on the ground.  
But the main topic of this section of the chapter is one of the more divisive 
local conspiracy theories that erupted during my fieldwork, of interest to elites and 
non-elites alike. It involved the assassination of a local journalist, Carlos Cardoso, and 
the subsequent trial. This trial, like the other examples, symbolised for many members 
of the urban middle classes both the “hidden evil” at the centre of elite social 
networks and the possible regression of modernity as the state no longer appeared to 
be run on “rationalist” principles, but by Byzantine conspiracies.  
 Carlos Cardoso had been one of the senior managers of the Mozambican State 
News agency during the socialist period. Although he came from a wealthy white 
Mozambican/Portuguese family and had studied abroad during the late colonial 
period, he was a committed socialist and quickly returned to Mozambique upon 
independence (Fauvet and Mosse 2003). While he had occasional confrontations with 
the Frelimo government, he cultivated ties with the more hard-line socialist wing and 
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the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa (AIM 73 2003).  
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was a strong supporter of Samora Machel. After Samora’s death and the transition to 
capitalism, Cardoso became increasingly critical of government policy, which he felt 
primarily benefited the wealthy. He left the state-run news agency and formed two 
independent papers, Mediafax and later the Metical. Although these papers were 
distributed by fax, they became very influential beyond their limited circulation of a 
couple of hundred, especially among the urban middle classes and elites. Cardoso 
began advocating economic nationalism, as he felt the revolutionary elite was selling 
the country out from beneath the feet of its citizens (Fauvet and Mosse 2003). He also 
began aggressively to report cases of corruption, especially bank scandals and 
allegations of money laundering during the real estate boom in Maputo of the 1990s.
78
  
On November 22
nd
, 2000, Cardoso was assassinated while being driven home 
from work. Although the government was initially reluctant to pursue the case, their 
hand was forced by mounting pressure, both internal and international. Six people 
were eventually arrested, and the murder was blamed on the Satars, a prominent 
Indian family with alleged mafia ties, who were involved with embezzling funds from 
one of the banks Cardoso was investigating. All six defendants were found guilty and 
three received sentences of 28 years in prison. During the trial one of the accused 
claimed they were acting on the behalf of Nyimpine Chissano, the son of the then 
president. Nyimpine had been employed by one of the banks in question as a 
consultant when its assets disappeared and he was also rumoured to have made 
immense, but illegal, profits in the real estate boom. Nyimpine was called to testify, 
but as yet no charges have been filed against him. 
 Cardoso was not the only well-respected Mozambican to be assassinated in 
connection with the widespread banking scandals. A senior officer at Banco Austral 
named Siba-Siba had been killed after he published the names of 1,500 people who 
refused to pay back longstanding loans. Many of the names were of prominent elite 
families.
79
 The Cardoso case was different though. In addition to the public outrage 
his death caused within Mozambique, he was white, well-connected both 
internationally and to members of the Frelimo government, and his wife was Danish 
and involved with Danish aid to Mozambique.
80
 The government was under intense 
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 Denmark is one of Mozambique’s major donors. 
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pressure by the international community to deal with the case in a manner that 
demonstrated the donor’s goals of “good governance” and transparency. Accordingly 
the trial became the second ever televised trial in Mozambique’s history.81 
Internationally this had the desired effect, and that year Mozambique was awarded 
more foreign aid from the World Bank than they had requested, effectively shoring up 
the losses from the bank scandal (Hanlon 2003). Domestically however, outside the 
ranks of the elites at least, it sparked ever more speculation of a wide-ranging 
conspiracy.
82
 
 The trial was electrifying. Throughout its duration one could not enter a shop 
without seeing all of the staff and the customers huddled by the radio listening to its 
progress. Talk in every taxi or bus concerned the possible fate of the filho de galo 
(son of the rooster, referring to Nyimpine Chissano). My elite informants would rush 
home during their lunch hour to watch the trial on TV. Many middle class informants 
took the day off when Nyimpine was first called before the court and invited friends 
and family over to watch the unfolding spectacle. I was present at a friend’s home and 
I watched how the audience initially took great joy in watching the heavyset young 
man in a designer suit, who was rumoured to be wealthy beyond their wildest dreams, 
uncomfortably mumble answers to the judge’s questions. They had finally seen the 
epitome of the “arrogance” of the elites’ new wealth and its repudiation of the former 
socialist goals of nationalist modernity publicly humbled. For a brief time it appeared 
that the social networks at the heart of the state had been defeated and their power 
brought out “into the open”. The owner of the house delightedly told me a story about 
Nyimpine being forced to leave a shop because the other patrons started loudly 
jeering when he arrived.  
Yet as the trial progressed and it became apparent that Nyimpine would 
survive his encounter with the law with his wealth intact, this joy turned to 
resentment. Nyimpine had long had a bad reputation and was cast in popular 
imagination as a gangster and a drug smuggler. As the trial continued, the stories 
about Nyimpine became increasingly elaborate. Middle-class informants would tell 
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 This was also due to irregularities that occurred during the trial. The man accused of actually 
planning the murder, Anabalzinho, escaped from prison when someone forgot to lock all three of the 
locks on his cell door. He then fled the country. Many felt he was the link between Nyimpine and the 
Satar family. He was sentenced in absentia, but was captured in South Africa the day before the 
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again and was recently recaptured in Canada.  
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me how Nyimpine had threatened them with a gun, beaten up local police, tried to 
coerce women to have sex with him by the power of his family name, and how he had 
been shot in the leg by the presidential security detail when he drew a gun and tried to 
attack his father in a fit of rage. While some middle-class informants would insist that 
the son had been doing the father’s dirty work, most of the overall blame fell upon 
Nyimpine’s mother, Marcelina Chissano. She had an even worse reputation than her 
son and was thought to be thoroughly venal and corrupt. She was seen as the shadowy 
mastermind behind many of the scandals. The stories began to take on all the 
elements of a Jacobean drama, with corruption, nepotism, brutality, murder, a 
scheming mother and a son who raises his hand in anger towards his father. It was the 
antithesis of what modernity was supposed to bring. Many middle-class informants 
were convinced that the results of the trial were flawed and those truly responsible 
had managed to avoid justice because of their political contacts. 
 Many (but not all) of my friends among the independence elite, however, 
perceived the situation very differently. Although few would rally to the defence of 
Marcelina Chissano, her reputation among many elite circles being only slightly better 
than in the popular imagination, most felt Nyimpine was innocent. Many of them 
knew Nyimpine personally. They stated that he was arrogant and this did not help his 
public image, but he was not a murderous drug dealing Mafioso, simply a successful, 
if sometimes questionable, businessman whose accomplishments had aroused 
jealousy. The elites I spoke with felt Nyimpine had been accused as part of an effort 
to misdirect blame and attention away from the guilty and that he was being made a 
scapegoat because he came from a powerful family. When I mentioned the other 
stories I had heard involving his various alleged acts of misconduct, most simply 
rolled their eyes. I was told that these stories came not from people who actually knew 
him, but from hangers-on: such stories were said to be simply expressions of jealousy 
because he is successful and they are not. While many of my elite friends, both 
independence and revolutionary, said there were problems with the trial and there are 
mafia connections with the government, this is the result of individual corruption and 
not part of a wide-ranging conspiracy. The majority felt that justice was done and 
those responsible had been sent to prison. 
 The divergence between elite and the middle class interpretation of this trial 
fits within the wider framework of the changes that have happened in the transition 
from socialism to multiparty capitalism.  What elites see as jealousy from those who 
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begrudge them their success, the middle classes see as a conspiracy that explains why 
wealth and power are still concentrated in the same hands, the hands of those who 
once promised a form of modernity that would bring prosperity and equality to 
everyone. Yet the reason conspiracy theories have not turned into action is because 
there is not really all that much that can be done. The revolutionary elite that once 
relied on the middle classes has far stronger backers now and few harbour any 
illusions that the opposition would be any better. Many of the urban middle classes 
think it may be worse. This is not to say that elites need no longer concern themselves 
with securing internal legitimacy. The numerous scandals that surrounded President 
Chissano did hurt him politically and lost him party support in a bid for the 
continuation of his presidency (Hanlon, personal communication). In his inaugural 
speech in 2005, the new President, Armando Guebuza, promised to put an end to the 
spirit of deixa andar (let it go, let it roll, a phrase that refers to Chissano’s perceived 
permissive attitude towards corruption and the misuse of power), in a bid to win back 
support from the disaffected (ibid). Yet what the conflicting attitudes towards the 
Cardoso case demonstrate is that while securing internal legitimacy is important, it is 
secondary to securing external legitimacy. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has discussed one of the central paradoxes of the democratic 
project in Mozambique: that the process of democratisation has left people feeling 
that they have become disenfranchised and that, despite the social closeness between 
the elite and the middle classes where the differences between the two are measured 
more by gradients of wealth and the power of their respective social networks rather 
than overall difference, the elite currently have less need to rely on them than 
previously. This analysis is accurate in as much as democracy in Mozambique was 
introduced less to legitimise the government with the people as to legitimate it with 
the “international community” and end the civil war. Unlike Chabal and Daloz’s 
conceptions of power in Africa, in which elites derive internal legitimacy through 
patrimonial networks, for the urban middle classes in Maputo at least, I have 
demonstrated that while the ideals elites are supposed to embody remains legitimate, 
the elites themselves, through their accumulation of “illegitimate” wealth, appear less 
so.  
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Although Mozambican society has supposedly experienced an “opening” since 
the transition to democratic capitalism, many members of the urban middle classes 
feel that they are being excluded from new opportunities because they lack the social 
connections to break into the existing elite. While urbanites frequently decry the 
repudiation of the former discourse of equality in favour of a new discourse that 
places a premium on the acquisition of wealth and individual success, it seems that 
the middle classes are in the process of internalising these values as well. The 
dissonance between the stated rhetoric of the new political order (which promises that 
all can participate) and the perceived reality (that is characterised by elite 
monopolisation of opportunity) is widely recognised, if differently explained by elites 
and non-elites. For the middle classes this dissonance between rhetoric and reality is 
often explained with the language of conspiracy, with the Carlos Cardoso affair 
appearing as the epitome of everything that has gone wrong with the transition. For 
elites, the conspiracy theories that have arisen from this case show a very different 
story, one characterised by the jealousy of those who have not managed to achieve the 
same degree of success in a new political and economic environment. What the case 
also symbolises is a worry, shared by elites and the urban middle classes but to 
differing degrees, that the current form of modernity espoused by elites may actually 
mask a regression to a form of “primitive” accumulation. The following chapter 
examines another expression of elite modernity concerning marriage and intimate 
relationships. This chapter also focuses on how shared ideals and social backgrounds 
can connect the urban middle classes and elites while differing levels of wealth and 
social status can create new barriers.       
.
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Chapter Six. 
 
Gender, Intimacy and Power  
 
The emancipation of women is not an act of charity, the result of a humanitarian or 
compassionate attitude. The liberation of women is a fundamental necessity of the 
revolution, the guarantee of its continuity and the precondition of its victory. The main 
objective of the revolution is to destroy the system of exploitation and build a new 
society which releases the potential of human beings, reconciling them with labour and 
with nature. This is the context within which the question of women’s emancipation 
arises (Samora Machel, quoted in Newitt 1995: 548). 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
As was often the case, after my interview with Olga I was invited to have lunch 
with her family. Olga suffers from a progressive bone disease that leaves her 
housebound. I had known Olga for quite some time during my fieldwork and I would 
often visit just for a chat, in addition to interviews and the collection of a life history. 
Olga and her family are of Portuguese descent. She was raised in Lourenço Marques 
(Maputo) by her mother who worked as a nurse. Her father had left the family when 
she was a small child. During the 1960s while Olga attended university in Lourenço 
Marques she became radicalised, following the example of the 1968 May Rebellion in 
France. She and her then future husband, Sergio, joined leftwing student groups, who 
sided with Frelimo in advocating independence for Mozambique. Although her 
mother strongly opposed her political views, Olga continued her involvement with 
leftwing groups until she and Sergio came to the attention of PIDE and were forced to 
flee the country to avoid arrest. They settled in Belgium and Olga began to work for a 
network of African independence organisations that put them in touch with Frelimo. 
They joined the party and left for Frelimo’s headquarters in Tanzania to participate in 
the liberation struggle. Because of their comparatively high levels of education they 
were made teachers at the party school located in a Frelimo base camp near the 
Mozambican border. After independence they were made the headmasters of another 
party school in Nampula before eventually being transferred to direct the Frelimo 
School in East Germany. Upon their return Olga and her husband worked at the 
Ministry of education, but Olga’s disease forced her to take early retirement. 
I enjoyed talking to Olga and her family; unlike many people Olga always made 
time for interviews. As she is currently studying anthropology at UEM she is 
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sympathetic to fledgling fieldworkers. I also think the interviews also helped her pass 
the time. Although Olga and her family are very well-off by Mozambican standards 
(they have a large apartment with servants and can afford to send both their children 
to university while allowing their eldest son to indulge in his hobby, sailing) and have 
strong political connections, they are not in the current top ranks of the revolutionary 
elite. They belong to the “old socialist” wing of the party and both Olga and Sergio 
are increasingly nervous about the capitalist direction that Mozambique has taken 
since 1991. 
Like many in Maputo, the entire family would often take advantage of the 
generous lunch siesta and come home and eat together. The empregadas (maids) 
would spend much of the morning preparing the lunchtime meal. During one lunch 
that I attended the family began to argue about a recent scandal involving the Minister 
of Education, Sergio’s boss. The Minister had been implicated in stealing money from 
an NGO scholarship fund and using the money to send his children to private schools 
in Switzerland. The children began attacking the perceived corrupt practises of the 
government in general and the Minster of Education in particular. Olga stayed silent, 
but Sergio began, half-heartedly, defending his Minister, which caused his children to 
laugh at him. The eldest son remarked bitterly: “Come on Dad, you know he did it, 
they always do, but you always defend them. Samora is dead and things have 
changed. Why do you defend them? You know what they are like now”. Sergio took 
offence to this and stated: “Yes, I defend them; look at what they have done for this 
country!” Sergio paused for a minute, trying to think of a policy enacted by the 
government that he supported and was still in practice after the fall of socialism. 
Finally he said: “The emancipation of women! That is what Frelimo has done. I will 
continue to support the party that has accomplished that in this country”! 
As both the quote by Samora Machel and Sergio’s comments show, the role of 
women in society has long been a major concern for the Frelimo party leadership and 
the revolutionary elite in general. Currently Frelimo reserves one third of its 
parliamentary seats for female delegates and has recently appointed a female Prime 
Minister, the highest-ranking woman in Mozambique’s history (Sheldon 2002). While 
these are important milestones, when Frelimo took power their concern went beyond 
simply empowering women to vote and hold political office. According to the party, 
the oppression of women was symptomatic of the wider “feudal” character of 
Mozambican society and the oppression of women was part and parcel of the 
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oppression all Mozambicans suffered (Sheldon 2002). In the revolutionary elite’s 
view this oppression was deeply rooted within Mozambican society, stemming, in 
part, from the brutality of Portuguese colonialism and the arbitrary power of 
“traditional chiefs” who, in practise were often appointed by the Portuguese. Yet this 
idea of oppression also went beyond the political realm. The revolutionary elite felt 
that Mozambicans were socialised to accept arbitrary authority both because of 
colonialism and due to the “backwards” nature of the family that supposedly made the 
patriarch all-powerful within his limited domain (Sheldon 2002: 131-135). It was 
these “backwards” attitudes shared by the population at large which had to be 
overcome for the creation of a modern society epitomised by the (unintentionally 
ironic) “Novo Homem”. While the emancipation of women was seen as a social 
necessity, it was because it served as a crucial part of the revolutionary elite’s wider 
project of modernity. 
After coming to power in 1975, Frelimo attacked polygyny and lobolo (bride 
wealth) as distasteful remnants of the old society. They argued that these practises 
relegated women to mere property, like goods that could be sold at a shop. For society 
to advance and for the creation of an industrial state, the party leadership argued that 
these attitudes would have to be overcome and abolished and women must be free to 
enter the economy at all levels. Shortly after independence the party took steps to try 
and enforce their ideal of gender equality on the nation. Polygamous men were 
banned from party membership and the practise of lobolo was officially outlawed 
(although it continued to be widely practised). The party also introduced legislation 
that was intended to address the plight of women and make them equal under the law. 
Furthermore, efforts were made to re-educate the population and create a wider 
understanding of the new role of women in a socialist society (Sheldon 2002; West 
2001). The steps taken by Frelimo to try and redefine the role of women in society 
after independence were similar to many measures taken throughout the socialist 
world (Molyneux 1981; Sheldon 2002). Moore (1988. cf.) demonstrates through case 
studies in the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba that the liberation of women was one of 
the major objectives common to all of these revolutionary parties. Although, as in the 
case of Mozambique and to a lesser extent, Tanzania, the liberation of women was not 
seen as a goal in itself, but as part of the wider objective of transforming societies in 
general. Legal provisions to create a state of equality between women and men and 
communist/socialist parties’ efforts to change the family structure were often 
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constrained by patriarchal attitudes of many (male) members of the party leadership 
and; as women’s liberation was part of a broader goal, it was often subsumed in 
importance to wider social objectives (Mbilinyi 1972; Moore 1988; Sheldon 2002). 
Yet, despite the limits that communist/socialist parties placed on feminist agendas, it 
has been widely observed that the role of women in society generally increased and 
communist/socialist parties generally made efforts to reform some of the most blatant 
expressions of patriarchy (Gal and Kligman 2000; Rosemblatt 2000). 
 As with the case studies provided by Moore (1988), while the emancipation of 
women (and eventually society in general) was the stated goal of Frelimo, the 
primarily male, former assimilado, urban, mission-educated party leadership had 
specific ideas as to what this would mean in practise. While the “backwards” ideas 
related to gender, intimacy, marriage and family were attacked by the revolutionary 
elite, the discourse they promoted, publicly at least, had similarities to the 
conventional model that had been espoused by the Portuguese upper-class and the 
mission schools, although it was based on legal equality for women. Prostitution was 
deemed a decadent and bourgeoisie crime and sexual relationships outside of 
marriage were officially frowned on by the party, and according to Sergio, discovery 
could lead to punishment (Hall and Young 1997). If a couple was living together or 
sexual relations resulted in pregnancy, Frelimo would often force the responsible 
parties to marry, especially if one of the people was a high-ranking member of 
Frelimo. This was often the explanation given for the presumed marital troubles of the 
then president, Joaquim Chissano, whose supposedly turbulent family life had become 
the stuff of legend in Maputo. My friend Sergio had also been forced by the party to 
marry Olga. When they fled Mozambique they had been in a committed relationship, 
but Sergio had no desire to marry as he felt the institution was bourgeois. Upon 
joining the party he found that he and Olga’s relationship was considered unorthodox 
and they were told to remedy that. Although they did not know him very well, 
Marcelino Dos Santos, the Vice-President of Frelimo, stood in as his godfather during 
the ceremony, demonstrating the importance that the party attached to the regulation 
of its members intimate lives. Upon returning to Mozambique after the liberation 
struggle, Sergio and Olga found that their marriage documents had been lost and they 
were forced to marry again. Sergio had always intended to stay in a committed 
relationship with Olga; still he often joked that he was the only man he knew of that 
had been forced to marry the same woman twice. The revolutionary elite felt that the 
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role of women in society and the “modernisation” of the role of women and of the 
relationships between men and women was a central plank of the revolution. But the 
emancipation was not seen as a question of individual liberties or as a matter for 
specific individuals. It was seen by the revolutionary elite as a societal need and these 
processes occurred simultaneously as the leadership of Frelimo felt the compulsion to 
ever more closely regulate the intimate lives of its members and bind high-ranking 
Frelimo officials more tightly together in what was known as the “ideological family” 
(personal communication Harry West). 
Anthony Giddens (1992) argues, somewhat controversially, that modernity 
brings about a revolution in romantic intimacy that is taking place throughout the 
world. The “modern” form of intimacy, according to Giddens, is based on a self-
reflexive personhood that holds itself as the primary reference, not the wider social 
group. It is in fact a “plastic sexuality” that is severed from its age-old integration 
with reproduction and kinship and it depends on being mutually fulfilling to the self to 
survive. In simple terms Giddens states that under modernity relationships are now 
based on social and emotional equality and are entered into for their own sake, and 
can be ended by either partner at will. As with many who speak of the changes 
brought about by modernity, the universalism of the tone is contradicted by the fact 
that most of the examples used tend to be drawn from the generic and idealised 
experiences of the western middle and upper-middle classes. Predictably Giddens has 
drawn criticism from his universalising tendencies. Kapila (2004) and Parry (2001) 
have demonstrated that in India ideas of intimacy are deeply connected with caste and 
class.  Local ideas of modernity, in conjunction with strong programmes of state 
intervention have created an ideal that modern relationships are not based on the idea 
of free de-coupling, but on the idea of permanence (Kapila 2004). In west Africa, 
Oppong (1981) observed that among Ghanian civil servants in Accra, entrance into 
the state economy and the adoption of “modern” forms of marriage did not destroy 
older forms of kin-based social organisation so much as reform them. As the 
examples above show, “modernity” is a complicated process that can take different 
forms in various societies. While it is undoubtedly true that many people throughout 
the world feel that processes often known as “modernisation” bring about 
fundamental changes in romantic intimacy and of the relationships between men, 
women and the wider society, generic descriptions of what these changes are will 
often be misleading at best if not grounded in specific social settings.  
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This chapter examines the often-contradictory effects of the party’s 
emancipation of women and Frelimo’s project of modernity on romantic intimacy and 
family structure among the Mozambican national elite. Like Giddens, the 
revolutionary elite also assumed that nationalist modernity and socialism would bring 
about a dramatic change, not only in the role of women, but also in the relationships 
both between men and women and between men, women and their wider families 
(Sheldon 2002). Many members of the revolutionary elite came from assimilado 
backgrounds and as shown in previous chapters, assimilação as a legal concept 
carried certain restrictions of the types of family relationships that would be allowed. 
Assimilados were not allowed to be polygamous (although some people did manage to 
circumvent these restrictions) and many were educated at mission schools. The 
Frelimo leadership spoke the language of nationalist modernity and socialism and 
viewed the religious establishment with suspicion, but elements of many of the 
revolutionary elite’s early Christian education helped to shape their later worldview. 
In many ways Christianity served as an initial entry into modernity for the colonial 
elite, and many of the customs their descendants, the revolutionary elite, later attacked 
were also previously condemned by the Church. Familiarity with elements of 
Christian tradition (both Protestant and Catholic) was common among the urban petty 
bourgeois of the south during the colonial period. This helped to bind the party 
leadership with many members of the urban middle classes, as Frelimo’s plans to 
transform intimate and family life held aspects in common with Christian teachings. 
The revolutionary elite felt that to build a new society it was essential to “modernise” 
gender and family relationships in Mozambique. Due to their ideological stance and 
the residual influence of Christianity, reformed gender and family relations were to be 
more in line with what was thought to occur in the “west”. Yet “modern” 
relationships for the revolutionary elite were to be very different than the model 
described by Giddens. The new form of family and romantic intimacy was not to be 
based on its ability to be fulfilling solely to the self, but to society. Initially personal 
choice was of limited ideological importance and despite the gradual “opening” of 
society since the fall of socialism; romantic intimacy and family structure have 
remained a key factor in the elite consolidation. Even under democratic capitalism 
individual fulfilment can often be a secondary consideration. 
 Mann’s (1985) study of Nigerian elites in the early colonial period 
demonstrated that “Christian” forms of marriage and family structure became 
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emblematic with a specific section of the indigenous elite. This was a small group 
whose power was not based primarily in traditional structures, but whose status grew 
in relation to the new opportunities provided by contact with the British. This elite 
included some successful traders, but the majority of its (male) members filled the 
growing need for professionals and the civil service, before there were a sufficient 
number of whites to fill these occupations. The Nigerian elite adopted western 
“Christian” marriages as an outward symbol of their status, but also because 
monogamous marriages conserved resources for the nuclear family unit and more 
could be invested into the educational needs and future positions of the children of 
these unions. Finally elite women generally advocated for this form of marriage as it 
both increased their status and guaranteed their place and that of their children could 
not usurped by a new wife. Similar marriage patterns have been observed amongst 
post-colonial elites in Sierra Leone and Ghana, both for the emphasis of status and the 
consolidation of resources (Cohen 1981; Oppong 1981). Yet despite the efforts among 
elites to consolidate resources in the nuclear family unit, there is a continuing 
tendency for elite men to form outside liaisons or “outside wives” as they are known 
in east Africa. While the nuclear family unit is legally recognised, the domestic 
primacy of elite women still faces threats (Karanja 1987; Mann 1985; Obbo 1987; 
Oppong 1981). 
The Frelimo-based national elite, although initially radically socialist, anti-
religious and egalitarian, has also undergone a period of domestic elite consolidation 
and has also had similar contradictory effects. While women were to be emancipated, 
the process was conceived and decided on by a ruling, predominantly male elite and 
undertaken in a “top-down” manner. In doing so the new legal framework for women 
followed the social vision of the party leadership. Families were not to be abolished, 
but instead, based upon a stable and monogamous husband and wife pair which would 
be the base of society. In reality the party never had sufficient power to enforce their 
views on the country in general and changing forms of marriage and romantic 
intimacy were concentrated among the revolutionary elite and the urban middle 
classes.  
Yet as these changing patterns became characteristic of elites and ever more 
concerned with elite consolidation, it became harder to distinguish elites from the 
urban middle classes. These two groups were drawn closer together threatening the 
unity of elites, as observed by Robertson: “Reproduction poses the most serious threat 
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to the maintenance of class power” (1991: 100). Like the example of the “power elite” 
described by Mills (1956) in the introduction of this thesis, growing social 
stratification has been accompanied by attempts by elites to police their boundaries 
and maintain endogamy. This chapter examines the efforts of elites to harness the 
changing role of women to ongoing processes of class consolidation through 
endogamy thereby surviving the “dangers of reproduction” that threaten to dilute 
scarce resources. Yet, as with the other African examples mentioned above, these 
processes of elite consolidation are never total, and elites in Mozambique have never 
achieved the levels of centralisation of the “power elite”. Although elite endogamy is 
broadly successful, their social closeness to the urban middle classes makes it more 
difficult to keep the groups separate. The chapter describes elite attempts to draw 
distinctions between themselves and others and how these social pressures are 
circumvented. Following the lead of Moore I examine both: “…how individuals 
become engendered subjects and come to organise their social practices in a way as to 
reproduce dominant categories, discourses and practices” (1994: 51) and how 
individuals try to manoeuvre around dominant social categories. I argue that while 
overall class barriers between elites and the urban middle classes may be hardening, 
romantic attachments do allow these barriers to be transcended on an individual level 
without endangering the system of stratification as a whole. Unlike the model 
proposed by Giddens, the form of modernity that has taken effect after Frelimo came 
to power has left romantic intimacy a question of concern not just at an individual 
level, but still deeply intertwined with questions of reproduction and kin. The social 
changes that followed the liberation struggle and that have gathered strength since the 
fall of socialism make it harder for elite families to exercise overall parental control. 
This chapter draws upon information from many different sources I encountered 
during fieldwork, but is primarily based on the experiences of six elite families 
(encompassing the revolutionary and independence elites) and five middle class 
families in Maputo and how these groups interact with each other. The remainder of 
the chapter will examine the processes by describing intimacy and courtship from 
independence to the present day, the process of class consolidation and the 
relationship of the elite with the urban middle classes, and changing patterns of 
marriage. 
 
6.2 Intimacy and Courtship 
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 As shown by Sheldon (2002) in her in-depth study of women’s history in 
Mozambique from the late pre-colonial period to the present, in many ways intimate 
relationships that did not directly lead to marriage and child birth are relatively new 
for most of Mozambique’s population. In the view of the party leadership, intimacy 
historically was directly tied to social and biological reproduction and, theoretically at 
least, was under the control of the wider family. Frelimo described this as the 
“feudalism” of the family. They felt this had to be abolished so women could enter 
society as full citizens and no longer be traded “like goods in a shop” according to the 
famous phrase of Samora Machel (Sheldon 2002). Some of the roots of this desire for 
change can be traced to the revolutionary elite’s social background under colonialism. 
During the colonial period traditional practices of marriage were considered 
“backwards” and the state prohibited them for many elites. Yet an “ideal” marriage 
focused on its wider social function, the creation of a strong and stable nuclear family 
unit dedicated to the production of children. Therefore marriages were often too 
important to be left to the choice of the couple alone, and familial supervision 
attempted to police relations both to consolidate social class and because of possible 
state sanctions (Sheldon 2002). While pre-material relationships and infidelity 
obviously occurred (sanctions were also much weaker for men) considerable effort 
was often expended on being discreet. The colonial state could rescind assimilado 
status for “immoral” conduct or what they viewed as “backsliding” into “heathen” 
African customs such as polygyny. Despite the numerous differences between the 
urban petty bourgeois and the majority of the population, concerned parents of both 
groups often tightly supervised sexuality and romantic intimacy. As one older 
Mozambican friend explained to me, when she began her courtship with her future 
husband, she was always chaperoned. The most daring activity she engaged in was to 
have secret phone calls from her fiancé that were unmonitored by her family. As 
numerous other informants explained to me, courtship was often very short and led to 
the immediate establishment of a family. 
 This began to change after the revolution. The education system was expanded 
and more young people came into contact with one another outside of the confines of 
home and familial supervision. As I have previously stated, one of Frelimo’s prime 
concerns was the regulation of its militants’ (and by extension their families’) intimate 
lives, yet some of the social forces they unleashed by the revolution began to put that 
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goal into jeopardy. This has become gradually more pronounced since the fall of 
socialism and the “liberalisation” of society. Paradoxically, as the perceived need for 
elite consolidation has become ever greater, the social control of families has 
weakened in some respects. Many friends of mine spoke of frequent parties that were 
held by school friends and neighbours during the socialist period. Under the austerity 
of wartime socialism these parties were one of the principal means of recreation. They 
were rather tame affairs compared to the discotheques that have flourished under 
capitalism. Alcohol was hard to obtain and available only in limited quantities and 
drugs were quite rare. The parties often started quite late and the owners of the house 
(usually the parents) typically went to bed early, leaving the young free to interact and 
form potential romantic attachments with only limited supervision. This trend has 
continued after the fall of socialism with the growth of capitalist individualism and 
the revolutionary elite practice of sending their children to study abroad where they 
are relatively free of parental supervision. Despite the revolutionary elite’s puritan 
roots, public sexual relationships that do not necessarily entail long-term obligations 
are becoming more common. Yet their meaning is still contested and many elite 
families worry that these relationships could lead to more permanent liaisons. Non-
permanent sexual relationships are generally known by the Portuguese verb namorar 
(to go out with someone, to have a girlfriend or boyfriend). There is pressure for 
independence elites to marry other elites (of which I will speak about more later in the 
chapter). But the preservation of endogamy is often very difficult in practice as there 
is extensive social contact between elites and the urban middle classes that can lead to 
romantic attachments. 
 Weekends among the independence elite and the urban middle classes often 
followed a predictable pattern in Maputo. On Fridays people would meet after work 
for drinks and perhaps dinner, then they would go home to rest and get ready for the 
night. My friends would often meet again around eleven in the evening for drinks at a 
bar, leaving for a disco at around midnight or one in the morning. One did not usually 
go home until around five in the morning. The popularity of any given disco was 
often fleeting and they opened and closed with great regularity. Although there were 
frequently changing venues, the discos themselves tended to rather similar. They were 
dark with flashing lights and played similar combinations of popular western dance 
music combined with Latin music and occasional African songs. The dance floors 
were usually full and surrounded by large groups of people who carefully watched 
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and commented on the proceedings. Women were usually dressed in their best and 
most revealing Brazilian fashions, while hip-hop and faux-gangster styles were the 
height of fashion for men, although some of the older men wore suits. The president’s 
sons and their entourage were usually lounging in the corner of whatever was the 
most fashionable club at the moment wearing white panama suits and white fedoras 
while smoking Cuban cigars and drinking Johnny Walker. 
 In a successful club, the balconies were teeming with people coming off the 
dance floor for more generalised flirting and to greet people. Most of the participants 
were well-known to each other and often connected through webs of work, school, 
familial and social relationships. The goal of these occasions was to relax and enjoy 
one’s self, but there were also frequent conflicts. Due to the perceived prevalence of 
adultery, couples often watched each other with a jealous eye and relationships were 
frequently regarded with a degree of mild paranoia. Occasionally violence would 
break out, usually as men accuse one another of trying to steal their girlfriends. More 
rarely violence would escalate and sometimes panic would ensue as one of the people 
involved in the fight would go to his car for his gun or knife. Less frequently women 
would be involved in violence, once again, usually prompted by accusations that 
someone had tried to steal someone else’s boyfriend. While many go to the discos to 
relax, dance and spend time with friends, one of the primary goals of the evenings 
was to form a romantic relationship. 
 Although elite families were concerned with maintaining elite endogamy, their 
(now adult) children were able to exercise a considerable degree of freedom. The 
types of social activities practised by the independence elite (and the urban middle 
classes) are displays of the cosmopolitan modernity that the independence elite is 
supposed to embody, which demonstrate their easy familiarity with international 
trends and fashions. The price of urban leisure activities was prohibitive for the vast 
majority of the population, but young members of the urban middle classes were able 
to enjoy the same facilities and take part in the same activities. The disparity in 
consumption patterns between the elite and the urban middle classes was often a 
question of degrees as opposed to overall difference. In these mixed environments it 
was easy to form cross-class relationships, although as this chapter will show these 
relationships were not always on an equal basis. As the above example illustrates the 
social mix can be volatile and is often characterised by mistrust. 
 
 188 
6.3 The Invention of Social Divisions and Machismo 
 
 There is a great deal of social mixing between the elite and the urban middle 
classes. As the previous chapter has demonstrated, the elite and the middle class share 
very similar social origins, but both independence and revolutionary elites speak of 
the different type of behaviours that supposedly characterise each group. Young 
women from the independence elite would often speak of the prevalence of 
machismo, or more sexist and less “enlightened” attitudes towards women, which was 
seen as concentrated among the less wealthy who are not as cosmopolitan. As Halima 
and Varyna, two members of the independence elite told me, they would be reluctant 
to form a serious relationship with someone who had not been abroad as they would 
be too “provincial” and would not have been exposed to more modern forms of 
relations, built upon notions of equality and respect. If pressed though, young elite 
women would often make similar characterisations about the machsimo of men 
belonging to the independence elite as well. This section examines how members of 
the independence elite continually create and re-define the social boundaries and 
different behaviours between these two groups, even if they do not always maintain 
the boundaries that they set. 
 In Roger Lancaster’s book, “Life is Hard” (1993) he describes machismo in 
Nicaragua as a stylised set of behaviours that affirms male dominance and patriarchy. 
According to Lancaster machismo is an ideal of male behaviour that is supposed to be 
characterised by an active, sexually dominant, aggressive man in contrast to the ideal 
of a passive and demure women. The “typical” machista is a heavy drinking, 
womanising, often violent man who dominates social and domestic life. In 
Mozambique similar patterns of behaviour are allowed for men (to a degree), 
although they were attacked under socialism (yet many members of the male 
leadership seemed to have had a somewhat ambivalent attitude towards machismo in 
practice), as these behaviours are often directly contradictory with the socialist ideal 
of destroying “feudalism” in the family. However, heavy drinking, multiple sex 
partners and on occasion multiple families were frequent occurrences among older 
male informants. Moore speaks of male violence directed towards spouses in Andean 
Columbia as explicable due to the prevailing set of gender relations: “…the self-
representations of individual men as gendered persons included the right and the 
power to have extra-marital relationships as part of a definition of masculinity as 
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active and aggressive, and hierarchically defined in relation to femininity” (1994: 69). 
Men in this context often vent their frustrations at their lovers and upon their wives, 
because their wives are the only people explicitly under their control.  
 The case is slightly different for Mozambican elites who are able to exercise 
social power more widely than the examples cited by Moore. In addition I have no 
data concerning domestic violence between men and women. Yet despite these 
differences there are similarities with Mozambican machismo. By exercising their 
“privilege” to indulge in “outside” relationships, men manage to monopolise a degree 
of power, as they can spread resources outside of the domestic unit. Although the 
revolution enabled (in fact insisted) that the status of women be changed in the new 
society, machismo allows men to assert power independent of the wider familial and 
social circles where elite power is nestled. Women often state that machismo is more 
prevalent primarily outside of elite social circles, but in many cases this appears to be 
more wishful thinking, a statement of how “modern” elite males should act, rather 
than an actual statement of fact. This situation is compounded by the fact that many 
women feel at a disadvantage, as there is a common belief that women dramatically 
outnumber men in Maputo. I was frequently told that the ratio was seven to one. 
Although this statement does not withstand statistical analysis, it is widely believed. 
Many women I knew felt that the availability of multiple sex partners for men means 
that they have to make compromises or their partner could easily leave them and find 
someone else. Machismo in Mozambique is a site of great social tensions as it is 
feared to be inimical to class consolidation by breaking up marriages and spreading 
resources outside a tight social group. This is widely recognised and relationships 
with elite men are often one of the prime opportunities for material advancement for 
women of lower-ranking backgrounds. 
 The epitome of urban Mozambican machismo is o dia dos homens (the day of 
the men). The day of the men is not so much an official date as it is a running joke. It 
occurs on Fridays and is celebrated by both elites and members of the urban middle 
classes. The most enthusiastic participants were men in their late 20s and older who 
were involved in serious relationships or married, although it was observed by 
younger, more loosely attached men as well. As with other urban social activities, the 
day of the men also tended to follow a standardised pattern. Men would meet each 
other at a bar on Friday night and have drinks. Conversation focused on issues such as 
work, politics, drinking and, of course sex. Whenever I asked a man where his partner 
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was I would usually be given a look of contempt, often accompanied by the reply: 
“Ela esta na casa. Sexta-feira é o dia dos homens” (She is at home. Friday is the day 
of the men). This would normally draw exclamations of approval from the others 
present. Those present would continue with drinking and male bonding. As the night 
progressed men would often complain that there were no women present and suggest 
that the party be relocated to a disco that would have mixed company. The day of the 
men did not have to be spent entirely in male company; in fact meeting new women 
was often one of its goals. The day of the men is about stereotypically male 
conversations with friends, but it is also about asserting the independence that goes 
with the Mozambican version of machismo, something that women are usually aware 
of, but often unable to stop. It was more than male bonding; it was a symbol of male 
independence tied to a reassertion of female domesticity. 
 Machismo symbolises male power and independence (and conversely male 
“backwardness” as well) despite the gains from the revolution and post-socialist 
period, yet norms covering the behaviour of young women are also undergoing 
considerable cultural tension. According to most of my female friends from the 
independence elite, there has been a gradual and often contested relaxation of the 
rules covering female conduct. Currently women are able to openly talk about sex in 
mixed gender situations and could take the initiative in forming romantic relationships 
without incurring much in the way of social sanctions. These changes began in the 
socialist period and have increased due to the continued “liberalisation” of capitalism. 
 Halima, an informant in her mid-20s during fieldwork, had studied abroad for 
many years. She claimed that the increase in education abroad was a key factor for 
changing attitudes towards women. 
 
When we came back from school we got a very bad reputation. There was a lot of gossip 
about us. Oh you know, the usual stuff. We learned a different lifestyle studying abroad 
and when we came back we did things differently. Things like clubbing, drinking, dating, 
smoking pot, that sort of thing. People thought we were really bad when we first came 
back. My father used to ask me why it was I, and not his sons who took after him. Things 
have calmed down now; many more people have studied abroad and come back. People 
are becoming more used to it, women acting independently (Field notes 5 July 2004). 
 
As Halima’s statements demonstrate, the growth of “cosmopolitan modernity” 
through one of its key symbols, studying abroad, has coincided with an increased 
measure of freedom for young women from the independence elite. It also conveys a 
subtle connotation of difference. Due to the fact that she and her friends had studied 
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abroad their painstakingly acquired cosmopolitan modernity could only be 
appreciated by a select few who had comparable experiences, usually of studying 
abroad. As Halima says, even elites were initially shocked by new standards of 
behaviour. That is why Halima and her friend stated that they would be hesitant to 
become seriously involved with someone who had not lived abroad. Thus the idea of 
elite endogamy is not only reinforced by the material considerations of class position, 
but also by shared attitudes. 
This sense of difference is evident in the ways in which different social groups 
view the changing standard of behaviour for young women. While young elites can 
lay claim to cosmopolitan sophistication, similar behaviour from women from the 
urban middle classes often draws harsh comments from the elder generation. One 
middle class woman I knew who was in her early 40s went so far as to claim that the 
crime of rape is now impossible because young women dress and act in such a 
provocative manner that any man could be excused for misreading a woman’s 
intentions. She had recently been at a disco with her husband and was furious that a 
younger woman had approached her husband and openly flirted with him, requesting 
drinks, right in front of her. As she told me: “I was with him, he had a ring on his 
finger and she did not even care”. 
 As with many of the divisions between the elite and the urban middle classes, 
the differential relationship with machismo exists more in theory than in practice. 
While elites speak of the types of behaviours that characterise the respective groups 
highlighting the social divisions between the cosmopolitan and liberal elites as 
opposed to the machista and materialistic middle classes, in actual practice many of 
the individual behaviours are the same, although the motivation behind them can 
differ. The difference lies primarily in the ways in which these groups can represent 
themselves, as either sophisticated or as unreconstructed sexists. Within these broad 
characterisations, many individual exceptions occur as well; but, while deeply 
meaningful on an individual level, exceptions do not tend to lead to an overall 
levelling of social difference. The following section will examine how the relationship 
between these two groups translates into the practise of class consolidation. 
 
6.4 Class Consolidation 
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 Alexander Robertson (1991) has observed that reproductive strategies are 
essential for the survival of upper class or elite groups and are a key factor in 
maintaining an elite identity and take a different form from those of the groups that 
they dominate.  
 
Above all, one has to have demonstrated the capacity to reproduce within the privileged 
class: to endow offspring with competitive advantages and to consolidate gains from one 
generation to the next. Reproductive strategies are therefore of acute concern. Like any 
other enduring community, a ruling class gains real coherence from webs of reproductive 
relationships woven by strategic marriages. Class, it is often said, is a matter of 
“breeding”. Reproductive strategies protect class privilege; and class privileges protect 
the reproductive process. … Dependence on family ties – the relationships of 
reproduction – is a physical survival strategy for the working class, and a social survival 
strategy for those who dominate them (1991: 130).    
 
In the Mozambican case, this can be seen by the reluctance demonstrated by young 
members of the independence elite to involve themselves with those who have not 
travelled abroad. In so many words this tends to restrict their relationships to other 
members of the independence elite. Some form of elite endogamy is not an entirely 
new phenomenon either. Since the colonial period there has been a tendency for elite 
families to “cut themselves off” from poorer kin. Part of this was a result of colonial 
policy as assimilado families were encouraged to disassociate themselves from 
“heathen” relatives for the fear of having their status rescinded (Sithole and Ingwane 
1977: 5-6). 
 In the capitalist era this process continues on what seems to be a dual track 
with elite families cutting off poorer relations to focus on the nuclear family, on the 
one hand, and trying to form connections with other elite families of similar standing 
on the other, as will be demonstrated later in the chapter. Oppong (1981: 54-55) 
observes that, among Akan civil servants in Ghana, their privileged position in society 
tends to re-orient expenditure away from the matri-kin group and towards the nuclear 
family, although very few actually completely sever their ties with wider family 
groups. Parkin (1972) describes how wealthier Giriama farmers are possessed by 
Muslim spirits forcing them to convert to Islam, but also allowing them to distance 
themselves from non-Muslim family members and to stop participating in expensive 
ceremonies involving the redistribution of large amounts of meat and alcohol, which 
allows them to concentrate their resources among the nuclear family. In Zambia, Long 
(1968) noted a similar tendency among those who became Jehovah’s Witnesses, once 
again allowing these groups to stop participating in communal ceremonies and focus 
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on the nuclear family unit. In Mozambique, connections with the Frelimo party and 
elite status seems to have taken the place of religious affiliation and the process 
appears more extensive than the Ghanian case, most likely due to its greater historical 
depth. While there are many deep interconnections between elites and the urban 
middle classes, many of these appear to be focused on the level of an individual, as 
will demonstrated throughout this chapter, and elite families are more socially closed. 
An example of this process is the family of Varyna. Her mother is currently in conflict 
with the much of her extended family, especially the members who are not as 
prosperous. Varyna’s mother argues that her nuclear family should not be responsible 
for supporting poorer members of the family as their resources should be concentrated 
on assuring the security and future prosperity of their own children. In her view she 
and her husband have risen to where they are through their own effort and she does 
not see why other members of her family cannot take responsibility and try to help 
themselves. She also banned her husband from supporting the poorer members of his 
side of the family, as they have not made good use of any previous support. While 
Varyna’s nuclear family maintains relatively amicable relationships with her father’s 
side, her mother’s side has been filled with mutual recriminations. 
 Although there is an increasing tendency for elite families to cut off poorer 
kin, this process is contested. One weapon that poorer kin have at their disposal is to 
cause public scandal through witchcraft accusations. The ethnography of Comaroff 
and Comaroff (1993, 1999) and Geschiere (1997) argue persuasively that the practise 
of witchcraft in contemporary Africa is an intensely modern phenomenon fuelled, in 
part by, the increasing social inequalities of capitalism. West (1997, 2001) 
demonstrated though his research in northern Mozambique that despite the “rational” 
basis of Frelimo’s modernist agenda, many Mozambicans feel that witchcraft (the 
“sorcery of destruction”) remains a potent force during both socialism and capitalism 
as changing living conditions result in greater conflict and jealousy while traditional 
sanctions have decreased. Many of my informants agree with West’s analysis, even if 
they disbelieve in the efficacy of sorcery. I often heard my informants express 
concern that jealous subordinates who coveted their positions at work would bewitch 
them.
83
 Not only is there a danger of being bewitched, but also being accused of 
witchcraft is also embarrassing. Going back to the example of Varyna’s family, after a 
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series of family tragedies, Varyna’s maternal aunt accused her father (who was living 
with Varyna’s mother) and Varyna’s mother of using sorcery to kill various family 
members in return for their wealth. This caused an open schism in the family between 
those who felt that both the accusations and witchcraft itself was completely 
unfounded and beyond the realm of believability and those who backed Varyna’s 
maternal aunt. There is almost no contact between the two sides and Varyna’s mother 
found the public scandal deeply embarrassing. In addition to the charge of murder, 
they found the idea of witchcraft upsetting. Although Comaroff and Comaroff and 
Geschiere have spoken about the modernity of witchcraft, many Mozambican elites 
view it as the epitome of backwardness. Not only was Varyna’s mother publicly 
accused of murdering family members, but she also viewed it as an ideological attack 
against the very modernity the elite is supposed to embody.  
While elites have been relatively successful (even if they face resistance) at 
consolidating themselves by linking their families and distancing themselves from 
poorer kin, the second strategy, the elite ideal of endogamy, is in practice extremely 
complex and often contradictory. As demonstrated by Oppong (1981) and Cohen 
(1981) post-colonial bureaucratic elites spent much time and attention trying to 
maintain endogamous relationships amongst themselves, although endogamy was 
never complete. There is a strong discourse of endogamy among the Mozambican 
elites as well, but this discourse is continually challenged by the social closeness of 
the elite and urban middle classes. This results in a confused situation where actions 
on the ground do not always resemble stated intentions. As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter there was a frequent complaint among young elite women that there was a 
lack of men in Maputo. After further observation it often seemed that it was not an 
absolute lack of men that was the problem, but a lack of “suitable” men. Class 
standing is a key factor in determining who is a suitable sexual partner, although there 
are differences between elite men and women and, despite the rhetoric of the 
importance of class, it is not always acted upon. Generally men are allowed more 
leverage in cross-class relationships with women, although marriage is often difficult 
for men as well. For many of the young elite men I knew, relationships with women 
of lower social standing were often more casual. In the case of serious liaisons, these 
cross group relationships, women of lower social standing often become “outside” 
wives. “Outside” wives may share their life with their partner and have children with 
them, but are often denied legal recognition. This will be discussed further later in the 
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chapter. Elite families can view cross-group relationships among women with more 
concern. There is the ever-present danger of a woman becoming pregnant, leading to 
the possibility of long-term ties between an elite family and a poorer one. 
 Even though cross-group relationships occur, they can result in confusion and 
inter-familial conflict. Theoretically romantic relationships should occur between the 
tightly-knit Mozambican national elite.
84
 Yet in many cases young elites had known 
each other since they were children, and as friends explained to me, this can create a 
sense of boredom. “You see it’s just so nice to see a new face, someone you have not 
known all your life”. While various ideas of being “modern” have encouraged 
changing ideas on romantic relationships, these processes have occurred in a climate 
of political instability. The end of the civil war and the fall of socialism have not 
dislodged the revolutionary elite from power, but have made their internal power base 
more vulnerable in some ways. Intermarriage remains a key factor in increasing social 
cohesion among the elite and concentrating resources within this small group, but 
these social networks are not impenetrable.  
 An example of these contradictory processes of exclusion and integration is 
Varyna, a young woman from the independence elite in her mid-20s. Towards the end 
of my fieldwork she formed a romantic relationship with a mulatto man from a 
middle-class background. He worked as a barman and had aspirations to become an 
artist. One day over coffee she mentioned to me that she was very nervous about 
introducing him to her parents, although she usually described her parents as very 
“modern” and liberal. When I asked why her parents might disapprove of her new 
relationship, Varyna said it was quite obvious. He had dreadlocks; he worked as a 
barman and he had never finished high school. She was worried as to what her parents 
would think and felt that they would be deeply disappointed in her. I was somewhat 
surprised; her father had been a soldier in a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary army. He 
had fought for equality. Varyna’s mother had also been a supporter of Frelimo during 
the liberation struggle. It seemed disconcerting that he could have become so class-
consciousness in such a short period of time. When I mentioned this Varyna simply 
looked bemused and replied: “He fought to develop this country; he did not fight for 
equality.” She explained that her parents’ experiences are what made them so class-
consciousness today.  
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They had to fight to get where they are today. They have worked really hard to make sure 
that their children have a nice life and a good education. They will not sit still and watch me 
take a step backwards for some guy with dreadlocks and no education, and worse still, no 
real plans to fix the situation. They would think he is not serious. I mean what kind of life 
would I have (Field notes 7-8 January 2004)? 
 
These class-based ideals were not simply imposed from above. Varyna had 
internalised them as well, although she was not directly acting upon them. She did 
finally introduce him to her parents, who, if uncomfortable about him, did their best 
not to show it. Varyna on the other hand continually pressured him to improve his 
life, cut his hair, and return to school. She wanted him to “make something” of 
himself and improve his social standing. In many ways Varyna was employing a dual 
strategy for trying to maintain the relationship she wanted while transforming her 
partner into someone more “suitable” at the same time. This strategy was not entirely 
successful and the relationship eventually ended badly and she left him. As with 
Varyna, many from the independence elite expressed concerns about jobs and the 
future prospects of their respective partners. Young women from the independence 
elite would often express reservations about a possible relationship if they felt that 
they would have to bear a disproportionate share of the economic burden. As I heard 
some friends explain to a woman who was involved with a poorer man and was 
expecting a baby: “Listen you have to understand that you will end up supporting him 
and the baby that is not going to change no matter what you think. Are you really 
willing to do that?” Despite their advice to others, it always seemed different when 
they themselves were involved. Many would try to employ a similar dual strategy to 
that of Varyna and form relationships outside of a restricted social circle while trying 
to transform their partner into someone they felt would be suitable for membership 
within this circle. Like Varyna’s case, these strategies often bore mixed results. As 
one woman from the independence elite told me after a failed relationship: “The 
differences in background and class were just too much”. She was deeply 
disappointed by his suspected infidelities and because their plans to secure for him 
foreign schooling and start various money making ventures had come to naught. Yet 
these differences do not form an airtight barrier, and the woman later resumed her 
relationship with the same man although his overall circumstances had not changed.  
 While elite men had a different set of gendered expectations, they often 
expressed similar concerns about cross-group relationships. Many, but by no means 
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all, of these relationships had an explicitly material basis, which did cause some men 
from the independence elite concern. Given that men were expected to provide 
generously for the women they were involved with, one common complaint was that 
women used them for their money and in pursuit of goals defined by the perceived 
material ethos of the current era.  
 I once accompanied a friend from the independence elite, João, to a nightclub 
one Friday evening. Towards the end of the evening he had been speaking with two 
women before we left and as we walked out of the club João seemed annoyed. He 
normally drove a large white Mercedes, but it was in the shop and his alternative 
vehicle was an old Toyota. According to João when the women he was talking to 
caught sight of the car he was using they lost interest and left. He began to complain 
to me about how women had become materialists who are only interested in how 
much money one has and about what one could provide. He said the only way to be 
sure that someone was not using one for their money was to form relationships with 
the wealthy and he was glad that his fiancé came from a wealthy family so he could 
be assured that her interest in him was “pure”.85  
The perceived greed of women was a common complaint amongst elite men, 
but some, especially elites who occupied the highest ranks, seemed to glory in the 
attention of “materialists” as it demonstrated their lofty social status. I was once 
introduced to the son of one of Mozambique’s highest-ranking officials at a disco. 
During the following conversation I noticed he was surrounded by a group of women 
whose attitude towards him was almost fawning, even though he barely paid them any 
attention. When I mentioned this, he just laughed and asked if I wanted one. While I 
doubt he was under any illusions as to the source of his attractiveness on this 
occasion, the possible materialism of his admirers did not seem to cause him much 
concern, at least not for the establishment of a casual relationship. If anything it his 
enhanced his already high social status by demonstrating that he did not have to worry 
about the motives of his admirers as his material base is so secure he can afford it. 
 Endogamy is a broadly agreed upon goal of class consolidation among elites, 
but in practise it is a confused and contradictory process. As demonstrated in the 
previous section, young elite women create social distinctions between elite and 
middle class men (often on extremely flimsy evidence), yet in their own personal 
                                                 
85
 Although as this chapter will later demonstrate, even this “pure” relationship was heavily determined 
by familial considerations and elite consolidation. 
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relationships they often try to erase these distinctions by “reforming” their partners. If 
these efforts failed, friends would frequently explain to me that one of the major 
problems of the relationship are differences in class standing and the “cultural” 
unsuitability that these differences created. Despite these warnings though, these 
relationships were not uncommon and those who failed in previous efforts would 
often try again. While young elite men shared similar concerns, their own strategies 
were very different. They generally had more leeway as there was less danger of the 
relationship becoming permanent and for some, these casual material based 
relationships served as a status marker. However, they expressed unease at the 
situation as well and felt that permanent relationships had a greater degree of “safety” 
among people of similar social standing, since these relationships tended to approach 
equality and there was less chance that they were being used. In the neo-liberal era in 
Mozambique, romantic intimacy has taken on paradoxical characteristics, as 
ideologies of elite endogamy have been internalised to a degree, yet that does not 
mean they will be acted upon. The remainder of this section will now discuss the 
strategies employed by women of the urban middle classes regarding romantic 
intimacy with the elite. 
 While ideally both middle class and elite families disapproved of romantic 
relationships that were based on a material basis, there was also a degree of 
ambivalence among many middle class families as romantic relationships were a 
recognised strategy of improving material circumstances. Naema, a middle class 
informant who been introduced earlier, frequently complained to me about the 
decreasing morals of the youth and she often singled young women out for increased 
promiscuity. Yet at the same time she understood that some moral relativity in regards 
to romantic intimacy was necessary for some, especially those with few other 
prospects. To illustrate her point she told me about her niece, Lara, an unmarried 27-
year-old woman with two children. Naema told me that while her niece was very 
pretty, she was not overly bright or well-educated and had few prospects of social or 
material advancement. Six years ago Lara was in a relationship with a wealthy man 
from the Indian merchant class in his late 40s who was rumoured to have mafia 
connections. He took care of all of Lara’s material needs. She did not work and he 
provided her with an apartment, food, clothing and spending money. Naema felt that 
her niece should marry this man and secure a decent life for herself and her children. 
Lara disagreed though; she did not like the amount of control her lover exercised over 
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her life and she wanted to be able to go to discos and associate with men her own age. 
The relationship later fell apart and currently Lara is involved with an older 
Portuguese man who once again takes care of all of her needs. As with the previous 
relationship, Lara does not want to marry this man and would rather go to discos and 
associate with men her own age. Naema is worried as her niece’s looks will 
eventually fade and then she will have limited prospects at best. I asked Naema if 
there were not strong similarities between this kind of relationship and prostitution, 
something to which Naema is very opposed. Naema replied that it is the same thing 
but then shrugged her shoulders and said: “ But what else can she do? You see a good 
house and security for one’s self and one’s children, that is all a woman really wants”. 
Lara’s strategy has not been uncommon throughout Africa. Women have frequently 
formed romantic relationships with higher status men for social and material 
advancement (Karanja 1987; Obbo 1987; Mann 1985). 
 In Mozambique these strategies are not purely restricted to lower status 
groups. Women from more privileged sectors of society also engage in relationships 
with a strong material component. Marta is a member of the independence elite, 
although her family does not belong to the highest ranks of the elite. I first met her at 
a party when she was preparing to leave for Portugal for university studies the next 
day. That evening she met Marcelino, the son of a very wealthy family with strong 
political connections. Although he had grown up abroad, his family had returned to 
Mozambique and his father had accepted a high-ranking government position. 
Marcelino now also worked in Maputo, in the financial sector. Although Marcelino 
and Marta met at this party the next day Marta decided that she was in love and 
decided not to undertake university studies in Portugal but to stay in Maputo with 
Marcelino. Most of my friends viewed her actions with disbelief. Although Marcelino 
was widely considered an advantageous match due to his family’s wealth and power 
many felt her strategy of social climbing was obvious. Furthermore she had not 
known Marcelino long and he had a strong reputation as a womaniser. Few thought 
her plan to become his wife or permanent companion would succeed. It was widely 
thought that she would have been better served by getting a degree, and then she 
could try to marry wealth. This way she would have something to fall back on if her 
plan failed.  
 While many elites try to “reform” partners when engaged in cross-group 
relationships, members of lower status groups are not without agency either. They too 
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try to utilise romantic connections to create a more secure social environment for 
themselves. Yet, as with many other differences between elites and the urban middle 
classes, the social strategies thought to be characteristic of one group are actually 
employed by members of both. The revolutionary elite has had some success in 
cutting family ties with members of the urban middle classes, but despite the ideology 
of endogamy there are still numerous cross cutting connections between these two 
groups. However these connections seem to be significant on an individual level and 
as of yet do not endanger the overall social structure, which gives elites their 
privileged position in society. The following section will examine how elite forms of 
marriage are instrumental in elite consolidation. However ideological models are once 
again often ambiguous in practise.   
 
6.5 Marriage 
 
 The customs surrounding marriage were one of the primary targets to be 
attacked by the incoming revolutionary government. The slogan abaixo com lobolo!, 
(down with lobolo) was chanted at rallies and polygamous men were denied party 
membership and viewed as “obscurantists” who refused to take the opportunity to 
enter the modern era with the new regime (Sheldon 2002: 117). The abolishment of 
these “backwards” customs coincided with the social background of the party 
leadership. Some members of the revolutionary elite came from various ethnic and 
racial backgrounds and they did not practise lobolo. Among those that did, many 
came from assimilado backgrounds and this group had long been under ideological 
pressure to abandon “African” cultural practises. There was also a sincere belief 
among many members of the revolutionary elite that customs like lobolo reduced 
women to the status of goods, something that the revolution was determined to change 
(Sheldon 2002: 133). Yet the revolutionary elite’s distaste for these practises did not 
mean that they necessarily supported individual choice in matters relating to romantic 
intimacy, as Giddens (1992) model of modernity tends to assume. The party took 
great care in intervening in the personal lives of militants and used martial alliances to 
build a wider “ideological” family. After the fall of socialism the subject of romantic 
attachments continues to be a great concern for elite families.  
This was especially evident in the connections between elite consolidation and 
marriage. During an interview with a former Frelimo MP, I asked if arranged 
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marriages ever occurred among elites. After thinking for a moment she replied: “Yes 
it does happen, especially among the top people.” She then listed four examples of 
arranged marriages that had taken place in extremely prominent families. She guessed 
that there are many more but said that she did not know the specifics. This was the 
typical response I encountered whenever I asked this question. Most of the people I 
talked to knew it happened, but due to the sensitive nature of the phenomenon 
(especially as the idea of arranged marriage was often thought to contradict the 
“cosmopolitan modernity” that elites embodied) I found it very difficult to collect 
much in the way of concrete, quantitative data. Yet the numerous stories I heard about 
arranged marriages does point to its importance to the processes of elite consolidation    
 Part of the difficulty in studying arranged marriages among the elite was that 
these types of marriages were conducted in a very informal, almost ad-hoc manner. 
As one informant explained to me: “It’s not like India or someplace like that where a 
matchmaker sets up two people when they are still babies. It’s much more casual 
here”. The following example of a young member of the independence elite who had 
just returned from studying in South Africa will demonstrate that, despite its casual 
nature, the underlying meaning was often very clear.  
 
It’s not like Cape Town here; you have to be careful who you talk to. If you are chatting 
to some girl and her family sees you they are going to start thinking about marriage. It 
goes like this. You are at some girl’s house and the father comes in and takes a seat. He 
will ask if you are still single. He will then say: “Our families have known each other for 
such a long time, why don’t you marry our daughter, it would be good. Why don’t you 
take my daughter out? Do you need some money? Here take this. Is it enough? Do you 
need more? Bring her back whenever, you are a good person and we trust you. Go out 
and have some fun.” It’s not very subtle (Field notes 1 February 2004). 
 
 Although interested families did not approach the parents of the prospective 
groom, but rather the prospective groom himself, my informant understood that his 
appeal was based not only on his own presumably bright future, but also on the fact 
that he comes from a wealthy and well-connected family. The idea of the match went 
beyond simply bringing together two young people, but for creating a stronger overall 
familial alliance as well. As with the Nigerian case described by Mann (1985) at the 
beginning of this chapter, intermarriage drew an already existing elite ever closer 
together, binding shared interests with kin ties. The following example demonstrates 
this even more clearly. It comes from a young woman from the independence elite, 
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who described the reason for arranged marriages among the elite to me in the 
following terms. 
 
The thing that you have to understand is that Mozambique is different from Europe, or 
even other African countries, with natural resources like Angola. You see the rich here 
have money now, but it will not last, not for generations like other countries. At the end 
of the day it’s politics that ensures money, not the other way around like other places. 
Our parents fought very hard to get us where we are and they want to make sure we keep 
this standard of living. That is why they pay so much to send us to good schools. My 
father is always going on about how we must use the benefits we have been given 
because he will not always be around to help us. He has some money now, but when he 
dies all my sister and I will inherit is some property. They earn money from this property 
now due to the rent but after they are gone we will probably have to sell it to pay the 
debts 
 
It’s different for many people though. In a lot of families the parents have really suffered 
and they want their kids to have a good life. They are pretty indulgent and give their kids 
everything, but the money will not last. Look around, the businesses that people have 
started fail and shady deals only work for so long. There is nothing to fall back on. See 
that’s the thing. Life here, for the rich, does not teach people to work. It teaches people to 
be dependent on someone and money always comes from somewhere else. That is why 
marriages are arranged. My parents would not do that. They know that my sister and I 
would not stand for it, and they are more modern than that anyway. But there are many 
ways to arrange a marriage. It does not happen here like the movies, when two kids are 
paired up when they are babies. Many times it is just the family exerting pressure to 
marry the “right person”. See when families combine there is more security for the 
future; they combine their money as well. It’s part of the attitude that has grown up here. 
People always look for someone to provide for them. It’s a kind of dependence and that is 
how people maintain their standard of living (Field notes 7-8 January 2004). 
 
 Although she is speaking directly about the consolidation of the elite, in many 
ways the strategies she describes parallel those employed by the women from the 
urban middle classes in the last section. One of the reasons for this seems to be that 
despite the fact that the elite monopolise the dominant position in society, in many 
ways they are dealing with other social groups from a position of relative weakness. 
As of the time of field work the revolutionary elite had not managed to amass 
sufficient resources to ensure long-term elite status independently of political power. 
One strategy for dealing with this is to combine with other elite families to increase 
both material resources and the ever-important political connections that elite families 
have developed over time. Once again many elites in Mozambique have developed a 
resemblance to the national bourgeois described in the introduction where political 
access is one of the key factors in amassing material resources.  Yet, despite the focus 
on elite consolidation, the lives of elites are so closely intertwined with that of the 
urban middle classes that social distance is difficult to maintain. As the following 
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section will demonstrate, the interconnection of the elite and the urban middle classes 
occurs amongst both the revolutionary and independence elites. 
 Official marriages among elites tend towards endogamy, but the goal of 
consolidating resources is often problematic, especially due to the prevalence of 
adultery. Karanja (1987) observed that although “western” monogamous marriages 
have become characteristic of the Nigerian elite publicly, many elite men often, 
discretely, marry further women through traditional ceremonies, the so-called 
“outside” wives. This trend has also been observed among elites in east Africa (Obbo 
1987) and colonial Nigeria (Mann 1985). Male members of the revolutionary elite do 
not seem to be taking additional wives through traditional ceremonies, but adulterous 
unions and “second” families of semi-official standing are not uncommon. While 
“second” families usually lack legal recognition, these unions are often public 
knowledge. Adultery is often widely condemned, but many women, especially among 
the revolutionary elite, tend to blame the other woman more than their husbands; it 
was uncontrolled female sexuality that was seen as the danger to the stability of elite 
unions. The social sanctions that existed were often directed towards these women 
and their children.  
 Women from the independence elite tend to take a slightly more even-handed 
approach. Halima, a young elite woman in her 20s comes from a wealthy 
Mozambican/Indian family with political connections. Her parents have lived apart 
for many years although they are still officially married. Her father had an affair that 
resulted in pregnancy and the marriage fell apart. Halima’s father and mother come 
from families that have been intermarrying for generations and an official divorce 
would be very difficult. Although Halima’s father lives with his companion and their 
child, he still acts as the official head of the first marital unit. He presides over family 
dinners and ceremonies, he pays for the upkeep of his first wife, they appear at all 
family functions together (even though their actual circumstances are well-known 
among the extended family) and they even continue to go on holidays together. 
Halima’s mother has never re-married and still desires to rebuild her relationship with 
her estranged husband. Halima herself blames both parents (although she continues to 
live with her mother and works with her father with whom she is very close). She 
blames her father for having an affair and although he has lived with his companion 
for years, Halima has never met her or her half-brother, both because her father is not 
anxious to bring his official and unofficial families into contact and because she has 
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no desire to contact them. The extended family is also firm in their desire to maintain 
elite endogamy and they refuse to acknowledge the second family’s existence. Halima 
also blames her mother for acquiescing to the situation and not officially leaving her 
father and she feels that her mother should put more pressure on her father. 
 While there are differences between generational attitudes of female elites 
towards adultery, the general consensus seems to accept a certain amount of adultery. 
As one young informant mentioned when she found that her partner was having 
affairs during her pregnancy: “Face it, it is something all men do, there is nothing that 
can be done about it”. Sometimes this attitude appears as amused indulgence, as 
Halima once told me: “Our men are just naughty. You know they are like little 
children”. This tacit acceptance is conditional though; men can engage in affairs as 
long as the official family is not endangered. Although second families may divert 
resources from the marital unit, they rarely have legal recognition and their economic 
survival depends, to a degree, on the whim of the man. I posit that this is one of the 
reasons behind the double standard for female adultery, which is viewed much more 
negatively and results in far stronger social sanctions. When women had outside 
liaisons there was always the chance of a resulting pregnancy. Unlike the “second 
families” of men that only disrupted elite social patterns on an individual level, 
meaning that the “outside” wives and children of such a union could always be 
discretely ignored, with women the child is a concrete symbol and is far more likely 
to cause an open breach and endanger the family. Although it doubtlessly occurs, 
women must be far more discrete because if the affair becomes open knowledge there 
is much more pressure on the husband to react.  
 These rules are not absolute and elite families can assert pressure to keep a 
couple together. One of my friends, João was engaged to a young woman named 
Tara. Both came from elite families and the marriage would be a good match of 
wealth and political connections. Although João had engaged in multiple affairs 
during the engagement (Tara was studying abroad) when he found out that Tara also 
had an outside relationship he broke off the engagement. The respective families 
refused to accept this decision and eventually pressured João and Tara to renew their 
engagement. Despite this, the danger of an open breach was far greater when João felt 
betrayed and the relative youth of the couple made them more susceptible to familial 
pressure.  
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While some elite marriages result in unhappy stories of material and emotional 
betrayal, many women still feel that marriage is the best way to ensure security 
(regardless of increased education), entrance into the workforce and the goal of the 
revolution to turn women into free and independent citizens. Once, while at a café 
with João, Tara and two of Tara’s friends, I was surprised to hear Tara began to 
complain bitterly about men delaying marriage, a complaint her two friends evidently 
appreciated. This was a pointed remark as João had mentioned delaying their 
upcoming marriage for another five years. I was curious at Tara’s insistence and what 
the hurry was considering she was only 21 years old. Tara and her friends replied that 
as a man I would not understand. She said that men have the luxury of time and can 
wait to marry until their 30s or 40s and still start a family; women on the other-hand 
face severe difficulty if they wait past their mid-20s. While Frelimo had wanted to 
free women by reforming gender relations and destroying the “feudalism” of the 
family, close to 30 years after the revolution, marriage and family remain key sites of 
power, even among those who were once committed to act as the midwives of the 
new society.    
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
 One of the goals of the revolution was to free women from the “feudalism” of 
family and to allow them to enter society as full, free individuals. This was seen as an 
essential step in the wider modernisation of society and its effects are still pointed to 
with pride by otherwise disillusioned Frelimo militants. Yet the form of modernity 
espoused by the revolutionary elite was very different than that envisioned by western 
theorists such as Giddens (1992). For Giddens, modernity in the case of romantic 
relationships results in sexuality is being divorced from conjugality and kinship being 
replaced by drive for personal fulfilment and serial monogamy. In Mozambique 
something different has occurred. Modernity in this case, with its nationalist roots and 
socialist outlook, was not necessarily about increased individual freedom or even 
personal fulfilment per se, but about a mass effort to transform society. There have 
been many changes since the fall of socialism, and the rights of the individual are now 
publicly trumpeted; but there are still wider considerations than personal happiness 
alone. While the revolutionary elite have managed to maintain their dominant position 
in the current capitalist era, the political environment remains precarious. The 
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management of kinship relations and romantic intimacy are crucial for the 
revolutionary elite to ensure the social reproduction of their status for future 
generations. 
 Yet the social closeness between the revolutionary and independence elites 
and the urban middle classes result in porous borders that are difficult to police. The 
trend for elite endogamy notwithstanding, frequent attachments occur across class 
lines. Men from both the independence and revolutionary elites form “secondary” 
families with “outside” wives and women often try and “reform” their partners and 
bring them closer to elite standards of behaviour. Yet these breeches in the walls of 
elite endogamy do not necessarily result in an overall weakening in the system of 
social stratification. Exceptions tend to take place on an individual level, which does 
not overtly challenge the dominant social position of elites.   
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 Chapter Seven 
 
Conclusion 
 
7.1 Remaining Questions 
 
 This thesis explored the social, economic, ideological and political processes 
that have accompanied the formation and growth of a set of interrelated Mozambican 
elites from the colonial period to the present day. Through my work I argue that a 
changing ideology of modernity has allowed these elites to attempt to legitimise their 
dominant social status, access positions of power and try to ensure the social 
reproduction of status for future generations. The conclusion of this thesis seeks to 
address some remaining questions and locate this particular research in the broader 
realms of anthropological inquiry. First I shall examine how my investigation was 
carried out and critically assess its strengths and limitations. I will then briefly 
describe three ways in which I think my research sheds light on wider questions 
concerning social power and transformation outside of a strictly Mozambican context. 
Finally, I will discuss how the issues examined in this thesis develop questions for 
further research.  
 
7.2 Strengths and Limitations 
 
 In the introduction of this thesis I argue that ethnography has a vital role in the 
understanding of elites and that it is not enough to simply “map” out the various 
positions that members of powerful groups hold, but rather to investigate how these 
positions are understood both by those who hold them and the wider society (Hansen 
and Parrish 1983: 261). With this kind of investigation one can then attempt to grasp 
why structures of power take the shape that they do and what their actual role in 
society is (Marcus 1983a, 1983b). One of the primary ways in which I tried not only 
to follow these observations, but also to enhance them was to add historical depth to 
my ethnographic investigation. Due to both theoretical interest and more prosaic and 
pragmatic concerns (such as access), members of the independence elite were among 
the major sources for much of my ethnography. This being said, it would be 
impossible to understand their current social role without a wider examination of the 
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historical circumstances that helped to both create their place in society and influence 
how they conceive it. To take this into account, I framed my investigation by 
examining elites across three generations. In so doing, I was able to not only chart the 
historical formation of this elite from the late colonial period to the present day, but 
also to analyse both the transformations of elite formation through time and some of 
its continuities. Participant observation was crucial for gathering information 
concerning members of the independence elite and it also shed light on aspects of 
intergenerational relationships among Mozambican elites. Life histories though were 
central to my efforts to understand these processes historically. Not only could they 
help me reconstruct aspects of the past (if usually from the vantage point of the 
present), but they were also ideal for trying to understand what my informants viewed 
as transformations and continuities of elite formation. My collection of life histories 
was supplemented by archival data, in the form of biographies, newspaper articles and 
various other works concerning the Mozambican elite. In this case I was extremely 
fortunate to work with a group of people who are not only highly literate, but whose 
activities have been well-documented, both by themselves and by others. 
 If engaging in a historical investigation of helped, in my opinion, to strengthen 
my analysis of Mozambican elites, this does not mean that my research does not 
suffer from very real limitations. As alluded to earlier in this section, access was a 
perennial problem. I may have had some advantages in gaining access to my 
informants due to relationships that pre-dated my research, yet there were parts of my 
Mozambican friends’ lives that were closed to me in many ways. For example, I was 
not able to gain much access to aspects of my informants’ public lives, such as their 
work. Given the type of research I conducted, I was also hesitant to collect certain 
kinds of quantitative data and my ability to access this forms of information was in 
many ways limited. Yet information of this nature would have been very valuable to 
paint a more detailed picture of certain kinds of the economic practices that have 
resulted from the transition to a more neo-liberal economy. In future research projects 
though, I will endeavour to include more of this type of data.  
 I did attempt to document the changing relationships between the elites and 
members of the urban middle classes, and present them from the point of view of both 
groups. Unfortunately, I was not able to do this with many poor urbanites or members 
of the peasantry. While this information would have been a welcome addition to my 
research, soon into my fieldwork I realised that it would be very difficult to gather, 
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and it would not be practical, at least for an inexperienced researcher. Therefore, 
outside some of the literature I have cited, depictions of the “poor” or “peasants” in 
my thesis are described from the point of view of the members of the elite or urban 
middle classes. The resulting “conceptual gap” in my analysis creates interesting 
opportunities for further study. 
 Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, research amongst members of an 
elite, or set of elites, forced me to encounter a particular set of ethical dilemmas. 
Working with a relatively small number of generally well-educated, bi-lingual and 
socially visible informants can pose serious difficulties. Despite all my well-
intentioned attempts to disguise the identities of my Mozambican friends, there is 
always a danger that these pseudonyms would not withstand a sustained and careful 
scrutiny by an interested Mozambican who is familiar with Maputo. Throughout the 
thesis I have diligently tried to maintain my informants’ anonymity and I will 
redouble these efforts for future publications. In addition, as mentioned earlier in the 
thesis, my analysis does not always coincide with the self-representations of my 
informants. This is important because I do not want to cause unintentional harm or 
embarrassment. In addition many of my informants were personal friends and it could 
be possibly damaging to myself and to prospective future researchers if my friends 
felt that they were “used” or misinterpreted. All of the ethical issues I have mentioned 
so far tend to fall into the grey areas of traditional anthropological guidelines and 
ways of dealing with them is more of an evolving process then a strict set of rules. So 
far conversations with Mozambican friends about the findings of my research have 
generally elicited broad, if not always enthusiastic, agreement, yet future implications 
(if any), remains to be seen. 
 
7.3 Wider Significance 
 
 The previous section discussed some methodological aspects that helped to 
shape this study and a few of the very real limitations of my thesis. In this section I 
will now focus on ways in which I feel my work might to speak to a broader audience 
outside Mozambican specialists. While my research is grounded in the Mozambican 
context and some of the nation’s social and historical particularities do not necessary 
translate well to the outside world, there are three main aspects of my examination 
that I feel could help inform wider debates.  
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 The first of these is my focus on elites. While studies of power and domination 
are increasingly frequent in anthropology generally, they tend to focus primarily on 
those who do not have much in the way overt power. Perhaps this is why 
anthropologists in last 20 years have produced numerous, and frequently very 
valuable, studies of types resistance, yet have comparatively less to say as to how the 
regimes and power structures that are resisted so fiercely manage to stay in place. I 
have personally witnessed a worrying tendency where some researchers produce only 
the broadest generalisations of powerful groups and subject them to relatively little 
rigorous analysis. Many of these same researchers would be furious if similar 
generalisations were published about the poor. Throughout this thesis I have tried to 
demonstrate the manner in which the interests, social structures and ideologies of 
Mozambique have been crucial in shaping the post-independence nation. In many 
ways the idea of a sovereign and unified nation of Mozambique is the result of a 
“dream” of the Mozambican elites (Bertelsen 2004; Finnegan 1992). I do not mean to 
deny the agency of other sectors of the population; this has been vitally important and 
in fact posed significant and in some cases virtually unanswerable challenges to 
aspects of the elites’ nationalist vision. Both Chapters Two and Three trace the 
collapse and transformations of the dreams of nation held by elites. While agency and 
resistance must be taken into account, more attention needs to be focused on trying to 
understand both the ways in which, and the limits to, the abilities of elites to “set the 
stage” for the formation of social relationships and possible sites of social conflict. 
This being the case, I feel we must heed the challenge set by Shore (2002) to study the 
powerful with the same interest as we study the relatively powerless in order to 
develop a more nuanced understanding of the relationships’ of social power in 
Mozambique, Africa and the world more generally. 
 The second aspect of this study that may have broader implications is its focus 
on the ideologies of modernity. Following the insights of Cooper (2005) who noted a 
distinct ambiguity in academic discourse concerning modernity, as it used as both a 
condition and an analytic devise and building on the work of Ferguson (2006), I have 
tried to understand modernity as a “native” category. In Chapters Two and Three I 
traced the social evolution, beginning with a particular set of “modernising” elites. In 
the colonial period this group tended to see themselves as the “civilised” or modern 
section of Mozambican society due to their comparatively high levels of education 
and close association with the colonial power. They were primarily urbanised, 
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forming a section of the colonial society’s petty bourgeoisie. Due to these social 
experiences and the particular historical factors surrounding southern Mozambique’s 
incorporation into the colonial state, this group had relatively weak links to 
“traditional power structures” and often harboured contempt for what they saw as the 
“backwardness” of the majority African population. Although the colonial elite had, 
in many ways, distanced themselves from the majority of the population due to the 
colour of their skin, they were also denied full entrance into colonial society as 
equals; and many members of the colonial elite became progressively alienated from 
the state. 
 The revolutionary elite, although coming from this social background, had 
developed very different ideas about the wider society. Although many came from 
assimilado backgrounds, this was often a source of shame, as assimilados were seen 
as complicit with not only their own oppression, but also that of the wider population. 
As I argue in Chapter Three, the idea of “nationalist modernity” deeply influenced the 
revolutionary elite and was seen as a universal and hierarchical goal upon which to 
build a nation that could “catch up” to the nations of the west (cf. Donham 1999).  
This concept differed significantly from colonial modernity in that the goal was no 
longer to modernise a small elite, but to bring the modernity of a small elite to the 
nation as a whole though mass mobilisation and heroic effort. Additionally the ideal 
of nationalist modernity differed from previous concepts of assimilação not so much 
in its actual conception but through the depth and breadth of its ambition. After the 
chaos and destruction of the civil war and near economic and social collapse, many 
aspects of nationalist modernity have fallen out of favour with many members of the 
ruling revolutionary elite. Yet some of the underlying conceptions that informed 
nationalist modernity live on, although in an altered form. The form of modernity 
embodied by independence elites is more personal and technocratic. Instead of acting 
as a symbol of the glorious future all would soon share, modernity has become more 
of a distinctive feature of the ruling elite, symbolising their ability to occupy the 
highest-ranks of society. It is transmitted to the rising generation of independence 
elites through exclusive schooling, often abroad, and in forms of consumption 
unavailable to much of the population. However a form of modernity is still central to 
their social position. 
 While I have been speaking above about a specifically Mozambican set of 
circumstances, this discussion of modernity does have wider applications. It is 
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important to understand modernity as a “native” category, but it is equally important 
to investigate the social circumstances that give rise to these kinds of ideas of 
modernity and here we can see many similarities. From the “Marxist” moderns of 
Russia and China described by Donham (1999) to the secularist and “westernised” 
nationalist vision of Kemal Ataturk, the idea of modernity as a linear progression 
where some nation’s rank ahead and others fell behind has driven many groups of 
nationalist elites. Yet this idea was not limited to elites alone. As Ferguson (2002, 
2006) so aptly, demonstrates while “modernisation” theory may be academically 
discredited, it still embodies the hopes of millions around the world. Returning to the 
earlier discussion of developing a fuller understanding of social power, we must also 
be able to understand how our informants conceive of modernity and how this 
conception helps to legitimise certain power relationships and contest others. 
 The final point in which I feel my research can inform broader debates deals 
with neo-liberalism and its associated effects on practices such as corruption and 
legitimacy. Although I recognise the powerful impact of neo-liberalism on economic, 
political and social relationships, I do not mean to argue that it creates a “blank slate”. 
As shown in Chapter Four, while neo-liberalism has caused definite changes in elites’ 
(and also segments of the wider populations’) understandings of race, these ideas are 
rooted in an older construct that originated in the colonial period and was transformed 
during socialism. There are further similarities as well. To once again cite West’s 
observation, there is a strong yet often unspoken resemblance with the dogmatism and 
messianic ambition of neo-liberalism and the previous socialism it supplanted (1997: 
676). Still, the adoption of the “democratic” neo-liberal model has brought about 
dramatic transformations.  
In Chapter Five I argue that while the stated purpose of the introduction of 
democratic and capitalist reforms was to wrest power from the state and involve the 
“people” in the economic and decision-making process, often the opposite has 
occurred. The fact that the political opposition is disorganised and in many cases fails 
to present itself as a viable alternative allows Frelimo to prevail in elections even as 
their legitimacy is threatened by rising inequality and the perception that they are 
increasingly tolerant of corruption. This creates a potentially dangerous situation as a 
ruling elite can secure itself both power and wealth with strong international 
legitimacy while important segments of the population become ever more alienated 
and embittered. As stated earlier, the effects of neo-liberal transformation are not 
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limited strictly to the political sphere and Chapter Six examines the changes and 
continuities of elite consolidation in regards to marriage and family. 
The goal of my research in this area is to move beyond a common trap that 
occurs when analysts focus on neo-liberalism and associated reforms such as 
democratisation and structural adjustment. In many cases the reality of the situation is 
submerged by a normative discussion; i.e. what should or should not happen is good 
or bad. I am not denying the moral implications of neo-liberalism, nor do I feel a 
researcher should avoid take a normative position; it is often almost impossible not to. 
The problem is that the focus can rest on an ideal type and its intended consequences. 
What I have tried to do in this study is to examine some of the actual consequences of 
the introduction of neo-liberalism and describe their social impact. 
 
7.4 Future Research 
 
  The conclusions of my thesis in regards to the formation of an interrelated set 
of elites and their changing ideology of modernity, which has created a sense of 
internal legitimacy and social cohesion, raise new possible avenues of research. I 
focused on a “national elite” based in the capital. To develop a fuller picture of the 
transformations of social power in Mozambique since independence, further research 
should be done on other groups of elites in Mozambique. Possible candidates for this 
further could include regional Frelimo cadres or people with a weaker relationship to 
the national elites, such as Indian merchants. This could help describe how the 
ideologies of colonial, revolutionary and independence elites were understood, acted 
upon or rejected by relatively powerful members of the wider society and how this too 
has been transformed through time. In addition, by examining these groups within the 
neo-liberal context, one can better understand what kinds of transformations the 
introduction of capitalism has brought to areas outside the municipal limits of 
Maputo.   
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